We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history.

—Michel Foucault

Despite critiques of critical pedagogy’s limitations on everything from how teachers and students are imagined (Lee, Trainor, Brannon, Janangelo, R. Miller, Lu) to how critical pedagogy’s theories set up difficulties and failures in the classroom (Tassoni and Thelin; Knoblauch), to deconstructive critiques about how it actually undermines or contradicts itself (Gore, Struggle; Ellsworth; McWilliams), composition scholarship continues to show signs of its attachment to so-called emancipatory goals articulated by and attributed to critical pedagogy. Even if left with few concrete strategies to fulfill this vision, we seem to be, at the very least, reluctant to surrender these laudatory “social visions” of change, justice, transformation, and democracy. This leads me to wonder what is at stake in our attachments to critical pedagogy discourse. In what ways do discourses of critical pedagogy establish their power?

Examining the discourse itself can illuminate how critical pedagogy constructs particular ethical and pathetic stances for readers to internalize by appealing to affect—specifically, their affinity to “noble” sentiments. These rhetorical effects compel our active and passive support and affiliation, or in words more commonly used in critical pedagogy literature, our “commitment,” “devotion,” and “faith.” Indeed, noble sentiments permeate critical pedagogy’s discourse through such phrases as the

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"language of possibility," the "politics of hope," a "critical citizenry," "emancipation," "participatory democracy," along with references to "healing," "salvation," and "transformation."

The work by Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren is based on the assumption that affect itself is a cultural and ideological construct, rather than an essential, private experience. So, while critiqued for its underlying rationalism, it is both somewhat ironic and fitting that critical pedagogy discourse is laden with language designed to elicit and signify emotions. Critical pedagogy’s noble sentiments work at the nexus of Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals: logos, ethos, pathos. Feminist and poststructuralist theorists like Gore (“What”), Ellsworth, Orner, and others have pointed out the limitations of their logical appeals and the failures of the ethos of the critical pedagogue. However, the scholarship has not yet fully accounted for critical pedagogy’s appeal to pathos. The discourse of critical pedagogy works both implicitly and explicitly in disciplining teacher affect, which I see as a central, if not constitutive, part of the ethical substance of teacher self-styling. Yet, neither Ellsworth nor Gore names critical pedagogy as an affective discourse per se.

The discourse of critical pedagogy achieves its cultural currency, not solely through its reliance on rationalism, but also through an unacknowledged reliance on pathos. Appeals to pathos play a crucial role in shaping teacher identity. Such appeals persuade the teacher or speaker to internalize a particular ethos, a self-image of oneself who, according to Aristotle, "looks right" and is thought "to entertain the right feelings," a speaker in whose "good sense, good moral character and goodwill" we trust—the noble character of the "transformative intellectual" or "teacher-intellectual" (qtd. in Bizzell and Herzberg 160–61; emphasis added). It is my contention that critical pedagogy is a pedagogy of affect that mobilizes dominant tropes of democracy and citizenship as "modes of subjection" to discipline the teacher by calling on him or her to promote and uphold Western culture’s highest and noblest ideals, with the idealized subjectivity to which both teachers and students should aspire, imagined as that of the "citizen" in a critically participatory democracy.

While I don’t mean to suggest that concepts of emancipation, justice, democracy, and critical citizenship are undesirable or wrong-headed
pursuits, I am troubled by how they seem to work in particular discourses to obscure their often repressive histories. Such easy acceptance disavows the reality that these ideals have not always (indeed, rarely have) been applied or mobilized equally for everyone, as feminist and Asian Americanist critics of democracy and citizenship have made clear (see Fraser, Walkerdine, Lowe, Palumbo-Liu; also see Norgaard). Affective appeals to these noble sentiments are deployed by discourses, like critical pedagogy, that function like “regimes of truth” to discipline appropriate subjects and instill appropriate structures of feeling in those subjects.

Given our particular history, composition professionals have a kind of affective genealogy that has predisposed us to an attachment to noble ideals, an attachment that itself goes beyond rational explanation. Laura Micciche argues that emotion is active within particular social and institutional locations. In “More Than a Feeling,” Micciche argues that composition and the labor it demands form a cultural system that teaches workers what constitutes “appropriate and inappropriate emotional dispositions” within specific institutional contexts (437). Micciche identifies disappointment as a key emotion that has defined the composition professional. I submit that, in addition to disappointment, early texts of the social turn (like The Politics of Writing Instruction: Postsecondary, Contending with Words, and Cultural Studies in the English Classroom) illustrate a genealogy of affect that includes defiance, indignation, and, more significantly, a desire for legitimation that has driven the profession. Thus, examining emotion within the institutional and ideological framework of critical pedagogy can reveal the kinds of emotional dispositions that “scholarly disciplines and cultural rules have taught us to think about and experience” (Boler xix).

Critical pedagogy disciplines the subjects and objects of its discourse through “technologies of self,” which

permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thought, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault, “Technologies” 18)
These technologies, like ideological interpellations, are not simply coerced, but work through imparting subjects with a kind of agency that can be effected through and on his or her body, soul, conduct, and being. These self-styling techniques target the "ethical substance" of teachers—"the gestures, postures, and attitudes which are in need of disciplining or styling" (Gore 63). These generally affective stylings are geared toward a "telos" established by the discourse, or "the kind of being to which we should aspire" (that is, the transformative intellectual) (63). Finally, a "mode of subjection" is identified—the greater, often abstract, goals in whose name the self styling is justified (democracy, critical citizenry, emancipation, justice, for example).

Critical pedagogy discourse includes affect as a central point, especially in relation to race and antiracist pedagogies. In Between Borders, a collection of essays largely devoted to issues of race and multiculturalism, edited by Giroux and McLaren, Lawrence Grossberg claims that essays in the collection constitute an "affective pedagogy, a pedagogy of possibilities... and of agency," in which teachers provide "a model of thoughtfulness" and exhibit "active and passionate articulation" with teaching and research in order to help organize a different "space of possibilities" for those (that is, students) who have already made ideological and affective investments in certain (presumably normative, oppressed/oppressive) positions (Introduction 18, 19).

In another collection, Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics, Giroux theorizes affect in relation to racism and popular culture in his articulation of "border pedagogy." Giroux aims to politicize affect and unveil the ways that our innermost investments and emotional ties are shaped by ideology and discourse. In one of Giroux’s more detailed discussions about border pedagogy as an antiracist pedagogy, he acknowledges that

If master-narratives of domination are to be effectively deterritorialized, it is important for educators to understand how such narratives are taken up as part of an investment of feeling, pleasure, and desire. There is a need to rethink the syntax of learning and behavior outside the geography of rationality and reason. [...] An anti-racist pedagogy must engage how and why students make particular ideological and affective investments and
occupy particular [. . .] often contradictory subject positions that give [them] a sense of meaning, purpose, and delight. ("Postmodernism" 249; emphasis added)

Giroux highlights the limitation of “rationality and reason” in the face of “feeling, pleasure, and desire.” Understanding affect allows critical pedagogues to see the complex and deeply ingrained ways in which people are bound to oppression and oppressive systems. For Giroux, racism is an affective discourse that structures what seem like our most private feelings, preferences, and tastes. He asserts that “racism is an ideological poison that is learned, it is a historical and social construction that seeps into social practices, needs, the unconscious, and rationality itself” ("Postmodernism" 219). Therefore, understanding the mechanics of this attachment promises to dismantle the power of such narratives.

If racism is essentially an affective construct, it works like a drug—a poison that brings pleasure, false consciousness that is washed over by desire, an irrational intoxicant. Affect secures the powerful hold that ideology has on us. It is something that resides within or works/manifests itself through the oppressed, those who need to be enlightened and liberated—in other words, students. An antiracist pedagogy would make students and their racist affect the object of critique and liberation, an object of teachers’ labor. Once we understand that racism impacts learning and behavior that are based in desire, critical pedagogues can take that irrationality and make sense of it, find the causes and the reasons for it. Giroux declares that teachers’ work must consist of discovering “why students have particular ideological and affective investments.” We must see that “the production and regulation of desire is a crucial aspect of how students mediate, relate, resist, and create particular cultural forms and forms of knowing” (149; emphasis added).

To address the impact of affect in discussions about race and racism, teachers are exhorted to “use their authority to establish classroom conditions in which different views about race can be aired but not treated as simply an expression of individual views or feelings” (250). Affect is something students bring into the classroom, something static that can be “aired,” unambiguously represented, and objectively analyzed. Affect is seen as something of a blight, an exemplification of false consciousness,
something that, we might gather from the passage, only afflicts students and others who have not achieved the raised, political consciousness assumed of transformative intellectuals. Affect constitutes content; it is the object of critique, revision, and, ultimately, purging.

Therefore, teachers must show how "the views we hold about race have different historical and ideological weight, forged in asymmetrical relations of power" (251). Despite Giroux's consistent qualification that this isn't just the liberal pluralist ideal of sharing opinions and experiences, and because teacher affect is never explicitly discussed, we are left with the implicit strategy of rational debate and persuasion (granted, of unequally weighted positions and feelings) as the primary means for convincing students to give up the beliefs dearest to them. The teacher's role is to take these pieces and weigh them against one another, like the blindfolded symbol of justice merely holding the scales. With this image, we might gather that the truth about injustice will be revealed and students' "meaning, purpose and delight" will be demystified more or less automatically.

Elizabeth Ellsworth's main contention, in her now famous critique in "Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering?" is that critical pedagogy's key assumptions and goals, what I've referred to as noble sentiments, are "repressive myths" based in rationalism and that they actually exacerbated the unjust conditions she and her students were working against:

By prescribing moral deliberation, engagement in the full range of views present, and critical reflection, the literature on critical pedagogy implies that students and teachers can and should engage each other in the classroom as fully rational subjects. (301)

Such a basis for reflection and putative action, sets up an "irrational Other" (women, people of color, "exotic Others") against which the rational subjects of critical pedagogy define themselves through a discursive category of the "generic 'critical teacher'"—the "mythical norm" of a "young, white, Christian, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied, thin, rational man" (301, 310). This further reinforces what Ellsworth sees as "a vehicle for regulating conflict and the power to speak" by universalizing and dehistoricizing the particular contexts in which reason and
expression are contained (301). Ellsworth argues that critical pedagogy "fails to come to grips with issues of trust, risk and operations of fear and desire" provoked by their theories of identity, voice, and politics (314).

Ellsworth is partially correct in her critique of the rational basis of critical pedagogy discourse. However, I believe that it is not the only, or perhaps even the main problematic of critical pedagogy discourse. While it may fail to explicitly address the affective consequences (trust, risk, fear, desire) of its theories, critical pedagogy discourse does not fail to produce affect, to instill certain fears and desires in teachers. Students' emotional and irrational reactions do not simply exist as the opposite of rational discourse embodied by the teacher. Rather, teacher emotions are provoked, bolstered, and abetted by the affective rhetoric of ostensibly reasonable or rational arguments.

Affect is the "what" and the "how" (the object and the means, the content and the conduit) for critical pedagogy. By deconstructing critical pedagogy's binary of rational versus irrational, we can see that in fact the two supposed opposites operate in concert, making rhetorical appeals to both ethos, on the assumed moral character and rational disposition of the critical pedagogue, and pathos, the inculcation of particular emotional dispositions in the audience. Specifically, the audience of critical pedagogy discourse would presumably be aspiring transformative intellectuals, teachers who are positioned as not-yet radical, but would-be and need inspiration and encouragement. This figure is set against what becomes constructed in the discourse as the "bad teacher," the unenlightened, oppressive, authoritarian representative of institutional power.

Disciplining Teachers' Special Dedication

In Foucauldian ethics, the transformative intellectual is the telos of critical pedagogy, described by Giroux in representative passages like the following, which is worth quoting at length. In Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life, Giroux delineates the pedagogical duties and goals of the transformative intellectual in political, ethical, and, I argue, affective terms. The transformative intellectual, then, is

[o]ne who exercises forms of intellectual and pedagogical practice that attempt to insert teaching and learning directly in the political sphere by
arguing that schooling represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations [...] one whose intellectual practices are necessarily grounded in forms of moral and ethical discourse exhibiting a preferential concern for the suffering and struggles of the disadvantaged and oppressed [...] someone who is able to analyze various interests and contradictions within society [and is] capable of articulating emancipatory possibilities and working toward their realization. Teachers who assume the role of transformative intellectuals treat students as critical agents, question how knowledge is produced and distributed, utilize dialogue, and make knowledge meaningful, critical and ultimately emancipatory. (174–75)

Giroux writes that the transformative intellectual is a kind of intellectual and political activist, someone who “exercises” intellect and pedagogy in order to “insert teaching and learning” into the political sphere. The transformative intellectual “argues” that schooling is essentially a power struggle. The powers of his or her mind allow him or her to “analyze” social formations and “articulate” possibilities for liberation. This subject is someone who aspires to a higher consciousness and from this privileged vantage point is able to see the various “social interests and contradictions” at work. The transformative intellectual “questions” the way knowledge is made and shared. The transformative intellectual “works towards” emancipation; “utilizes dialogue,” and “treats students as critical agents”; “makes knowledge meaningful, critical and ultimately emancipatory.” The transformative intellectual challenges students with dialogue, pushes them to become active citizens, and infuses meaning into what we might assume would be otherwise meaningless to them or oppressive in ways they couldn’t discern or resist alone.

Despite the seeming emphasis on the rational capacities of the transformative intellectual, the text reflects affective dispositions and gestures that he or she is also to abide. The transformative intellectual is “grounded in forms of moral and ethical discourse” and exhibits “preferential concern for the suffering and struggles of the disadvantaged and oppressed.” This subject is concerned about students’ well-being and potential or is, at least, able to perform or outwardly exhibit this concern.
The transformative intellectual can assert a certain kind of moral and ethical righteousness in "assuming" this role. This passage relies upon Aristotle's definition of maxims, general statements regarding "questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided" (qtd. in Bizzell and Herzberg 182). The utterance of general statements that the audience is assumed to already believe in obviates the need for proof or example. It "invest[s] a speech with moral character"; the utterance itself becomes "a general declaration of moral principles," which presents the speaker "as a man of sound moral character" (184). So, while passages like these would likely elicit much head-nodding and affirmation, the details of how a teacher might actually achieve the moral and ethical grounding or the "political clarity," as Ann George puts it, to work toward emancipation is far less clear (100).

These utterances are discursive formations that function as "regimes of truth" that actively and interactively interpellate speakers and listeners to identify with dominant ideologies and affects. The appeal to the emotions makes such identification much more difficult to disentangle as they tend to be, Aristotle explains, "attended by pain or pleasure" and have the ability "to change men as to affect their judgments" (161). According to Enlightenment rhetorician George Campbell, "moral sentiments" have the ability to sustain and augment the excitation of the passions: "Nothing is more efficacious in this respect than a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, a sense of glory ... the sentiments of sages whose wisdom we venerate, the example of heroes whose exploits we admire" (qtd. in Bizzell and Herzberg 783). The power of appealing to the passions is even less amenable to open analysis or rational debate because it is "generally assumed without proof, or even without mention" (783). From a rhetorical view, feelings can be assumed, and the work of discourse on the emotions can be hidden.

In critical pedagogy discourse, these appeals invite teachers to identify with the speaker, internalize the appropriate dispositions, and self-style themselves to fit the models of subjectivity proffered by them. The invitation or interpellation works by arousing the passions of the would-be transformative intellectual, so that he or she would be wont to emulate the speaker's moral character and emotional dispositions. In Campbell's words, such persuasion works according to two actions:
The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers, the second is to satisfy their judgment that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. (775)

In the Foreword to *Teaching for Social Change*, William Ayers gives us one of the most ardent examples of how critical teachers ought to discipline themselves, focusing primarily on their potential gratification:

To teach consciously for social justice, to teach for social change, adds a complicating element to [the teacher's] fundamental message [you can change your life], making it more layered, more dense, more excruciatingly difficult to enact, and at the same time sturdier, more engaging, more powerful and joyful much of the time. Teaching for social justice demands a dialectical stance: one eye firmly fixed on the students—Who are they? What are their hopes, dreams, and aspirations? Their passions and commitments? What skills, abilities, and capacities does each one bring to the classroom?—and the other eye looking unblinkingly at [...] economic reality. Teaching for social justice is teaching that arouses students, engages them in a quest to identify obstacles to their full humanity, to their freedom, and then to drive, to move against those obstacles. And so the fundamental message of the teacher for social justice is: You can change the world. (xvii)

While Ayers' description seems, on the surface, to be about students, the passage implies an important active role for the teacher, the primary audience for his text. Ayers asserts that teaching for social justice requires teachers to know who their students are, to know students' "hopes, dreams, and aspirations," students' "passions and commitments," and to recognize "the skills, abilities and capacities" students bring to the classroom. Critical teaching "arouses" students, "engages them in a quest to identify obstacles to their full humanity, to their freedom." It *inspires* students to "move against those obstacles" (xvii). The emphasis on the transformation of students constructs them rhetorically as objects for teachers (and oddly for pedagogy-as-agent) to know, recognize, arouse, engage.
In this formulation, the teacher is projected as someone whose ethical substance is constituted by a *desire* to know and arouse students. In Campbell's words, the passage "excites the desire or passion" of the teacher to know and arouse his or her students. Thus, the teacher is animated by an implicitly affective agenda. Teachers are encouraged or rewarded with the satisfaction of recognizing students, seeing in them what others may have overlooked. Furthermore, critical teachers *appreciate* that critical teaching is "more layered, more dense, more excruciatingly difficult to enact, and at the same time sturdier, more engaging, more powerful and joyful much of the time" (xvii). This discourse solicits teachers' identification and internalization of feelings of passion, appreciation, and reward that should accompany their support, care, recognition, and salvation of students.

Teachers are also to correct those less-desirable feelings that may make them balk at the hardship or feel cowed by the complexity of this type of teaching. The use of the term "excruciating" adds an element of hyperbole that makes this read, fittingly, like a pep talk (which also makes one wonder why, if critical teachers find their work so rewarding, they would need a pep talk). Teachers are encouraged to find such difficulty an excruciating, but exhilarating, exquisite joy. It conveys a disingenuous sense of glee in hardship that suggests a zealous commitment and a glossing over, if not outright denial, of the struggles real teachers might face. This is not merely an oversight, however, but an expected strategy that according to Campbell is used when "an unfavourable passion or disposition [is] to be calmed" (783). He suggests that one can counter such unfavorable emotions "first, by annihilating or at least diminishing the object which raised it; or secondly, by exciting some other passion which may counterwork it" (783). So, in the case of the would-be transformative intellectual, the fear or intimidation of difficulty is countered by arousing a sense of joy.

In his initial articulations of the teacher-intellectual or transformative intellectual figure, Giroux's rhetoric is a little less ecstatic, though no less impassioned. In several places, Giroux has reiterated the idea that transformative intellectuals are "free men and women with a special dedication to the values of the intellect and the enhancement of the critical powers of the young" (Teachers 125; emphasis added). The work of
transformative intellectuals is to "help students develop a deep and abiding faith in the struggles to overcome injustices and to change themselves" (126; emphasis added). His prose implies that it is not enough for critical pedagogues to teach that injustices exist. Teachers must seek to teach students to have faith in the struggle against injustice and desire to change themselves.

Implied here is that transformative intellectuals would instill those feelings in students, that they would excite passion as much as they would act as agents of critique. Despite its antiauthoritarian message, critical pedagogy supposes a teacher-centered pedagogy (see Gore, Lee). Furthermore, while the rhetoric explicitly suggests that teachers must attend to student affect, the discourse also makes the ethical substance of teachers the objects of discipline: their gestures, attitudes, behaviors—or, in other words, teacher affect.

**Discipline and Punish: A Model Pedagogy**

Critical pedagogy discourse is suspicious of affect as a force of ideology. Its articulation of affect, however, is based in explicit and implicit valuations of certain affects that are viewed as negative and feminine, while privileging and keeping invisible other masculinist affects. Along with passages like the one above that discipline by inspiring and encouraging particular dispositions and attitudes, other passages utilize pathos and ethos to discourage certain affective performances by inciting the fear of shame. Critical pedagogy ensures allegiance to its mode of subjection—that is, democracy and critical citizenship—through a pedagogy of shaming that directly and indirectly disparages teachers who struggle or express dissatisfaction with critical pedagogy. These rhetorical strategies tend to trivialize and even demonize the experiences of teachers whose efforts at decentering power did not leave them feeling self-satisfied and magnanimous but, instead, grasping for control, respect, and authority. This invites the reader to identify with the speaker and conspire in disparaging the "bad teacher." This bolsters the reader's aim to become a transformative intellectual, encouraging us to throw our lots in with critical pedagogy and against the model of the bad teacher that is shamed before our eyes. Observers witness the discursive shaming of the "bad teacher" and are taught what not to become, what of their ethical
substance needs to be corrected in order to be esteemed by those whose admiration and acceptance we seek.

According to Aristotle,

[S]hame is a mental picture of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion. Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of use we respect. We admire those, and wish those to admire us, who possess any good thing that is highly esteemed; or from whom we are anxious to get something that they are able to give us. (qtd. in Bizzell and Herzberg 169)

By this account, shame is an especially social and relational affect, acutely dependent on the views of others. Shame can only function in the case where the person being shamed is reliant on the opinions of others or has something to gain from appealing to them. Shame underscores unequal power relations and is a powerful tool of discipline and self-styling for this reason.

A supreme example of the pedagogy of shaming can be found in the way Giroux and McLaren respond to Ellsworth’s report of how critical pedagogy failed in a graduate course on racism that she taught from a critical pedagogical orientation. She argues that critical pedagogy’s ideals about democratic participation and rational debate were inadequate, and indeed reinforced relations of domination: “The injustice of these relations and the way in which those injustices distort communication cannot be overcome in a classroom, no matter how committed the teacher and students to ‘overcoming conditions that perpetuate suffering’ [. . . .] [C]ommitment to rational discussion about racism in a classroom setting was not enough to make that setting a safe space for speaking out and talking back” (316).

Giroux and McLaren separately castigate Ellsworth for her critique. Although Chris Gallagher, Amy Lee, and Patti Lather give in-depth and thoughtful analyses of their responses to Ellsworth’s critique, I want to reexamine Giroux and McLaren’s treatment of Ellsworth, specifically for
how it reveals the affective disciplining of the teacher/practitioner. In “Schooling the Postmodern Body,” McLaren launches a defensive assault against Ellsworth. He relies on the position of objectivity and invisibility already established in the figure of the transformative intellectual’s ethos and deploys the rhetoric of scientific objectivity to challenge the validity of Ellsworth’s critique. He points to her faulty “proof,” the unrepresentative and decontextualized “sample” of quotes. Rather than seeing her critique as one possible reading of critical pedagogy, he proclaims hers a “woeful misreading,” thereby asserting the critical tradition as a fixed and stable body of knowledge of which he implies he has the “correct” reading. This contradicts his claim about critical pedagogy as an “intermittent, partial and unfinished conversation.” Yet, since he vests himself with the authority of “tradition,” he seems to feel justified and entitled to judge, rather than engage with the substance of Ellsworth’s critique. It seems he admonishes her for daring to critique at all (72).

McLaren sets up this objective, true tradition against claims about Ellsworth’s affective and psychological states. He questions her intentions; he accuses her of being cavalier, of falling prey to “distortions, mystifications, and despair.” He criticizes her self-doubt and accuses her of using theory as a scapegoat to cover over her own, individual, desperation and failure. McLaren sets up a dichotomy between the emotional, feminine, failed practitioner and the objective, authoritative, masculine figure of the transformative intellectual and the tradition of critical pedagogy, which are effectively removed from scrutiny. His gendered and rationalist perspective works to further delegitimate Ellsworth as emotional and womanly, and he attributes her failure to those qualities. We are led to conclude that if she were more rational, more impervious to affective tides—or, in other words, more manly—then she wouldn’t have failed, but rather would’ve been able to let the truth and inherent efficacy of critical pedagogy emerge. We are to think that Ellsworth ruined it because she didn’t practice critical pedagogy right; it had nothing to do with possible flaws in critical pedagogical theories.

In Giroux’s response, he asserts that Ellsworth’s project “represents less an insight than a crippling form of political disengagement”; she
“delegitimates” and “degrades the rich complexity of theoretical and pedagogical processes that characterize the diverse discourses in the field of critical pedagogy” (“Border” 160). He views her critique as “self-righteous” and sees her as trying to claim that her ideological reading be the primary and singular way of understanding critical pedagogy. Giroux suggests that her problems with critical pedagogy resulted from not facing the tension that haunts all forms of teacher authority, a tension marked by the potential contradiction between being theoretically or ideologically correct and pedagogically wrong. (160)

According to Giroux, Ellsworth undermines the strengths of her work and, apparently, of her very constitution by “succumb[ing] to the familiar academic strategy of dismissing others through the use of strawman tactics and excessive simplifications”; furthermore, she falls prey to “careerism” and “theorizing” in “bad faith” (rather than the deep and abiding kind of faith) (160). He concludes that critical pedagogy’s “theoretical sweep may be broad, the sentiment utopian, but it is better than wallowing in guilt or refusing to fight for the possibility of a better world. Sentimentality is no excuse for the absence of any vision for the future” (161).

We can read in Giroux’s response to Ellsworth, a construction and critique of her character. We see a weak yet arrogant person, succumbing to desperate, low-down tricks. Indirectly, Giroux suggests that Ellsworth is a quitter—she gave up on critical pedagogy rather than staunchly supporting the “vision.” She let herself “wallow in guilt.” She let her “sentimentality” cloud her perception and thus couldn’t see that things could go wrong pedagogically even though the theory and ideology are “correct.” He deflects the criticism of critical pedagogy by asserting its complexity and its ultimate rightness. Critical pedagogy discourse seems to reinforce the notion that these are the ideals; we just have to “get it right.”

Giroux and McLaren’s treatment of Ellsworth illustrates how the ethical substance of critical pedagogy is regulated by upholding certain visions and attitudes and denigrating others. The message sent by such
public shaming is that rather than succumbing to despair teachers must internalize critical pedagogy's emotional dispositions: righteousness, desire for change, and a certain euphoria of possibility. Teachers are to invest in the hope of democracy and faith that critical pedagogy will take us to that utopian democracy. Teachers are to exhibit or at least claim (perform) an interest in changing the world, in engaging the realities of inequality and the legacies of oppression, rather than question that goal or the means of achieving it. To fail to do so risks being shamed in the eyes of those "whose opinions of us we [ought to] respect." It risks their admiration, which we seek, and the authority we anxiously desire them to confer upon us. We risk alienating, offending those who possess that "good thing that is highly esteemed"—namely, the cultural capital that comes to be associated with theoretical treatises and the ethos of looking "right," entertaining the "right" feelings, being in the "right" frame of mind.10

Teaching critical literacy to students involves, if not depends on, "schooling" their emotions (Worsham). But more to the point, it requires that teachers manage their own desires and emotions, valuing certain kinds of affects directed toward certain ends over other emotions and other possible ends. This model of pedagogy suggests that a certain sentimentality and weakness—attributes often identified with women and implied to be feminine—are to be corrected if one wishes to be a true transformative intellectual. For example, McLaren writes a fervent account of the present circumstances of our society and the associated affects that need to be overcome and resisted:

We inhabit skeptical times, historical moments spawned in a temper of distrust, disillusionment, and despair. Social relations of discomfort and diffidence have always preexisted us, but the current historical juncture is particularly invidious [...] marked by a rapture of greed, untempered and hypereroticized consumer will, racing currents of narcissism, severe economic and racial injustices and heightened social paranoia. ("Multiculturalism" 192; emphasis added)

This passage suggests that affects like distrust, disillusionment, and despair are weaknesses, things that are wrong. Fittingly, Giroux and
McLaren critique Ellsworth primarily for succumbing to such wrong feelings. On the one hand, we can see that their discourse encourages self-styling in positive ways through overcoming despair, guilt, and self-doubt. On the other, it also betrays a sub-text that valorizes the performances of “militant optimism,” contempt of bad teachers, as well as a sense of importance and moral duty, and the desire to promote in students the desire to change and to have faith in justice. Rather than seeking to critique or suppress emotion altogether, critical pedagogy seeks to encourage, create, and correct certain kinds of affective dispositions while vilifying others.

Affect and sentimentality have typically been gendered feminine, and associated with nurturing and love, “soft” emotions that belie vulnerability, infirmity and, occasionally, moral rectitude. While emotional dispositions and behaviors are largely socially constructed, certain emotional dispositions are gendered masculine and raced white, and for those reasons are less likely to be perceived as emotional. These “hard” emotions inject intellectual exchange with agonism, urgency, self-importance, and a colonizing imperative—rhetorical devices that represent a stylistic masculinism. We are called upon to be “bold and unflinching” in the face of injustices, to be unsatisfied with moral relativity, to wrestle with social relations, to be encouraged by possibility, and to “dream the dream of liberation” (McLaren 216–17).

Disciplining Whiteness, Styling Authority
In a similar process, critical pedagogy discourse also disciplines race and insinuates certain affective dispositions that a transformative intellectual would exhibit in relation to it. Including considerations of race in the examination of affect and critical pedagogy discourse promises to yield even more insight into how moral commitments and teacher subjectivities are interpellated. In “Multiculturalism and Postmodern Critique: Toward a Pedagogy of Resistance and Transformation,” McLaren articulates critical multicultural pedagogy with a call to “interrogat[e] the culture of whiteness” (214). Balancing the modernist notion of totality with postmodern critique, he offers important insights into the problematics of mainstream multiculturalism, and he argues that an understanding of the discursive nature of identity formation can bolster a critical praxis.
Here, McLaren offers explicit accounts of educators' experiences in the classroom, perhaps in response to critiques that critical pedagogy focuses too much on the student or that it is too unreflective of itself and the pedagogical agent. Despite discussion of "difference" and the rejection of essentialist notions of subjectivity (with "citizen" understood as plural and hybrid), the text belies assumptions made about the teacher that maintain distinctions between teacher and students and between dominant and oppressed subjects.

Teaching is framed as a negotiation of the "educator's problematics," which McLaren leaves unnamed but sees as constituting the meaning-making processes and perspectives of the teacher. He exhorts teachers "to recognize those internalized discourses that not only inform the ritualization of their teaching practices, but those that organize their vision of the future" (212). The teacher should be able to see "the classroom [as] the site of [his or her] own embodiment in theory/discourse, ethical disposition as moral and political agent, and situatedness as a cultural worker within a larger narrative identity"—within "textual [and] affective space[s] the teacher creates" (216). Teachers are understood as having an informing role, an affective as well as discursive role, in the creation of classroom dynamics.

He insists that teachers "need to cross borders into zones of cultural difference." Furthermore, "they need to create a politics of alliance building, of dreaming together." Most importantly, they must struggle for a solidarity that "develops out of the imperatives of freedom, liberation, democracy, and critical citizenship" (212–13; emphasis added). This is the way, McLaren suggests, that teachers can dismantle "whiteness as the cultural marker against which Otherness is defined" (214). He bids educators to take up "difference," but to do so "in ways that don't replay [. . .] Anglocentrism, Eurocentrism, phallocentrism, androcentrism" (213). In other words, the transformative intellectual would critique the reassertion of whiteness as the norm against which otherness is constructed. Confronting representations of the dominant white subject allows for the creation of new subjectivities without reverting to narratives of authenticity or concealing "relations of power and privilege" (214).

Yet, statements urging teachers "to participate in the affective as well as intellectual cultures of the oppressed" situate teachers in exclusion
from the oppressed (216). This assumes teachers who do not already participate affectively or intellectually in those cultures and narratives. So, even while we are to think about what teachers bring to the classroom, they are inadvertently constructed as if they don’t come from particular cultures or contexts or have been inscribed by particular narratives, even if from the so-called dominant culture. It does not also account for how differing or overlapping narratives would interact in their “participation,” a term that suggests a temporary visitation from the outside. For example, how would teacher narratives of femininity, minority status, and disciplinary exclusion inform their participation with students who may themselves be inscribed by narratives of white, male privilege, class status, and so on.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition, the connotations of whiteness evident in the text invite some questions as to the nature and impact of its authority. Recognizing that whiteness underwrites normative positions of authority, institutional and cultural, McLaren views the educator as predisposed to its seductions. Still, his attempt to deconstruct this “pathology of domination” is freighted with contradiction and anxiety, as is evident in the tenor of an especially notable passage:

\begin{quote}
Educators can no longer project onto the student-as-Other that part of themselves that out of fear and loathing they rejected or subtracted from their identities in their attempt to become unified subjects—that “split-off” part of themselves which prevents them from becoming whole, that disfiguring surplus that they have cast out in order to become white or live in the thrall of racelessness. ("Multiculturalism" 216–17)
\end{quote}

This passage reveals the possibility of several readings about the implicit and explicit relationship of whiteness and authority. The postmodernist part of critical multicultural education informs the premise that whiteness, like race, is a construct; it is not an identity that is tied to physiology or skin color. With that in mind, however, whiteness and racelessness seem to be conflated, even though as the text implies, whiteness is an illusory state. Second, in order to achieve this state, subjects cast out or disavow some unappealing part of themselves. They project that “disfig-
uring surplus” onto others (in this case, students). Third, subjects fear and loathe that part of themselves. It could be surmised that these teachers (or dominant subjects in general), inscribed by insecurity and self-hatred, purge those feelings by transferring that fear and loathing onto the other.

While it may seem a little extreme to put too much pressure on this short passage, its affective intensity, along with its postcolonial, psychoanalytic underpinnings, invite examination. In this passage, McLaren casts whiteness as an abstraction, a misguided belief, false consciousness. Thus, race, like affect, is a social and ideological construction that reflects certain kinds of ethos and pathos. While McLaren critiques whiteness as the norm, the text suggests that all unenlightened educators, regardless of their social positions, would seek to “become white,” to “live in the thrall of racelessness.” The suggestion is that whiteness has inscribed all subjects and has been internalized as an ideal; and that it has been internalized in more or less the same way (or at least there is no acknowledgment of difference here).

The implications of this are complex. The passage suggests a default emotionology, or structures of feeling, for dominant subjects (teachers who are not self-proclaimed transformative intellectuals being lumped into this category). There is no room in this articulation for the contradictory and competing narratives that inscribe even dominant subjects (particularly if the dominant subject is, to some degree, a fiction, a fantasy). For teachers who are not male, not white, not straight, it would necessitate the passing as or performance of the so-called dominant subject and its structures of feeling.¹³ I believe assumptions like these, embedded in much of the critical pedagogy literature, shed some light on why some feminists and African Americanists, especially, tend to be wary of the promises of critical pedagogy theory and practice (see Singh, Paul, Delpit). Through passages like this, critical pedagogy models a kind of ambivalence and an intense anxiety about dominant subjectivity and affect, reflected in their contradictory construction of affect itself.¹⁴ They vacillate from rational deliberation to a utopian commitment to faith, from constructing authority as white to denouncing whiteness, from emotional dispositions that range from hope to contempt.
This passage reflects critical pedagogy’s keen distrust of anything that smacks of dominant culture, including authority, institution, and whiteness. It conveys a deep suspicion of teachers in their abuse of authority, particularly when it is wedded to their experience or expression of emotions. These uncritical teachers cling to a fantasy of whiteness that affirms a self-serving authority at the cost of students’ well-being. Whiteness or racelessness is an impossibility, but the subject struggles in futility, in rage, to deny this—thus is the affective baggage of dominant subjects as teachers.

The alternative, suggested here from the detached transformative intellectual’s view, is that one achieve emancipation from these delusions by investing affect in other places. Rather than expending fear and loathing in denial, the liberated educator would, presumably, embrace the “truth” that the surplus is internal. The subject-object binary can be deconstructed to reveal that they are not separate, but rather intertwined and part of each other. The educator would come to the realization that we are all raced and that whiteness is a fantasy of superiority and authority.

Although both McLaren and Giroux go to great lengths to explain that affect is ideological, that subjectivities are historical and discursive, this passage inadvertently reinforces the association of authority and whiteness. McLaren’s descriptions of teacher emotion imply a universalizing tenet that all educators (who are not emancipated by critical pedagogy) are prone to fear and loathe students, that perhaps those are the main, if not the only affective responses teachers have been, albeit historically, conditioned to feel. In this passage and context, those universalized affects are also construed as private, originating in some failed individual psyche—one that has failed to see the ways in which they are instilled through discourse. The implication is that if one were simply more astute, one would see through it and purportedly shed oneself of the delusion.

The process of redemption for such “bad” teachers is initiated after they recognize that they “can no longer” resort to their bad habits. They come to see that whiteness and racelessness is a fantasy, that the other is a part of themselves. One way that critical pedagogy expects this transformation to occur is through the “exploration of identity,” which
would "be preceded by a critique of hegemony" (217–18). To become an emancipated liberator, subjects need to "uncouple themselves from the 'disciplined mobilizations' that regulate their social lives and rearticulate the sites of their affective investments in order to create new strategies and alliances of struggle" (217–18). It is not clear why or how these bad teachers would be convinced of the impossibility, not merely the disagreeableness, of their previous ideas and actions—simply that they would be better off investing their affects elsewhere. Moreover, McLaren does not offer a specific analysis of fear and loathing as situated, discursive, material, or cultural notions, nor how teachers might get over these feelings, powerful even if constructed, and develop new feelings toward those they have so intensely reviled.

The language of prohibition, commands, and precedence contradicts McLaren's claim that liberation is "a lived tension," a "passing into the 'not-yet'" a process and negotiation, a dialogue, a "multi-voice[d] democratic discourse" (217, 216). On the contrary, it seems that at least for teachers, the tension, dialogue, and transformation occur after they have acquired the language and conditions necessary to give voice to their own (or their students') experiences (Orner 87). Rather than appear as a process of negotiation, the emphasis on the apparent moral and persuasive power of emancipatory rhetoric seems to be enough in itself to function as a door slamming on the unenlightened teachers' dearest, most repressive dreams, enough to startle them into seeing the truth—that is, they must simply find other places, more moral, ethical, critical, and liberatory in which to invest their affect.

Reinvestment will lead to new strategies and new relationships, and an investment in authority will be replaced by investment in shared struggle. Moreover, there is an implied promise that the gratification (though ostensibly emancipatory) one receives from this reinvestment and reorientation will be as great as the prior gratification that knit them so tightly to oppressive authority and realities. It appears that this process involves more than the realization bad teachers must come to (that their attitudes no longer obtain); it also involves a process of affective identification with the image of the transformative intellectual and internalization of affective dispositions that mark one as having made the transition.
By chastising bad "educators," this passage hails teachers who hope to be "true" critical pedagogues to identify with the speaker. It thereby interpellates the teacher to feel disdain, righteous indignation, suspicion, and moral and intellectual superiority over the "bad" teacher figure. This passage exemplifies in the extreme a rhetorical style that critical pedagogy discourse often employs. The moral imperative is imparted through passages that describe the "pressing need to transform social practices and institutional relations" (217). We must do this, says McLaren,

because history compels us to do so, because the present historical juncture in which we witness so much misery and suffering necessitates it. History compels us because our dreams and our suffering are forged in it; it is what houses the furnace of our will. In the iron womb of history we create the shape of our longings, and to reclaim history is to be fully present in its making. (217)

Such affective rhetoric coupled with the solicitation, in the passages described above, of idealized feelings of passion, desire, and faith make a powerful force that shores up the overall integrity of the transformative intellectual figure and reinforces the invisibility of the mechanisms by which this figure creates its appeal.

Inadvertently, the rhetoric performs a stylistic "whiteliness"—a term that describes judgmentalism and self-righteousness that have accompanied assumptions of white superiority and dominance (Fox 199). It reflects "habits of mind," a set of confidences that Minnie Bruce Pratt delineates in "Identity: Skin, Blood Heart," where she reflects on beliefs that informed her white Southern, Christian female identity. Whiteliness includes "a staggering faith in [one's] own rightness and goodness"; the belief that one deserves race and class privileges; the belief in one's sense of right and wrong; the valuing of action based on principles rather than feelings; and "a belief in [one's] authority in matters practical, moral, intellectual" (qtd. in Fox 202).

Catherine Fox makes the connection that the ideology of whiteliness can be seen in assertions made by critical educators of the rightness and goodness of the concept of "critical thinking" and how it bestows the
moral responsibility and the authority to instill critical thinking (at least of the "right" answers) in students. This attitude can result in a lack of humility that may interfere with the kind of self-reflection or perspective that McLaren calls for. The vexing, contradictory affects associated with whiteliness make such a perspective difficult to achieve. McLaren does not examine the ideologies, affective investments, and material conditions that shape his own perceptions of and feelings about teachers. In addition, because he construes his explicit understanding of affect as primarily borne of dominant ideologies, he is unable to account for the affects, even the liberatory ones (though I suspect the process of distinguishing the liberatory from the oppressive would be far from self-evident) that his rhetoric in fact produces and promotes. Moreover, it causes him to overlook the historical contributions/impositions of teaching as a female gendered endeavor that solicited women teachers to perform nurturance, love, and even to promote values of democracy and justice within the constraints of traditional institutional authority (Jones).

McLaren doesn't ask how this genealogy of civic education may shape and delimit teacher affect, noble or otherwise. Why do teachers fear and loathe? Or why, for that matter, should they recognize and disdain the bad teacher and find joy in critical pedagogy's agenda of self-reflection and change? The question of whiteness remains. How does the ideology of white supremacy and the self-styling of whiteliness impact not just dominant subjects, but minority subjects who would be the transformative intellectual? Keeping in mind that whiteliness is not a characteristic exclusive to white people, as well as the historical push to assimilate and appropriate the "Other," what are the implications of the performance of certain affects by transformative intellectuals who are not white? If the position of transformative intellectual is constructed as white, what are the costs for teachers of color to occupy that position? And if dominant authority is associated with whiteness (or whiteliness), how does the transformative intellectual perform emancipatory authority, and what does that look like?

**Inconclusions and the Ambivalence of Affect**

Emotions—both feminine and masculine, hard and soft—constitute an important part of the ethical substance of the would-be transformative
intellectual and are a critical target for discipline. In addition, we learn that teachers should not question the tradition; and, moreover, we should be able to pick ourselves up by our emotional bootstraps and move beyond our affective disabilities, the blinders of sentimentalism, so that we can finally see that critical pedagogy is "theoretically right," even if we don't get it right in practice. It is in these ways that Ellsworth, and probably the rest of us, fails. Critical pedagogy models a certain "right" subject as the transformative intellectual, which reveals a discourse that maintains the privileged position of the masculine *ethos* in the voice of the theorist and inadvertently reaffirms the dominance of whiteness and maleness. Critical pedagogy discourse disciplines gender and race, coding them affectively as masculine and whitely. This teaches the would-be transformative intellectual particular affective dispositions that must be internalized in order to succeed. Perhaps these are the reasons we fail and persist despite our failures.

*Pathos* can be seen at work not only in the content of the discourse, but in assertions of faith that are expressed with lilting cadences as "deep and abiding," commitments described as not merely ordinary dedication, but "special dedication." In such passages, persuasion is reduced to invocations of "injustice" and "suffering," relying on stirring readers' moral associations of these abstract concepts. Indeed, such affects interpellate teachers into appealing self-projections. What teacher wouldn't want to see herself as dedicated, doing something special that will be deep and abiding? Critical pedagogy promises and demands from teachers the inducement of joy and passion both in others and in themselves. In other words, teachers ought to arouse and be aroused, inspire and be inspired by the project of social change.

However, these dreams don't come without costs. Indeed, these dreams are part of the emotional wage or what Eileen Schell identifies as "psychic income" that keeps women especially bound to nurturing roles ("Costs"). This among other rewards has bolstered the idea of "the calling" and the profession of teaching, justifying its cultural devaluation and relatively low pay, particularly for women (Ross). The affect-laden discourse justifies these techniques of self-styling in the name of democracy and citizenship, along with the romanticization and privileging of struggle, sacrifice, and conflict as necessary and inherently good. These
noble and uplifting phrases reinforce teachers’ faith and desire and advertise teachers’ experience of critical teaching as powerful, joyful, and engaging, if difficult to enact. However, the affective rhetoric here serves to valorize and justify excruciating difficulty as inherently noble. These rhetorics annihilate or diminish the actual work of teachers. Glorifying sacrifice and pain serves to further keep teachers in a denigrated position, laden perhaps with extra preparation and additional reading, necessitating nontraditional teaching practices, and eliciting emotional resistance from students and perhaps even the institution (also see Ferganchick-Neufang, “Women’s”; Schell, Gypsy).

All of these consequences have a material dimension: creating certain classroom conditions becomes a form of emotion management. Instilling and exhibiting dedication, faith, and joy is emotional labor. In The Managed Heart, Arlie Russell Hochschild defines emotional labor as “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display; emotional labor is sold for a wage and therefore has exchange value” (7). Emotional labor, according to Hochschild “requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” (7). The material and practical considerations of what and how to teach involve not only commitments of the heart, but of time, energy, and the attention of the body and mind. Therefore, the call to affect is a call to labor. The work of critical pedagogues isn’t only the exposition of ideals and argument, but the internalization and performance of affects designed to achieve certain ends. Given the much-debated erotics of teaching (Gallop, Ebert, Albrecht-Crane, hooks), what are the implications of exhorting teachers to “arouse” students’ “desire”? Can we be sure of what we are in fact arousing? What does a woman of color arouse that a white male teacher does not and vice versa? What histories and narratives inform that outcome? What kind of emotional labor does that involve? What are the costs?

In these ways, teachers cannot claim a position above their own livelihoods and structural inequalities simply because they claim a higher moral ground. This is not to say that critical pedagogy discourse works alone in the function. One could rightfully argue that there are worse things than to model or incite encouragement or hope. Indeed, the call to
nurture for women teachers has been a parallel function, no less problematic. My point is that our focus on the assumed rationalism of critical pedagogy discourse has kept us from examining its affective dimensions, which if left unquestioned, I argue, would undermine our ability to understand the ways institutional discourses, even radical ones, keep our work and our imaginations and other real possibilities bound.

Furthermore, to consider the complex ways in which affect functions not only for our putatively oppressed students but for teachers and would-be transformative intellectuals in and out of the classroom, we must take into account dimensions of race for how they mediate the efficacy and ultimate ends of the structures of feeling that are hailed by regimes of truth—dominant and radical alike. As Ilene Crawford suggests, “Histories and politics of race influence emotional identifications and shape affective stances” (680). Crawford identifies bell hooks and Cornel West as providing examples of how to “do the work of mapping emotional landscapes and recomposing our affective strategies” (680).17

Here, Asian American theorists can elaborate the discussion on emotion and identity through the concepts of racial melancholy and euphoria (Cheng, Eng). Thus, they are poised to illuminate the various contours and features of our shared “emotional landscapes,” as bell hooks notes, as well as the different paths we travel through them. Asian Americans have been affectively interpellated and constructed in American culture along different paths than Anglo Americans or African Americans. These paths include the complex and contradictory discourses of democracy and citizenship.

While full discussion of these implications is beyond the scope of this paper, I do want to point out some potentially productive areas for further exploration. On the point of citizenship and subject formation, we can turn to Lisa Lowe’s *Immigrant Acts*, where she argues that Asian American subject formation has been imbricated in the changing claims, requirements for and rights to citizenship that are reflected in conceptions of nationhood, race, and ethnicity, and immigration policies. Lowe writes, “In the last century and a half, the American citizen has been defined over and against the Asian immigrant, legally, economically, and culturally” (4).18
Positioned as an ambivalent figure, both insider and outsider, the Asian immigrant as would-be citizen is disciplined through affect. In particular, Anne Cheng’s analysis, in *The Melancholy of Race*, of the formation of the “citizen” through affect may provide a productive contrast to the image of the liberated citizen of critical pedagogy. Cheng argues that the model minority subject is constructed and maintained through a melancholic affective process, which she describes as euphoria, the performance of symbolic assimilation (42).\(^{19}\) The model minority subject is “not only assimilated but also euphorically sings the praises of the American way” (Cheng 23).\(^{20}\) Despite the attempt by model minority subjects to “alleviate the pains of exclusion” this way, the performance itself is a sign of outsiderness (42). Euphoria is a complex and contradictory concept that presumes the exclusion of Asians while at the same time celebrating the possibility of ideal citizenship and belonging. Asian-American subjectivity is disciplined by, on the one hand, the promise of assimilation (which inspires them to strive after it) and, on the other, the threat of “potential failure, shame, and humiliation, not to mention […] self-denial and self-beratement” that the impossibility of assimilation presents (69). Thus, euphoria represents the insinuation of Asian Americans with dominant values and their identification with the dominant subject—praised for remaining passive and joyous, demonstrating the tenuous position of all those who strive to belong.

One of the most powerful emotionologies for Asian Americans is the need to belong, concomitant with the aspiration to whiteness or racelessness.\(^{21}\) The emotional dispositions expected of model minority subjects, particularly in their attachment to the ideal of citizenship and the assumption of a dominant, white or whitely pedagogical standard, make it an especially seductive and fraught position, especially when bestowed with the moniker of “honorary white” (Tuan). The model-minority subject is valorized and held up as a model citizen and worker, and Asian women are held up as models of femininity (Cho).

The “militant optimism” and ecstatic joy of would-be teacher-intellectuals are hailed to mollify their struggle, their dreams and hopes for democracy, equality, and justice. This interpellation both mirrors and stimulates the melancholic euphoria of the model minority in interesting
and complicated ways. While on the surface the comparison of the model minority with the transformative intellectual may seem untenable, when we look more closely at the assumptions and rhetoric of critical pedagogy, we can see how and why euphoric Asian-American subjects could possibly be the most appropriate subjects for critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy discourse dovetails with and capitalizes on model-minority discourse to discipline euphoric hope and commitment that provides a buffer or screen between the dominant white male power structure (and its hidden ideologies) and the disempowered student masses. In this scenario, the model minority becomes the most appropriate gatekeeper, one who stands in the doorway, both belonging and not belonging, desiring inclusion and enforcing the exclusion of others, held as a stopgap by the promise of entry and the euphoria of occupying a coveted spot in a long queue of hopeful initiates.

Critical pedagogy’s rhetoric of affect needs to be demystified as not necessarily an emancipatory force, but as also potentially serving exclusionary and ultimately conservative ends. Lowe’s understanding of citizenship as a simultaneous “‘technology’ of racialization and gendering” could provide further insights into how to resist normalizing affective discourses (11). Lowe suggests that Asian American bodies function as countersites that challenge the Western national body and rhetorics of citizenship and meritocracy. Asian American cultural formations reflect a heterogeneity, showing contradictions and disidentifications with “national fictions of identity” that “‘perfor[m]’ and imagin[e] a new subject” (53). An examination of the intersection between Asian American subjectivities and critical pedagogy’s discursive interpellations may help us imagine both sets of positions in new ways. I submit that expanding our understanding of race beyond the tendency to binarize black and white, and considering race, affect, and critical pedagogy through the lens of citizenship may prove a fruitful endeavor: doing so may help us deconstruct the transformative intellectual as citizen extraordinaire, imagine new subjects, and perform new affective stances in our struggle to make meaning and exercise agency.

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Notes

1. For the purposes of this essay, I will be using the distinction made by Jennifer Gore that identifies the particular branch of critical pedagogy associated with Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren as focusing primarily on educational theories and social visions. Bizzell has argued for composition’s affinity to critical pedagogy vis-à-vis the concept of authority (“Power”). Also see Chris Gallagher’s *Radical Departures*, where he identifies Giroux and McLaren as having proclaimed a “critical tradition” that has informed the way composition has articulated its social relevance and progressive education heritage. Some key critical pedagogy texts in composition, including Fitts and France, Knoblauch and Brannon, Hurlbert and Blitz, Hurlbert and Totten, Berlin and Vivion, and, more recently, Tassoni and Thelin, Durst, Dixon.

2. Scholars that have taken issue with the untenable goals, if not the harmful effects, of critical pedagogy have yet to significantly question the goal of democracy. As a case in point, in a recent article on the problems of critical teaching, William Thelin urges readers to find “places to try to rescue critical pedagogy.” He asks, “Why must the goal fall in disfavor when the pedagogy appears not to have worked?” He argues that there is much to be learned from “classroom blunders” and that we should not be too discouraged nor let failures “undermine and alter our democratic, progressive goals” (117). I am struck by the tenacity and insistence with which this point is made, which hints at an attachment that is far deeper than an intellectual commitment. Despite or because of that belief or perhaps a willfulness for the goal to be right, Thelin seems to take democracy as a self-evident, uncontested end; thus, it comes to function like a god-term. He does not ask *why* democracy should be kept as the goal. Nor does he problematize the various narratives in which democracy has been contested. Even the staunchest critics, like Gore, find it difficult to completely abandon the critical pedagogy project.

3. Feminist, poststructuralist and composition theorists (Jennifer Gore, Elizabeth Ellsworth, Mimi Orner in education and Amy Lee and Lil Brannon in composition) argue convincingly that critical pedagogy privileges masculinist discourse and promulgates largely masculine models of teaching and teacherly ethos. Ellsworth critiques critical pedagogy’s rationalist tendencies to universalize and dehistoricize the social inequalities that have hindered true democratic participation.
4. I use the term affect, borrowing from Susan McLeod's general delineation, to point to the broader category of cognition, physiology, psychology, and behavior, of which emotion is a part. I use the term somewhat interchangeably with emotion, however, to include the constructivist and poststructuralist view, put forward by Lynn Worsham, that emotion is the "tight braid of affect and judgment, socially and historically constructed and bodily lived, through which the symbolic takes hold of and binds the individual, in complex and contradictory ways, to the social order and its structure of meanings" (216). Also see Grossberg.

5. There appears in some instances to be a dominance of progressivism particularly in mainstream academia—one can never go wrong making claims to social justice, liberation, democracy. Academics can usually count on affirmations and approving head nods when students' empowerment or the perils of authoritarian teaching come up in discussion, even if teaching on a first-name basis with students may simply disguise the institutional and social power relations at work. If Miss America finalists and college application essayists give us any clues to the "common sense" of our culture, noble sentiments affirming world peace and "helping others" always appear to be the right answer, somehow beyond critique or question.

6. In "Truth and Power," Foucault describes regimes of truth as a "general politics of truth" that determines which discourses are validated or invalidated, which ones are valued, how truth is acquired, and how we are to esteem those who get to decide what is true and false (131).

7. Micchiche's use of "emotional dispositions" is based in Carol Stearns and Peter Stearns' term, "emotionology"—the "emotional standards" or norms, that affect "behavior as well as judgment" and how one interprets one's own emotional condition (Stearns and Stearns 7). Emotionology and emotional disposition are useful terms that imply the ideological and cultural roots of emotions, how they are expressed, experienced, and understood. However, it should be noted that as with ideology, subjects can exercise agency against emotional standards or expectations. Rather than simply, unconsciously, and helplessly internalizing emotional norms, subjects can choose at least to perform emotional standards without having completely internalized or invested in them, or to resist them altogether, as is often the case with women and people of color who are accused or praised for "acting like a man" or "acting white."
8. Also see Micchiche and Bauer's recent collection of essays on emotion and composition, *A Way to Move*.

9. See Smith for an analysis of how texts call upon readers' affective dispositions.

10. See Hairston ("Winds"; "Diversity") and Spellmeyer ("Out"; "Travels" for discussions of the weight "theory" had come to have in composition in ways that revealed composition and compositionists' lack of self-esteem, a yearning for disciplinary legitimation and acceptance within the structure of English studies which privileges literature and literary theory in particular. We can see how such conditions could help to revitalize the progressive genealogy of composition as a form of intellectual practice and engagement in the politics of teaching (despite Hairston and Spellmeyer's warnings), making the transformative intellectual a seductive figure, indeed. Viewing teachers as intellectuals provides a "strong theoretical critique" and allows us to "rethink and reform the traditions and conditions that have prevented teachers from assuming their full potential as active, reflective scholars and practitioners" (Giroux, *Teachers* 126). The promise to compositionists that adopting this role might bolster their legitimacy, resonates with both asserted demands for equality (Bullock and Trimbur) and critiques against composition's attachment to its own oppressors (Hairston, Spellmeyer). The "special dedication" of transformative intellectuals offers a nobler image of composition's progressive educator. Critical pedagogy discourse encourages teachers to resist the normalizing constructions of teachers as technocrats or unreflective practitioners who blindly carry out a predetermined goal. Thus, this message has particular relevance for composition teachers in justifying their struggle against such denigrating positions and assumptions about what they do—for example, uncritically teach grammar drills (Bizzell, "Power").

11. See critiques and narratives by female and minority faculty, along with gay and lesbian and working class scholars, confronting the complexities of negotiating authority, pedagogy, and social positions (Dixon, Chiang, Johnson, Lim and Herrera-Sobek, Friedman, along with the many essays in Kirsch, et al).

12. Ferganchick-Neufang also makes a compelling argument that women are vulnerable to contrapower harassment, where despite being in positions of institutional authority, women teachers can still be harassed by male students who are empowered by social, if not institutional, authority ("Breaking").
13. See Caughie for further articulation of the performative nature of subjectivity, which makes passing a norm rather than an exception to the rule.

14. See also Trainor's analysis of the essentializing and othering of white subjects (students in particular) in critical pedagogy.

15. See Lee for further analysis of critical pedagogy's rhetoric of imperatives.

16. Inevitably, whiteness also has its costs: an overreliance on an "ethics of forms, procedures, and due process"; alienation from depth of certain feelings; and "the insecurity and hypocrisy that are essentially connected with the pretense of infallibility" (qtd. in Fox 202).

17. Also see Gilyard, as well as Prendergast's critique of the "absent presence" of race in composition studies.

18. Lowe cites examples of this in the perceived and much publicized threat of immigrant Asian laborers in the nineteenth century as the "yellow peril," and images of Asian countries and peoples as "exotic, barbaric, and alien," as well as the internment of Japanese American citizens during World War II (4–5). In other words, inequality and exclusion are the foundations of citizenship; without them, there would be no notion of a citizen; indeed, there would be no need for it.

19. See Hu, Chan and Wang, and Suzuki for more details about the history of the model minority stereotype, which essentially praises them for their political passivity and acquiescence as well as their putative "achievements," which, Palumbo-Liu argues, preserves "the inherent logic of laissez-faire capitalism and the inconsequential nature of race and ethnicity before such a logic" (Asian/American 186). This places Asians in American "in between" dominant and minority culture, a state of doubleness or schizophrenia: they are situated "within the dominant ideology" and freed from "the burden of their ethnicity and race" while retaining "the signifier of racial difference" (186). The difference maintains the founding mythology for dominant subjects. As Cheng observes, the model minority reflects a process of racialization in the U.S. that operates through "the institutional process of producing a dominant, standard, White national ideal, which is sustained by the exclusion yet retention of racialized others" (10).

20. The desire to connect academic discourse to civic discourse, at the heart of critical pedagogy, is cast as a "love affair," leading to "courtship, seduction, and marriage [. . .] and its other: fear [. . .] double-voiced as [. . .] estrangement, rejection, and divorce" (Norgaard 255–56). Norgaard critiques composition's
“civic fantasy”—the assumption that the agency that academic discourse constrains would become “real and unfettered” in civic discourse—expressed in “the rhetoric of civic celebration, of singing the praises of the street” (256).

21. Cheng describes the popular view of Asian Americans as the “most foreign” if the “least colored” of minority subjects (23).

22. I suspect that the situation of composition professionals in their historical struggle for inclusion (that is, citizenship) in the legitimate world of disciplinarity and professionalization would make this interpellation particularly acute.

23. Also see Hesford and Kulbaga for analysis of Asian American women’s particularly fraught and complex positions in a transnational labor context.

24. Lowe forwards the ideas of heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity to name the material conditions of Asian American groups and to complicate the Western fiction that bolsters the orientalist desire “to consolidate the coherence of the West as subject precisely through the representation of ‘oriental’ objects as homogenous, fixed, and stable” (67).

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