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dais. But then again, a yearbook should represent many voices, and seventy-five years is a long time.

Consensus and Dissent may have no direct "impact on the teaching lives" of its readers in the sense of providing practical techniques for implementation. This is not how it is intended, though. NCTE offers here a broad approach to the English classroom, and, by implication at least, this approach should make an impact on the profession. This book may appeal to specialists, generalists, and beginners, and it may be especially valuable to curriculum leaders reviewing their programs in light of recent research claims while forging consensus and managing dissent locally.

The role of English in American education is a jigsaw puzzle being filled in at schools, colleges, libraries, and conferences in various ways. With Consensus and Dissent, NCTE continues at its seventy-five year mark to help us put the pieces together.


Reviewed by Theresa Enos, University of Arizona

In this extension of his 1984 monograph, Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges, James Berlin traces our century's rhetorical lineage by classifying writing instruction into epistemological theories. His terms for these theoretical strands—objective, subjective, transactional—seem analogous to the elements of the communications triangle—subject, writer, audience. Just as we must consider all three elements to achieve a balanced rhetorical stance in our discourse, so we must bring epistemological strands together to achieve a completeness in the theories underlying our teaching. This inclusive rhetoric is epistemic rhetoric, the communications triangle transformed into a sort of double helix made up of "superior" strands from objective, subjective, and transactional theories, self-contained within the matrix of language.

Berlin begins forming his rhetorical double helix by tracing and building a taxonomy of objective, subjective, and transactional epistemological approaches in education, first surveying nineteenth-century writing instruction, next covering 1900 to 1960 in twenty-year blocks, then discussing major rhetorical approaches between 1960 and 1975, and last exploring current practices.

Objective theories locate the real in the material world. Analogous to the "subject" element of the communications triangle, "objective" theories subsume writer and audience under an objective or referential presentation of the subject. First, Berlin traces current-traditional writing instruction, based on Scottish Common Sense Realism and its emphasis not only on correctness but on the inductive process of drawing inferences from data. Current-traditional rhetoric in this century was first appropriated by Harvard; built into its curriculum was a requirement for training students to develop their writing skills by formalistic, drill-for-skill exercises and short modes-of-discourse themes. Supposedly, this approach implanted in students good language habits. By 1940, nearly all college writing programs were following Harvard's current-traditional approach, a positivist epistemology based on a teacher-centered pedagogy. (The course was built upon lectures, handbooks, and, later, the research paper.)

Berlin also traces other objective theories, showing how a similar epistemology underlies all of them: (1) The behaviorist theory, and its empirical focus which led to a distinction between product and process and valorization of the authentic voice (some will want to argue with Berlin's "authentic voice" lineage); (2) the semanticist theory, and its message that language does not discover medium but is a medium of communication; and (3) the linguistic theory, and its focus on the structure of language as the course
content. Like this latter attempt to make the writing course a content course, the "ideas approach" (1900-1920) attempted to form a content course by focusing on legal, political, and social questions. Models, imitation, and response in argumentative rather than expository discourse provided the methodology. Growing out of general semantics came the course in communications (1940-1960), a combining of liberal arts and the social sciences; instructional scope broadened as reading, speaking, and listening were joined with writing.

Subjective theories, analogous to the "writer" element of the communications triangle, locate reality in the individual. The first of the subjective theories that Berlin traces is one Yale developed in opposition to Harvard's meritocratic approach. Romantic, organic, expressive, literature-oriented, and aimed at the "gifted," the "rhetoric of liberal culture" was Yale's subjective epistemology for aristocrats who were being prepared to be individualists, who would go on to create art. Out of this bellettristic approach came another strand of elitist rhetoric which had Plato and Emerson as its precedents and Freudian psychology as one of its major approaches. From this strand, influenced by cognitive psychology and psychologists like Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow (and certain interpretations of Romanticism), came an emphasis on invention. The individual, through the private act of writing, discovers truth. A creative and authentic voice in writing thus cannot be taught, even though students can learn how to write.

From this climate provided by philosophical idealism came the expressionistic rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s. Expressionistic rhetoric sees truth as a web of shifting complexities that emerge in the act of writing, not as a lump already formed and waiting in the mind to be found. This Platonic, Romantic view of writing valorizes self-discovery. Writing-as-discovery classroom strategies draw on meditation and journals that lead students through the steps of prewriting, writing, and rewriting.

Transactional rhetoric, analogous to the "audience" element of the communications triangle, locates truth in the interaction of the elements of the rhetorical situation; reality is the product of both the observer and the observed. Berlin skillfully traces the hard-to-define philosophy of progressive education, including John Dewey's ideas on educational reform. From some of these ideas on progressive education came transactional rhetoric, where individual development and a world view move outward to various societal groups and their world views. Berlin places classical rhetoric, cognitive approaches, and epistemic rhetoric in this category.

Berlin demonstrates how classical rhetoric, revived in the late 1950s, pulled together several of the strands he has already traced. Through rhetoric, both a substantive art and a methodology, writers discover rather than present knowledge. Tracing rhetoric's revival from 1960 to 1975, Berlin also shows (more implicitly than explicitly) how classical rhetoric began to be reduced almost as soon as it was rediscovered. The classical rhetoric that has become part of our writing instruction emphasizes rationality, not the true Aristotelian relationships among writer, work, audience, or ethos, logos, pathos.

From cognitive psychology comes our relatively recent attention to heuristics. Significantly, Berlin argues that cognitive theories are transactional because they focus not only on the individual but also on the social context of language. During composing processes the mind moves outward to audience and linguistic structures. In the writing process, the writer reflects or re-creates stages the mind passes through.

But it is epistemic rhetoric that Berlin is moving toward in an attempt to pull together these strands of writing instruction in the 1980s. Epistemic rhetoric views reality as a social construction; thus, the way we use language reflects the interaction between the referential and our perception of the external world. Such a transactional relationship rejects the subjective and objective approaches as separate views of reality. (Berlin leans toward putting the expressionistic approach into epistemic rhetoric, but explains that its proponents' view of truth arising only from oneself prevents him from the inclusion.) Thought and language are one. "Rhetoric exists not merely so that truth may be communicated: rhetoric [also] exists so that truth may be discovered" (165). Epistemic rhetoric, thus, acknowledges the philosophical basis of rhetoric that allows us to transmit knowledge as well as generate it.
Language is the key to understanding the discovery of knowledge and must always be present, for "interlocutor, audience, and material world are all regarded as verbal constructs" (16). It is only epistemic rhetoric, Berlin argues, that rivals Aristotelian rhetoric in its comprehensiveness.

Is epistemic rhetoric the "new" rhetoric we've long been awaiting? By tracing the different theories that underlie the teaching of writing in our colleges and showing how the "best" of objective, subjective, and transactional rhetorics have coalesced into an epistemic rhetoric, Berlin provides an important history lesson about why we teach as we do. Other historians of rhetoric and composition studies will not, of course, agree with all of Berlin's connections and interpretations of our history.

But because writing, as Berlin argues, "is at the heart of education, one of its most liberating and humanizing agencies" (127), a significant value of *Rhetoric and Reality* is that it will surely generate even more rich areas of research that need to be articulated. Giving us a sense of who we are, where we are, and how we got here, Berlin has indeed fulfilled his purpose in writing this monograph: "Study of the dynamics of change in writing classes during the present century will serve as a guide in charting the course of composition instruction in the future" (5). We are the agents of change. What, then, do we want this future to be?

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Reviewed by Chris Rideout, University of Puget Sound

With much attention being given to critical thinking these days, it is fitting that writing teachers take a new look at argumentation. Annette Rottenberg is quick to make this point in the second edition of her textbook, *Elements of Argument*, in which she approaches argumentation with the same rethinking of traditional formal methods that characterizes the critical thinking movement in philosophy.

Rottenberg uses Stephen Toulmin's model of argument, adapted, as she notes, from his *The Uses of Argument* (1958). In her structure, Toulmin's *claim, evidence, and warrant* are presented as *claim, support, and warrant*. But since originally presenting his model, Toulmin has modified it. Although Rottenberg does not acknowledge these modifications, I found some evidence of them in her textbook. For example, in the chapter on warrants, she discusses the need to evaluate warrants; this discussion seems to reflect Toulmin's concept of *backing*, which underlies warrants. Rottenberg does warn her reader that her model of argumentation is a simplified version of Toulmin's, and so she is probably not to be faulted for presenting a less thorough model.

On the other hand, Toulmin's model is biased toward logical appeals to readers. Rottenberg mentions this bias and, in consequence, adds to her model two components that are important for writing teachers—especially those influenced by the New Rhetoric. First, she incorporates what she calls a "motivational appeal," which she describes as a warrant "based on appeals to the needs and values of an audience, designed to evoke an emotional response." She explains that the motivational appeal allows a writer to make what would conventionally be called an appeal to emotion but without abandoning a rational framework for persuasion. Second, Rottenberg uses an "audience-centered" approach to argument. Throughout the book, she reminds students of the need