Just Choose:
Derivative Literacy as Economic Education

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Like the rest of us, students are used to surveys, and I have an exercise that looks like a survey that I've been using for quite awhile with my honors classes, undergraduate theory classes, and first-year writing classes. The way it works is simple. I hand out a sheet with maybe thirty-five or forty items on it, and the instructions are that students choose a response for each one on a range from strongly like or strongly agree to strongly dislike or strongly disagree, or, finally, indifferent or don't know anything about it. And I encourage them to explain some of the reasons for their choices. I try to list everything in what seems a random order. Most of the items are things like clothing stores, music and musical groups, toothpaste brands, blog sites, TV shows, movies, ISPs, and so on. But I also add some very different items as well, such as fascism, capitalism, The Market, racism, stereotypes, communism. And I always try to include a few semi-technical terms that occasionally appear in the media, like braneworld theory, stock derivatives, or computational biology. So the list students see looks like a randomly jumbled up bunch of stuff. You might go from Lip Fusion XL to capitalism, T.I., satellite radio, Garrys Island, computational biology, Crest whitening strips, American Idol, organic orange juice, Hot Topic, emogirl21, Green Day, and on through the list. Again, everyone chooses on a scale from strongly like or strongly agree to strongly dislike or strongly disagree, or indifferent or don't know anything about it. After the exercise, we add up all the scores for everything and discuss the results.

I change the terms around often from year to year so that some are at least reasonably up to date and some aren't. I wouldn't want to make any empirical or ethnographic claims for the results in any case, though I'm sure most could guess that with music, TV shows, clothing stores, and so on, choices typically are all over the place. Likewise, I'm sure it's not surprising to hear that there are some constants. Fascism, for example, is usually a big negative, though I did have one student once who registered a very positive response. In the class discussion afterwards, however, it turned out he thought fascism was the name of a company who made really high quality index shifters for bicycles—like Shimano shifters, only a lot better. But nobody in any class has ever explained that "yep, racism is a great thing." Or said, "Yes, strongly agree, I believe we should all treat each person we meet on the basis of whatever stereotype seems like it might fit." Nobody would want an ad that promised conformity if you use the product. And nobody yet has known what derivatives are. A great many of my students have worked for McDonalds at some point, and reportedly McDonalds financed their Japanese opening almost entirely with derivatives. The use of derivatives is now making a big comeback after the spectacular ups and downs of the 1990s. But at least on my little exercises, derivatives go right up there with racism and stereotypes in the one-hundred percent club.

I'll come back again to some of the typical results of my classroom exercise, but before going any further I should confess immediately that when I started assigning these student exercises I had to spend considerable time trying to get an idea of just how derivatives work. Thinking across cultural studies in the very broad sense that Michael Denning describes in *Culture in the Age of Three Worlds*, as simultaneously a new name for and a critique of "the humanities," Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in *Multitude* supply one of the rare mentions of derivatives. With respect to the last few decades they note: "There has been an enormous expansion, in particular, of the role of derivatives, that is, financial instruments whose value derives from the price of an asset, such as a commodity or a currency" (280). I still appreciate even the very
brief explanatory "that is" in the Hardt and Negri passage, and of course I would have felt obligated to include one here except that I passed off the responsibility to them instead. The folks at the National Council on Economic Education, however, would likely be much more surprised at my innocence in assuming some degree of economic knowledge than by my confession about derivatives or by my students' lack of recognition. They've been on a crusade for some time to lift us out of our economic illiteracy in the U.S., because they're convinced that most of us get it wrong most of the time with respect to almost anything that has to do with economics.

On the "Who We Are" section of their website, they explain: "Since 1949, NCEE has built a unique Network of state Councils and university-based Centers to position our organization as the definitive resource for teachers who share our conviction that practical economics must become a core component of the curriculum. We've led the charge, but there's still much more to do." Despite over fifty years of work, their regular surveys of "average" people's knowledge show that most still don't meet standards: "The gap is still serious. NCEE surveys show that nearly half of our young people don't understand how to save and invest for retirement, nor how to handle credit cards, don't know the difference between inflation and recession, nor how government spending affects them. If we fail to act now to improve economic literacy in this country, our children will be at risk for crippling personal debt, costly decisions at work and at home, and lack competitive skills in a fast-paced global economy." In a grand irony earlier this year, Congress was sufficiently persuaded by such arguments to declare April as national financial literacy month.

The NCEE doesn't expect us to master detailed knowledge about such things as the intricacies of how different forms of derivatives work, just to get the basics right. In a series of twenty Content Standards for basic economic literacy (available in PDF from their website), they lay out lesson plans and "benchmarks" for fourth graders, eighth graders and twelfth graders that are meant to include both fundamental premises and practical, everyday insights. Just as in my classroom exercise, choice figures hugely
across this material. Content Standard 1 mandates that even fourth graders must come to understand that economically you can’t have everything you want, hence you have to make choices. By twelfth grade you should have reached the larger conclusion that scarcity is the primary fact of economic life. Scarcity “exists because human wants for goods and services exceed the quantity of goods and services that can be produced using all available resources.” Learning to make good choices thus becomes the central component of economic good sense, whether in balancing a checkbook, making a decision about whether to support a Federal balanced budget amendment, or playing the futures market. Or planning one’s own long term future. Content Standard 15 emphasizes that students must realize how to maximize one’s “human capital” in a competitive labor market. Already by 4th grade students should understand why in economic terms they must continually choose to “practice new skills.” That improves their human capital, which in turn improves productivity generally. Augmenting one’s human capital is also a good thing for the national economy.

At least by twelfth grade, however, it would seem students are expected to master some remarkably circular reasoning with respect to the relation between the health of the national economy and good choices by individuals. Benchmarked in Content Standard 9, for example, twelfth graders learn that pursuing “self-interest in competitive markets generally leads to choices and behavior that also promote the national level of economic well-being.” Fair enough, but then it might well seem an easy leap to the idea that collusion with other sellers, for example, could seem by that definition not only in one’s own interest, but also a pretty good thing all around. This is supposed to be a competitive market, however, and continuing through Standard 9 we find out that collusion with even one other seller would reduce “the level of competition in a market,” which is a very bad thing indeed for the national level of economic well being—as in fact students should have known since fourth grade. Earlier, content Standard 2 had excoriated a so-called “command economy” where choices are made from the top rather than by each individual, as in our market
model. Nevertheless, no matter how much self-interest individual sellers may think they have in price fixing, or how much twelfth graders might imagine a higher minimum wage as in their interest, and so on, learning to identify one's own real self-interest is nearly always coincident with understanding the grounds for national economic well being, which after all equates to the pursuit of individual self-interest, and so on round and round. When people just learn to command their own choices in the right way, a "command" economy becomes unnecessary.

In short, and as might be expected, the content standards for basic economic literacy are all drawn straight out of familiar neoclassical principles. The circular reasoning, however, helps enforce perhaps the most significant lesson of all as the groundwork for NCEE literacy: there's really nothing you can, or should, do about the economy. It will run itself fine if left alone, uncontaminated by exogenous factors or interference of any kind, and your job is to learn to make good choices within the terms laid down by its one-hundred percent club. According to the NCEE, however, that's precisely the root of the problem. Most people don't know enough to be able to make good choices. Thus, as Jack Amariglio and David Ruccio point out in Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics the NCEE material divides the population quite cleanly into two groups. There is a (very small) group of individuals who are usually academically trained in economics and who do know the correct answers, and then there's that huge mass of the population who express instead a kind of "ersatz" economics, all those "policymakers and politicians, journalists, advocacy groups, lobbyists, and just plain folk" who can't ever seem to get it right, even on basics (256). Perhaps regrettably in this case, it seems that we're not living in a "command economy," so that those who know the correct answers can't just impose them on everyone. But they can pour a considerable amount of money and communication time into the attempt to educate us all about what is correct.

I realize that challenging such dominant norms for what constitutes economic literacy may not appear a particularly useful or relevant direction of classroom work for fields like composition,
cultural studies and literary study. At the same time, however, looking across the vast range of texts studied in these fields, it should be apparent that all kinds of economic referencing occurs, most of which would fall considerably outside the parameters of "correct" knowledge identified by the NCEE content standards and the ideological weight of economic assumptions surrounding them. Some may be directly Marxist, but there are also representations, for example, of collective work by no means organized in capitalist labor terms; various barter systems of market; sometimes almost feudally organized illegal trade and all manner of locally networked work and trade linkages; "command" economies; many workers, usually women, doing the unpaid labor without which every existing neoclassical "Market law" would be immediately repealed; numerous instances of craft and artisanal work; slave labor; commune living in all kinds of versions, sometimes in relation to exterior markets and sometimes not; artistic collectives; technogeeks working in an underground economy; virtual trading of avatars and AI positions; farm labor on isolated farms and in agribusiness; both on and off the radar working immigrants, and on and on. Once we include texts our students produce in addition to texts brought into the classroom for study, the list could extend almost indefinitely.

At the risk of some overgeneralized melodramatics, however, I would guess that at best, when thought about at all, the great majority of students most of the time take all this in as cultural representations rather than as relevant to the way the "real" economy actually works today. And directly or indirectly such perceptions reflect the separation of the economy from other sectors and from culture generally that functions as a basic lesson underwriting NCEE forms of economic literacy. Dominant literacy works to extend and reinforce the idea that the economy operates best when it operates independently. Thus, while I don't think alternative representations in the texts students produce and in the texts we teach lack economic substance or content, I am convinced the effects remain largely confined to cultural relations as zoned off from economic processes. Maintaining that border is very much a part of what a dominant economic literacy champi-
oned by the NCEE is all about. Challenging it seems to me a crucial reason for teaching counter literacies. After all, both composition and cultural studies instructors are quite used to working in interdisciplinary conditions, and even literary scholars can adapt. In any case, I'm not really imagining our classrooms becoming exercises in credit card responsibility, nor a process of somehow training ourselves to do the math required by econometrics and the magic accounting involved in derivatives. I have in mind a job I think we can attempt. It may involve a difficult process and some new knowledges, but the idea is a very simple one. Against the insistence that the economy runs effectively over there, while over here each of us individually learns to make good choices in accordance with its laws, we can do what we can to teach a counter literacy where students understand and act on the awareness that economic relations are already right here.

When we finish my classroom exercise and total up scores, we spend some time considering the disparities among the kinds of items on my list. But students usually want to talk most about what seems the obviously important issues to them. Why is it that in some cases (current music, cosmetics, and so on) people make such a diversity of choices, while in others such as racism, stereotypes, and derivatives—and the usual near misses like fascism and communism, as well as most artifacts of yesterday's culture (in contrast to day before yesterday's)—almost everybody chooses exactly the same response, whatever it is? And why is there a one-hundred percent club at all? After all, evil dictators kill people right and left and still can't quite enforce one-hundred percent on anything. How does it happen here? In talking through these questions, most students point everything first toward individual feelings and decisions. One chooses communism or fascism or not; one examines oneself as carefully as possible to determine possible racial prejudices or tendencies to rely on stereotypes, and so on. Even items like braneworld theory or biometrics can suggest elements of personal choice—"I'm majoring in history, so I don't have any idea," or "I heard about that string theory stuff but just really wasn't interested."
More generally, facing the results of the classroom exercises my more liberal students tend to emphasize the assumption that choices shouldn’t be constrained, that true social freedom lies in expanding the available choices for everyone. The more conservative students, however, don’t usually dispute that premise; they simply want more emphasis on a corollary that everyone must then take responsibility for her or his choices. Like most of us, the students also seemed deeply committed to the idea of maximizing available choices. The major exception seems anything to do with large scale economic processes. It’s as if the economy, in contrast to the items that appeared directly in my survey, simply couldn’t be viewed as a possible field to exercise choices about. My students are often willing enough to talk about specific items like derivatives once I offer some explanation, and certainly about a large term like “capitalism.” Indeed “capitalism” has never made the one-hundred percent club in any class. Criticisms are common, and expressions of agreement and approval are often muted when voiced at all. The issue, however, isn’t really value judgments about specific economic systems or practices. In most cases the questions about a one-hundred percent club involve how everyone seems to choose the same way on these items. But with regards to the economy dominant economic literacy would seem to have established parameters suggesting that choices can and should be made everywhere—except about the fundamentally separate operations of the economy itself.

Unfortunately, the alternative isn’t quite as simple as teaching students some reasons and possible means for expanding powers of individual choice to include more fundamental economic matters, for it is precisely in those terms of an individual power of making choices that the idea of choice functions as one of the most powerful recruiting forces for dominant economic literacy and the specific economic processes it helps hold in place. In a recent newspaper column, for example, longtime conservative commentator George Will supplies a typically telling instance of the incorporation of choice into a literacy that rationalizes dominant, exploitative economic relations. After fulminating for awhile about John
Edwards' old style "1930s paradigm of poverty," Will explains how poverty relief should work in relation to what we now know about how to deal with the issue: "The new paradigm is of behavior-driven poverty that results from individuals' nonmaterial deficits. It results from a scarcity of certain habits and mores—punctuality, hygiene, industriousness, deferral of gratification and so on—that are not developed in disorganized homes." Obviously, there's nothing "new" whatsoever about this paradigm, but it is significant how Will avoids any direct blame-the-victim imputation that people irresponsibly and perversely choose a culture of poverty for themselves. Instead, he simply equates the human with the economic as understood within dominant literacy. Thus, people are described as if already economic entities (with "deficits," "scarcities," and so on), and then Will need only explain that "culture" in the form of good economic choices and good habits is necessary to ensure the full realization of possibility as human beings. People don't choose poverty. Nevertheless, the workings of the economy ensure that poverty will result from the accumulation of an individual's choices unless one realizes that at each step choices must be made by every individual in the best way to maximize "certain habits and mores" that are appropriately fitted to basic economic processes going on over there.

I don't at all mean to suggest that choice is therefore a "bad" thing to be "rolled back," any more than Marx would have argued that wage labor is a bad thing introduced by capitalism and that therefore we should all return to slave labor. But like wage labor as Marx understood it, in our time the emphasis on individual choice can and increasingly does carry with it specific schemas of economic literacy and complex networks of economic practices reinforced by the pedagogical powers of dominant forms of economic literacy. Choice must first be dislodged and reinvented in order to do other kinds of necessary work without trailing that whole ensemble of economic relations behind it. Representations of alternative economic relations can help in that task, since these are by no means always configured with individual choices as the point of departure for subsequent sequences of effects. Nor is compe-
tition always represented as a necessarily fundamental relation that is determined by the inevitable scarcity of desirable resources. The repetitive insistence throughout media culture that every field and every encounter must necessarily be competitive can be challenged by a whole range of possible alternatives.

It is perhaps all too tempting, however, to contrast an alternative multiplicity of "real people" doing "real things" represented across cultural texts against the "abstraction" of the NCEE image of *homo economicus* endlessly maximizing rational choices in a world of scarcity created by the insatiable desires of everyone competing for the same prizes. As Amariglio and Ruccio remark in a slightly different context, such direction is typically found in many critiques of neoclassical principles: "What we find usually in most of these critical traditions is the charge that neoclassicals, with their preference for formalization and abstraction, have lost the 'real' human being as the agent of economic behavior" (109). Nevertheless, much of the NCEE material does seem like a deliberate flight into abstraction. In looking at the benchmarks for respective grades specified in Content Standard 5, for example, fourth grade students are asked to identify an exchange of goods or services they have made, while eighth grade students must not only describe such a transaction, but also recognize the position they themselves have occupied in the process as "buyer" or "seller" and why. By grade twelve, students engage in a full simulation process, albeit with a rather fixed "correct" conclusion to reach: "Participate in a trading simulation where students represent different countries with specific goods to sell and specific goods they want to buy; conclude that a nation pays for its imports with its exports, or by borrowing." The path begins with each student in his or her own "real" person exchanging something or other; moves through a stage where students learn to see themselves as playing specific designated roles in a larger economic process; toward finally at grade twelve an understanding of a process at the national level of imports/exports and debt. Presumably, the big picture of economic activity can only be grasped by abstracting it out of anything to do with specific people in the specific circumstances of their lives.
While such abstraction may seem little more than a relic of nineteenth century epistemology, easily challenged by the positive attraction of seeing "real people" represented, it seems to me capable nevertheless of remarkably mobile mutations in the present. In the midst of his exploration of online gaming, Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games, Edward Castronova introduces a classic piece of economic theorizing that seems to suggest a progression of abstraction similar to the NCEE material. The idea of club goods is a way to model the behavior of multiple consumers in a market that may well involve some considerable congestion in their attempts to enjoy the good. "The theory," Castronova explains, "predicts what size a club should be, based on the amenity it provides as well as the way population sizes turn into congestion costs. And if we also know the total demand for this kind of good at the optimal fee levels, we can predict the number of clubs" (137). One person in an athletic club with a swimming pool isn't a good idea, since the person must pay the whole cost alone; a huge number of people is cheaper, but, as Castronova puts it, "one cannot actually get into the pool because it is filled up with humans, stacked in like sardines" (137). As a result the theory predicts more clubs until an optimum balance is reached. This looks like a good potential example for use in a NCEE Content Standard since everybody in these scenarios behaves with a rational calculation of best interest at every one of the many choices necessary. Thus, the analysis can emphasize an abstracted process to such an extent that no "real humans" are anywhere in sight, let alone any who appear dripping wet in swim suits. But, of course, rather than folded back into a relic epistemology of abstract representations, in Castronova's book the example appears in the midst of an often rather rhapsodic discussion of current online gaming.

Consider his initial description of "avatar." After working through the sequence of choices necessary to build and name the body you will inhabit, he concludes, "While this [the computer's loading of current info] is happening, the screen goes black or is replaced by a whirling vortex graphic, helping you to imagine that your com-
puter screen is a viewing portal, a camera, whose point of perspec-
tive is now being sent magically into the head of a creature named
'Sabert' [the name he chooses to illustrate the difficulty of creating
"new" names when a great many players are involved] who lives in
an unknown place on the other side of the galaxy. When your
viewpoint enters Sabert's head, he becomes your avatar—the
representation of your physical being in that other place" (34).
While Sabert is described as being built by a determinate se-
quence of choices, the representation of agency here wouldn't
necessarily be best described as a product of rational abstraction.
And for gamers and others such avatars obviously carry an
immense charge of affective intensity rather than appearing as
only the end result of a long and dehumanizingly empty process of
abstraction. My point is hardly to conflate gaming with neoclassical
economics, though to Castronovo that sometimes seems a natu-
ral, but rather to emphasize the transformational powers possible
to the equation of individuality and choice even in a context of
neoclassical abstract processes empty of "real" humans.

Although the NCEE bases much of its literature on their
evidence of the shocking failures of the population generally to
understand the basics of economic literacy, it's not as if people
aren't paying attention to economic matters. As Castronovo re-
ports, gamers are often involved in astonishingly intricate pro-
ceses of virtual trading. Amariglio and Ruccio describe attentive
and often "fractious" conversations about economics with students
on high school visits, even if the comments don't always reflect
NCEE Standards by any means. In a very different context, I think
Timothy Brennan is right on target in setting up his central question
about future developments in postcolonial studies (in "The Eco-
nomic Image-Function of the Periphery") by way of the currency of
interest in economic developments: "In a period when corporate
CEOs are considered sages, when at least a third of all news
reporting is dedicated to the stock market, and when the individual
citizen hangs on the words of Alan Greenspan, the answer to this
question must surely involve the economic, even if it cannot
tirely rest on it" (105). The NCEE may be discouraged about
what they understand as the illiteracy evidenced everywhere. Amariglio and Ruccio, in contrast, find in all this flurry of interested discourse in everyday economics potentially important challenges to dominant norms.

As they recognize, it's impossible to expect opposition to be grounded in specific conclusions: "There are many other examples we could cite in which everyday economics arrives at conclusions that are different from, and in many cases diametrically opposed to, the ideas put forward by the majority of academic economists. The fact is, however, that there are also many instances in which the two discourses tend to coincide—a lesson which many liberal and left (e.g. Keynesian, feminist, radical, Marxist and other heterodox) have learned the hard way in the classroom and in attempting to get their views aired and favorably discussed in the media" (278). The promise they see in everyday economics is less a matter of conclusions than of what they understand as the refusal to remain within the discursive channels that preserve an understanding of economic relations as an autonomous realm: "Everyday economics, precisely because it is produced in and through a different set of discourses, always threatens to escape from the confines to overflow the boundaries, of academic economics—and to turn against it" (278). I think their emphasis on challenging claims for the autonomy of economic relations an enormously important direction to encourage with students. At the same time, however, it seems to me impossible to ignore the transformational powers of choice in this context of everyday economics as well.

One of the particularly significant alternative discursive conventions they see operating in everyday economics is in fact quite familiar from the context of critique they discuss earlier—namely, a tendency to "look for and focus on the decisions and actions of 'real' people and institutions: car manufacturers raise prices, the Fed lowers interest rates, IBM decides to lay off workers, Japan protects its markets, the U.S. Postal Service is inefficient, and so on. The emphasis is less on the elegance and parsimony of the form of argument than on the ways in which winners and losers can be identified and the responsibility for particular economic out-
comes can be attributed to the activities of an actual agent (or set of agents) in the economy" (268). The emphasis on an identifiable named agency seems an immediate contrast to the typically neoclassical NCEE assertion that the economy is a separate sector that simply runs itself according to abstract processes and "laws." Yet, like a number of critiques of neoclassical principles, the everyday economics discourses that Amariglio and Ruccio cite also depend on the assumption of "real" people in the midst of recognizable institutions. More importantly, in this case the discourse effectively translates a claim about separable processes into the powers of specific agents, in much the same way the abstract representatives of homo economicus who populate club goods theory might become the highly charged avatars of video games. Finally, in each of their examples (a list I'm sure could be extended considerably) the power of agency is located somewhere else. Not only is individual choice preserved, but also barriers are reinforced as a result. Economics is over there, and this time what's over there has specific names and places. It's little wonder that an everyday economic common sense might perhaps then endorse anything from a credit card blowout (because they're going to get you anyway), to the kind of worshipful attention to CEOs and stock market reports that Brennan notes, in hopes of getting a hint about the correct choice from those at the top. Common sense, as Gramsci understood very well, can involve many different and sometimes even contradictory conclusions. Against the barrier of economics and its immensely powerful agents over there—why not.

While it may be possible to persuade students into negative value judgments about how finance capital works or capitalist exploitation or Republican sponsored tax cuts, and so on, the result isn't necessarily a willingness to explore economic alternatives. It's more likely just a sense, at best, that economics is bad shit to be avoided and thank god we're in protected cultural disciplines now. I can't see that several decades of claims to be more rigorously historical and materialist in our classroom practices have changed that depressingly familiar situation very much. And I don't think it
could be improved if we just learn to analyze the texts we study in really really really materialist ways. At worst, we end up sounding very like neoclassically trained economists berating the masses for not even knowing the basics. Amariglio and Ruccio argue that the "dismissal of ersatz economics as a nondiscourse also presumes and performs a modernist narrative of the disciplinary self" as the expert who knows in the middle of a vast sea of ignorance (257). But clearly that narrative can’t be confined to the economic sector of campus.

The pedagogical key here seems to me to be the texts students produce. Interpretive practices, for all they can yield a necessary understanding, also tend to reinforce the perception of economic relations as over there, leaving textual traces behind to be analyzed in relative cultural safety. Understanding how economics can move from there to here is unlikely except through understanding how one participates in production. In classroom terms, learning can begin immediately with student texts and the ways in which they are caught up within the relations between ensembles of work and competition, and specific production processes. It is possible of course to isolate student writing as if a series of choices made by individual writers, as exemplified in a number of familiar approaches to teaching writing. Choice in this sense, however, helps maintain and extend an endlessly proliferating field whose detail keeps from view those production processes that function as the prior set of conditions on which choice depends. The autonomy of individual choice appears as the source of all behaviors and their effects over here, and hence the natural accompaniment to the workings of the economy over there.

Which is also one of the primary tasks accomplished by surveys. I said I didn't want to make any empirical or ethnographic claims for the results of my classroom survey exercise, but actually I do have another kind of claim to finish with. As increasingly a gold standard of even very sophisticated research, let alone a constant of media culture, the survey as much as anything is positioned to be a powerful agent in the reproduction of choice. Whatever the content or the circumstances or the methodological sophistication
involved, surveys must clear a magical circle of exchange equivalence between individual choices and data to be aggregated. With the monotonous regularity of continuous digital input, new “choices” can then be expected to build on the “data” of what has already happened and is waiting to be activated, the information age equivalent of the congealed labor of Marx’s famous description. Thus, the final turn of my classroom exercises is to undo the survey that began them, in the recognition of how like any other survey the first answer it supplies will always be the assertion of primacy to individual choice. Choice in other words is not only a derivative instrument for the financing of a contemporary capitalism, but through surveys and countless other instruments of dominant economic literacy a derivative capable of atomizing into invisibility all the underlying assets that make it possible.

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Works Cited


