Hegemony and the Discourse of the Land Grant Movement: Historicizing as a Point of Departure

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We are a people dedicated to the triumph of freedom and democracy over evil and tyranny. The heroic stories of the first responders who gave their all to save others strengthened our resolve. And our Armed Forces have pursued the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere with valor and skill. Together with our coalition partners, they have achieved success.

Americans also have fought back against terror by choosing to overcome evil with good. By loving their neighbors as they would like to be loved, countless citizens have answered the call to help others. They have contributed to relief efforts, improved homeland security in their communities, and volunteered their time to aid those in need. This spirit of service continues to grow as thousands have joined the newly established USA Freedom Corps, committing themselves to changing America one heart at a time through the momentum of millions of acts of decency and kindness.

—George W. Bush (Declaration of Patriot Day)

Prior to September 11, 2001 there had been increasing claims of a declining role of the nation-state and an increase in the rhetoric of globalization, but September 11 revealed the ideological force of national identity. President George W. Bush’s speeches have repeatedly reaffirmed and actively constructed American nationalism, always eliding the ambiguity and contradictions of American identity. Often, as in the epigraph here, Bush defines America as the finest example of a democracy—a nation where freedom, voice, and collective participation make

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its people the apogee of civilized beings. However, the essence of what it means to participate in an American democracy became evident after the events of September 11, when Bush, General Motors, Mario Cuomo, and countless others launched a media blitz assuring the American people that the best way they could help their country would be to consume: buy cars, keep our country strong; visit New York—there are seats available for Cats; buy a refrigerator, or shoes if you cannot afford an appliance; and for our country’s sake, buy an American flag. In other words, it has become clear that in America freedom is intricately connected to the freedom to buy and the freedom associated with market activity.

Less than a year before September 11, Americans were witness to another lesson in what it means to participate in democracy. The American public had been expressing little faith in the election process itself, a growing dissatisfaction with both of the two parties that were supposed to be representing them, and a growing anger about the political system’s obvious serving of corporate interests at the expense of people’s rights or wellbeing. The public’s response to these issues resulted in such things as mass-attended demonstrations and political rallies, increased support for organized labor, and the appearance of a relatively formidable third party candidate for president. George W. Bush became president of the country only after the voting process was clearly perverted in Florida and, even still, without winning the popular vote. While critics of the newly elected administration claimed that the office was gained illegitimately, I argue that rather than a crisis of authority for a specific individual (George W. Bush), the events which seemed to culminate in the tragic events on September 11 and the tragic events in response to that day, were indicative of a crisis of authority for the whole dominant socioeconomic system, what Gramsci called a “crisis in hegemony.”

The way dominant structures continue to respond to this crisis—not the “attacks on America,” but what must be understood as a much more complicated context where a whole system is being challenged as much from within as without—remains a historically consistent one: reasserting hegemony by using the structures and institutions that are most effective at reproducing dominant ideology to discursively construct the values by which its subjects understand and respond to their perceived situation. Such structures and institutions include the media (hence the onslaught of advertisements urging us to buy, buy, buy for America), the military, faith-based organizations, and—the focus of my argument here—universities. Within a month after the events of September 11, a conservative nonprofit educational organization, The American Council
of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) published a widely circulated (and contested) report: "Defending Civilization: How Our Universities are Failing America and What Can Be Done About it." The report claims that universities are supposed to ensure the transmission of Western ideology to students and to support, not question, the leadership of the country, especially at moments when American hegemony has been overtly challenged. The report accuses professors and students who have spoken out in any way against the actions taken after the attacks of being unpatriotic and as undermining the security of America itself. The responses to the report, in large part, defend universities as sites where critical engagement with issues such as war have historically taken place and suggest the role of the university is precisely to ensure such freedom to question and inquire, analyze, and protest.

While this important debate appears to place in contestation distinctly opposing views of the role of the university, these understandings of the function of the university are actually far more compatible than they would appear. In fact, both aspects of the university—cultural bastion of Western ideology and hotbed of debate and protest—are crucial to the production and perpetuation of American hegemony. Higher education in America plays a significant role in defining social relations under a dominant socioeconomic system in several ways: by transmitting the cultural values of that system and by producing technologies and skilled workers for that system. In addition, the institution of higher education is a significant site for containment of resistance to the dominant system. Higher education is a social institution understood as having the resources and expertise necessary for identifying and providing solutions to social problems; however, those problems and solutions are most often defined in terms of the interests of the dominant system that created the institution. At the same time, institutions of higher education are also constructed as somehow separate from larger society. For example, discourses of the differences between university life and the "real world" are pervasive and campuses are large contained geographies; thus, the protest and resistance on university campuses has been generally tolerated and expected.

It is in moments of crisis, such as what we are experiencing in our contemporary situation, that social institutions are called upon to create social stability. As the people within those institutions formulate and enact best responses to that call, the contradictions and assumptions about the role of the institution are often more apparent, as with the debate exemplified with the ACTA report. It is at these moments that it is crucial
that we approach such questions with a historicized understanding of the institutions within which we work.

In what follows, I take up this approach of discursive and historical analysis applied to the formation of the land grant university system. Expanding the concept of ideology into a discussion of hegemony, I attempt to problematize the institutional context from which we work. The importance of this critical understanding of public higher education at our current historical moment is underscored by the activities being initiated within the university (and programs such as composition), as well as by increasing external criticism and pressure on public higher education to conform to dominant interests. In the past decade, for example, institutional imperatives have encouraged (or mandated) the increased extension of educational activities directly into community contexts, such as integrating community-based learning through service learning and community literacy centers. These activities, understood within a theory of hegemony, are both shaped by and perpetuate dominant interests and carry with them significant implications. Our current tumultuous political climate has resulted in various external threats and coercive measures defining legitimate activity within a university, further delimiting the social roles of our professional activities, especially in terms of resistance to dominant structures. As Sharon Crowley, James Berlin, Richard Ohmann, and others have pointed out, our professional identities and the work we do as professionals are authorized by our institutional positionality.¹ Teasing out our responses to such a historical moment, making decisions about pedagogy, scholarship, and our professional subjectivities requires us to grapple with the complexity of the institution of higher education. I argue that before we can begin that task, we need to look at the historical function of higher education itself, and I turn to one of the defining moments of the history of American higher education—the passing of the Land Grant Act and formation of land grant institutions—to provide a historicized understanding of the way the institution of higher education tends to function. In providing this analysis, I hope to provide a foundation for reading our institutional history as well as a model of discourse analysis that will enable us to engage in a more critical understanding of our institutional work.

Hegemony and Containment
The American system of higher education has been critiqued throughout its history for its relationship and service to the dominant capitalist economic system.² To argue, however, that social institutions and those
who people them are imbricated in or shaped by a dominant economic system—namely, liberal capitalism—leaves one open to the possible charge of vulgar economism. That is, the assumptions of these arguments might be understood as claiming that economic interests—or the economic "base"—rigidly determines social systems they create: the "superstructure." Antonio Gramsci in "The Modern Prince" described such a reductionist argument as one which asks "the question: 'who profits directly from the initiative under consideration?", and replies with a line of reasoning which is as simplistic as it is fallacious: the ones who profit directly are a certain fraction of the ruling class" (166). This sort of determinism appears fairly easy to dismiss. For example, university programs often seek to serve those who are disadvantaged by current social systems, and in many cases do directly benefit those groups. Additionally, it is also apparent that much of what occurs within universities—course content, social justice programs, campus activism, controversial publications, and the like—is articulated from stances that are overtly critical of "ruling class" interests. It seems unlikely that a vulgar correspondence of base and superstructure would allow for these apparent inconsistencies or contradictions.

Like Gramsci, I am aware of the limitations of "vulgar Marxism"—those interpretations of Marx that oversimplify the relationship of the economic base and the social superstructure. Gramsci explains that it is "necessary to combat economism not only in the theory of historiography, but also and especially in the theory and practice of politics. In this field, the struggle can and must be carried on by developing the concept of hegemony" (165). In fact, Gramsci's theories in general might be understood as providing a rich understanding of the relationship between social relations and economics through this concept of hegemony—the network of social, political, and economic structures that legitimize power in a society, exercised through the mechanisms by which people determine their behaviors, values, and actions. A key feature of hegemony is that the choices people make in terms of those values and actions appear to be individual free choice, not as externally coerced. However, those values and actions tend primarily to serve dominant interests and to maintain the position of those in power (both political and economic). Because human motivation and consciousness occur within lived experience, not in an abstracted ideal, a system of values and practices must be able to account for (and conceal) contradictions between beliefs and material conditions. For example, the principles of a capitalist economy—which require exploitation and class distinction—create objective conditions for most
of the individuals within that system that do not correspond to their own self-interest. The complicated system that is required to maintain those individuals’ consent and investment in the economic system, then, requires cultural and political mitigation of those objective conditions. Therefore, the economic base is not an unfettered determinant of the superstructure, but rather a complex “balance of forces” (167).

A theory of hegemony moves us beyond oversimplified notions of ideology as an abstract and monolithic belief system to an understanding of the interplay of belief and experience in a sort of social totality that governs human interaction. Because hegemony includes abstract social values enforced by economic and cultural structures, it provides the means by which ideology is enforced and reproduced in what appears as a “natural” correspondence. Hegemony is the appearance of a seamless fit between dominant economic interests and the voluntary behaviors of those subordinated by them to act in accordance with those interests:

The maximum of legislative capacity can be inferred when a perfect formulation of directives is matched by a perfect arrangement of the organisms of execution and verification, and by a perfect preparation of the “spontaneous” consent of the masses who must “live” those directives, modifying their own habits, their own will, their own convictions to conform with those directives and with the objectives which they propose to achieve. (Gramsci 266)

Gramsci accounts for human agency among these forces by demonstrating that people within a system are not simply subjected to economic imperatives and laws, but interact with a web of cultural and political factors (enforcers, messages, rules, and the like) as they “legislate” their own lives.

Ideology requires subjects to identify themselves with a framework, and such identification has historically been broadly associated with nationalism. While examining the historical development of American higher education (and the implications for contemporary work at a time when renewed—if not fanatic—appeals to nationalism are used to justify many practices), it is helpful to focus an analysis of hegemony on the characteristics of American liberal capitalism. American liberal capitalism is the combination of a fairly free economic market and a democratic political system that tolerates and encourages individual difference and freedom. If we understand hegemony as the web of beliefs and practices enforced and reproduced within and by social institutions, we can look at our own system of liberal capitalism for examples of how cultural,
political, and economic structures work to reinforce each other and secure consent from the people who "live" that system. In the state of Arizona, for instance, high school students are required to take a class on entrepreneurialism and the free market economy in order to graduate. For this course, the students must successfully develop, produce, market, and sell a product. Students go to their families and friends both to analyze them as potential consumers and to market the final product to them. The course is mandated by state created and enforced standards. The course is naturalized for students and parents by the lived reality of consumerism that students interact with on a daily basis. The exercise prepares students for futures that will apparently be determined by their abilities to participate in market activities, emphasizing their own individual ingenuity and hard work as means to success; in other words, they learn the fundamental principles of liberal capitalism.

Hegemony is far more complicated than isolated discursive practices such as state mandated courses. To expand an analysis of the ways American higher education developed to both promote the values of capitalism and to contain contradictions to those values, it is helpful to explore the history of liberalism. The critiques and analyses of liberalism by such theorists as Gramsci, Stuart Hall, and others help explain the characteristics of liberalism itself that have made it conducive to establishing and maintaining a dominant framework of values. In "Variants of Liberalism," Stuart Hall traces the history of liberalism, not as a monolithic system of thought, but as what we might understand as an increasing convergence of beliefs, even as they remain in constant flux, into a hegemonic structure that is most conducive to capitalism. Hall links liberalism's historical emergence to the English Revolution (1640–1688), which, despite its "complex and diverse causes... did create the conditions in which capitalism developed and the bourgeois classes of society became the leading classes" (48, 49). Gramsci also describes the unique characteristic of this revolution in terms of its liberal ideology:

The revolution which the bourgeois class has brought into the conception of law, and hence into the function of the State, consists especially in the will to conform (hence ethicity of the law and of the State). The previous ruling classes were essentially conservative in the sense that they did not tend to construct an organic passage from the other classes into their own, i.e. to enlarge their class sphere "technically" and ideologically: their conception was that of a closed caste. The bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level. The entire
function of the State has been transformed; the State has become an “educator,” etc. (260)

According to Hall, “The social classes which rose to social and political ascendancy with this transformation of traditional England into an agrarian and commercial capitalist society were those whose rise in social position depended on the clearing away of barriers to their advance—an idea articulated largely within liberal discourse” (52). That liberalism’s philosophical and cultural tenets include incentive to participate in the sociopolitical structure because it is based on individualism, a conception of freedom linked to private property (and those associated “rights”), and the promise of material reward for adhering to those values make liberalism highly effective in terms of hegemony. These features of liberalism encourage people’s “consent” and participation.

Additionally, liberalism demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between material conditions and prevailing values precisely because it “did not have any absolutely fixed class identity or connotation” but, tends to encompass and respond to even competing views of “equality,” individual merit, freedom, and the like (Hall 57). The history of ideas associated with liberalism include Thomas Paine’s radical individualism and Edmund Burke’s philosophical conservatism (57). Liberalism’s ideological force comes from its ability to contain its own contradictions and adapt to varying philosophical positions.

Liberalism becomes hegemonic because it is able to rationalize its own contradictions and, more importantly, create structures to contain those contradictions, fostering the conditions of “free choice” that Gramsci indicates are essential for hegemony. At the heart of American liberalism is the “free market”—a capitalist economic system that functions according to the logic described by Herbert Marcuse that is able to encompass apparently competing views as its foundation in a specific “rationality” that is linked ultimately to justifying its economic foundations. In “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State,” Marcuse writes, “In keeping with its economic views, liberalism links this victory of reason (and here begins the typical liberalist conception of rationalism) to the possibility of a free and open rivalry of divergent views and elements of knowledge, which is to result in a rational truth and rightness” (16). Embedded within this logic is the incentive for potential accumulation of wealth that capitalism promises, but does not equitably deliver. The logic of liberal capitalism functions through a rhetoric of freedom and mobility but also ensures the apparent
freedom of dissent. Dominant interests are not simply formulated and imposed, but are rather reactive to and actively engaged with resistance. Absolutely necessary to such a system, then, are institutions that simultaneously reinforce the valuing of the incentives to participate (the belief in capitalism itself), that provide the apparent access to achieving those incentives, and that maintain the conditions where the contradictions and inevitable resistance to a system (that by definition can never deliver success to all or even most of its subjects) can be neutralized while appearing to be tolerated. American higher education is such an institution, and, as I demonstrate below, has always been such an institution because those most invested in the dominant system of liberal capitalism developed public higher education precisely to perform this complex hegemonic function.

The Formation of American Public Higher Education

The hegemonic force of liberalism—that is, the imbrication of social institutions in dominant material and ideological structures in order to reinforce and articulate dominant values and contain contradictions to them—is exemplified in the land grant university system. Contemporary conversations about the purpose of education is rife with competing views and the recognition that cultural values remain in flux. Much of that contemporary debate encourages a “Return to our Roots” in the land grant mission (see, for example, the Kellogg Commission on the Future of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges). For example, the discourse of the land grant movement is prevalent in the increasingly popular trends of service-learning and community-university partnership centers, especially in public universities where the land grant mission is cited as mandating those programs. Michigan State University’s Service Learning Center illustrates this tendency on its website with the statement: “By merging experiential education with the traditional academic environment, service-learning supports MSU’s long-standing mission as a land-grant institution” (Michigan). The sheer referential force the phrase “land grant mission” appears to evoke suggests that it is an element of cultural hegemony, functioning to establish a measure of shared values and as a reference point for determining policy or action.

When the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 is currently invoked, it is generally characterized as establishing state universities to offer practical, liberal education for all citizens, regardless of economic status through the threefold mission: research, teaching, and extension (or service). Scholars tend to construct the land grant mission within the
rhetoric of democracy and access, arguing for a return to that mission within a liberal discourse valorizing institutional access as a means for mobility and success, and ultimately for societal equity. Often in this discourse, the land grant mission serves as a foil to critique the relationship between education and corporate interests. Corporate influence in higher education, many contend, works counter to the larger social good by perpetuating a consumer society that creates a two-tiered economic structure, constructs more barriers to access, and more efficiently destroys the environment (Smith). Many critics of this problematic relationship between corporate interests and universities claim that this is a contemporary phenomenon. For example, in *The University in Ruins*, Bill Readings argues that we now need to recognize that “the University is not just like a corporation; it is a corporation” (22). He asserts that the university has “historically been the primary institution of national culture in the modern nation-state,” but in contemporary society “the University no longer has to safeguard and propagate national culture, because the nation-state is no longer the major site at which capital reproduces itself....The idea of national culture no longer provides an overarching ideological meaning for what goes on in the University” (12–13). Readings argues that the original “idea” of the university was as a cultural “safeguard” and that recently the university has become a self-referential, “non-ideological” corporate entity (13).

Readings and other critics urge for change that honors what they view to be the traditional mission of American universities. However, these critiques, whether they invoke the tradition of a land-grant mission, or claim a recent shift from enculturating students into national identity to serving globalized corporate interests, tend to overlook the history of the land grant mission and its significance in shaping these very concerns. An analysis of the history of the land grant act and the movement behind the legislation suggests that the spirit of the act itself has a great deal to do with the problems it is now being called upon to reform.

**Fruits of Democracy**
The Morrill Act of 1862 federally mandated the now extremely complex relationship between states and public educational institutions. Though the Land Grant Act officially passed in 1862, the act itself was just one moment in a much richer historical context. Justin T. Morrill first introduced the Land Grant Act to Congress in 1857, where it was tied up in committees until 1858, and passed by the Senate in 1859 only to be vetoed by President Buchanan. In his notebooks, Morrill says he came up
with the idea for the land grant initiative "as early as 1856" (qtd. in Berg 1). However, in an impassioned thesis, Edmund J. James argues "the credit for having first devised and formulated the original plan and having worked up the public interest in the measure so that it could be passed belongs clearly to Professor Turner [Illinois] and should be accorded him"; James supports this claim with a great deal of correspondence and significant public opinion on the matter dating from 1832 (8). This history reveals the complex relationships and the domains of discourse in which the act was shaped and intentioned.

Most histories of the Land Grant Act of 1862, especially those published at the centennial of its passing, describe it as a moment of the realization of American ideals. Dr. Edward Eddy, Jr. (then President of Chatham College in Pennsylvania) asserts that the Act "triggered a revolution in higher education," and that, "[i]n broad perspective, the so-called land-grant colleges are a part of democracy's logical development" (3). Eddy describes the achievement of the Act in "the words of historian Carl Becker, of that kind of 'impudent freedom' which breaks from all tradition. . . . The type of control, the nature of the curriculum, the standards of admission, and the guiding principles of educational organization became a symbol of the fruits of democracy" (4). These depictions of the Land Grant Act, claiming the achievement of a democratic ideal, draw our attention to some issues that warrant further investigation. Allan Nevins' historical claim is worth quoting at length:

The most important idea in the genesis of the land-grant colleges and state universities was that of democracy, because it had behind it the most passionate feeling....

Social and economic democracy in America means primarily liberty of action and equality of opportunity. The central idea behind the land-grant movement was that liberty and equality could not survive unless all men had full opportunity to pursue all occupations at the highest practicable level. No restrictions of class, or fortune, or sex, or geographical position—no restrictions whatsoever—should operate. The struggle for liberty when carried to its logical conclusion is always a struggle for equality, and education is the most important weapon in this contest. Democracy implies intellectual liberty with full freedom to think, write, and speak. It implies an open society without caste lines, giving its members full freedom to move from calling to calling, rank to rank. (22)

In Nevins' words we see articulated many of the basic principles of liberalism—economic, philosophic, and democratic. Nevins imposes
those values onto the history of the land grant movement through his contemporary celebration of them. He constructs these tenets as uncontested shared values. In doing so, Nevins contributes to the hegemonic function not only of public higher education, but of those values themselves.

Nevins suggests that the abstract democratic ideals he describes were the impetus to propose change for social conditions through American education. However, in *The German Ideology*, Marx argues that, "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of men, the language of real life" (47). Marx argues that "[w]e set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes in this life-process" (47). To do otherwise is to give ideology an illusory independence and create abstractions that "have in themselves no value whatsoever" (48). Only when we examine the interplay of cultural, political, and economic factors in constructing and perpetuating values, and ask in whose interests those values work, do we move beyond such abstraction. Michel Foucault’s theories of discourse enable us to examine those hegemonic relationships through the discursive articulations that construct them.

Foucault argues that such abstractions actually create a system of imposed "unity of discourse." The constructed histories that Marx argues are detached from historical "reality" are, for Foucault, "notions of development and evolution: they make it possible to group a succession of dispersed events, to link them to one and the same organizing principle, to subject them to the exemplary power of life" (23). Foucault asserts that,

These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively, of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the Justifications of which must be scrutinized. (25)

For Marx, the uncritical abstraction of "unity of discourse" amounts to the "whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history" (67). Utilizing critical theories of hegemony to deconstruct historical discourse allows us to look critically at events in history such as the land grant movement to reveal how those events have been made into an apparent ideological unity.
Reuniting Discourse with a Historical-Material Context

America in the mid-nineteenth century was a young nation, struggling to establish identity even amidst great internal strife. According to many historical accounts of the Land Grant movement, at the time of the passage of the Act, "the very fate of this nation hung in the balance, when brother was fighting brother, when we were in danger of being splintered into two weakened and antagonistic nations" (Nevins 45). Intricately involved with the internal clash and imminence of the civil war were agricultural and industrial issues. One cannot overestimate the significance of agriculture in early America. Paul Miller claims, "There was more space than man was accustomed to even dream about. The land was rich; one could exploit it and destroy it and move on so quickly that even flush of shame was absent" (18). Despite this exaggerated characterization, it is clear that land use and agriculture were primary concerns in America as the population increased and other industry competed for labor. In response to increasing pressure of the dictates of market economy and land use, science played a significant role in determining the direction of material progress in America.

In mapping the development of Plant Sciences, Will Martin Myers explains that prior to the mid-nineteenth century, "The traditional university did not normally support [science] research. . . . Scientists of those days were patrons of the king, physicians, clergymen, and a few wealthy amateurs" (46). However, by mid-century, as it is pointed out by Nevins, "The effulgent midday of science was at hand" (15). As biology, plant, animal, and soil sciences developed, they promised further advances in agriculture. Isaac Newton articulated the intrinsic connection of science and agriculture while serving as the first Commissioner of the newly established United States Department of Agriculture: "The simple argument, therefore, is this: increased scientific and practical knowledge in any occupation increases man's power in a tenfold ratio; agricultural knowledge, therefore, begets productiveness, and in the same proportion develops the wealth, the prosperity, and the progress of our country" (qtd. in Muckenhirn 32).

One historian of the land grant act characterizes the time period as one in which Congress, "of necessity, devoted most of its thoughts to a torn nation" (Nutt 85). Given that situation, he suggests that it is surprising that the act was passed: "Miraculously, at least two Congressional acts did become law in 1862 [the land grant act and the creation of the United States Department of Agriculture]" (85; emphasis added). However, it seems clear that these material conditions were all very closely con-
nected. In fact, George Nutt fails to mention, but it is important to note, that the Homestead Act, allowing for the public disposition of land through private claims, was passed the same day as the Land Grant Act. These conditions of production and society are all directed toward related ends: progress and efficiency in terms of economic development. Contrary to what Nevins and Nutt seem to argue—that the land grant was a decisive moment of democratic social change—it becomes clear that the act was actually the necessary product of prevailing material social and economic conditions.

The Rationality of Economics
In the discourses surrounding the land grant movement, it becomes evident that the values of "freedom" and "progress" valorized within the land grant movement are intrinsically tied to the broader formation of specific economic values. In a letter in the Sangamo Journal, as early as 1832, George Forquer encourages the development of land grant college initiatives, articulating a careful cost/benefit analysis and concluding: "If eligibly located, it [a publicly funded institution] would be the means of rapidly converting some one of our villages into a populous and wealthy city, thereby adding greatly to the value of property, and to the wealth of the country" (qtd. in James 41). Forquer explicitly lays out the economic rationale for creating a public institution, but even when the discourse appears to revolve around more humanistic values, the economic values are still clearly primary. Linking moral with economic progress, James Turner says education "should aim to put every pupil in such a position that his whole life afterward may be but one continuous, natural and easy progress from one state of mental and moral development and power to another" (qtd. in James 54). He reasons that education, therefore, needs to be tied to an individual's particular calling in life. The professional class already had such opportunity in education: "The divines, the lawyers, the physicians, the teachers, and the military men of our country, each and all, have their specific schools, libraries, apparatus and universities, for the application of all known forms of knowledge to their several professions" (55). He argues that the farmer does not need the professional's literature, but a literature of his own, about his practical occupational interests in order to be as successful as the lawyer, doctor, or clergy, suggesting that with these opportunities, the industrial class could become more economically productive in those fields.

Turner also ties economic goals with the land grant plan in the "Plan for an Industrial University for the State of Illinois," dated November,
1851. At one point in the document, he even employs an analogy based on production: "reading, writing, &c., are, properly, no more education than gathering seed is agriculture, or cutting ship-timber navigation. They are the mere rudiments, as they are called, or means, or the mere instrument of an . . . education" (qtd. in James 67). The argument for making the country's industry competitive in the world market (the early rhetoric of "globalization") becomes central when Turner says that if we thought we had progress with as little as the "primer, the spelling book, and the newspaper," what "miracles" could institutionalized education promise "from new and unknown worlds of light, soon to break forth upon the industrial mind of the world" (74). American democracy, he argues, is the natural place for creating the most competitive society: "And this done, we will not only beat England, but beat the world in yachts, and locks, and reapers, but in all else that contributes to the well-being and true glory of man" (75). The well-being and glory of man, here, are clearly defined by the goals of material production.

Further evidencing the economic impetus for the movement, many of the documents supporting the land grant initiative appeal to lack of productivity, or "waste" of land. The "Memorial of the Fourth Industrial Convention of the State of Illinois" begins with a declaration of this lack of productivity: "We are daily made to feel our own practical ignorance, and the misapplication of toil and labor, and the enormous waste of products, means, materials, and resources that result from it" (James 90). Marshall P. Wilder is quoted as addressing the Berkshire Agricultural Society with the lament: "For want of knowledge, millions of dollars are now, annually lost by the commonwealth, by the misapplication of capital and labor in industry. . . . We plead that the means and advantages of a professional education should be placed within the reach of our farmers" (98). Senator Morrill, in his journals, delineates his reasons for pursuing the Land Grant Act. He identifies his primary reasons within an economic rationality:

First, that the public lands of most value were being rapidly dissipated by donations to merely local and private objects, where one State alone might be benefited at the expense of the property of the Union.

Second, that the very cheapness of our public lands, and the facility of purchase and transfer, tended to a system of bad-farming or strip and waste of the soil, by encouraging short occupancy and a speedy search for new homes, entailing upon the first and older settlements a rapid deterioration of the soil, which would not likely be arrested except by more thorough and scientific knowledge of agriculture. . . . (qtd. in Berg 2)
While he goes on to indicate that the fact that he was “a son of a hard-handed blacksmith” as a reason for the land grant, this resounds as sentimental rhetoric when compared to the actual economic discourse that motivated his support of the land grant idea.

The actual text of the Land Grant Act itself is devoted to matters of economics. While those who refer to it generally quote the now familiar “…to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life,” the rest of that statement reads that the act shall establish “at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to the agriculture and mechanic arts…” (qtd. in Berg 35). While those lines come from the fourth section of the act, the other eight sections—the majority of the act—are concerned with details of land and budget appropriation and provisions for state use of the lands and monies to come from the act.

The land grant idea was shaped by members of the dominant professional class within a discourse of economic utility. It was the articulation of the desire to serve capitalism in terms of heightened productivity by putting public land into use as capital and facilitating the creation of more productive laborers. However, as I argue below, the formation of public higher education can also be understood as providing the dominant class a way to respond to resistance to the conditions it was creating by constructing working class interests and appearing to serve those interests through a public institution.

Response to Resistance
If, as Turner demonstrates, the history of the land grant can be traced as far back as 1832, the conditions that coincided with this development also make it clear that the formation of public higher education was not simply a proactive tool to create favorable material and cultural conditions for capitalism, but also an attempt to contain growing resistance to those conditions. The historical accounts of the institutionalizing of education, when those accounts do not romanticize education as a democratizing project but rather as the development of what Althusser called “ideological state apparatuses,” tend to frame that history as a somewhat linear development of institutions in an instrumental fashion as a tool of dominant interests to technologize passive subjects. Therefore, the history is framed either as a generous and honorific democratic impulse, or as a totalizing mechanism for controlling subjects. Analy-
sis of the historical context, however, reveals that the relationship is much more complex.

In “Notes on the Schooling of the English Working Class, 1780–1850,” Richard Johnson argues that public education did not develop simply to provide specific labor skills so much as necessary social “skills” and ideologies: “So when economists or economic historians tell us that the industrial revolution ‘required’ new skills in the labour process, we may doubt the premise and also reply that it seems to have needed new human beings with a new, more disciplined, sociality” (49). However, the development of English public education did have a great deal to do with a relationship and response to working class resistance. Johnson points out that working class movements and resistance activities have been well documented by historians such as E.P. Thompson. As radicalism developed, a key element of the radical agenda involved educational programs:

Chartists and Owenites in particular espoused education, really useful knowledge—in much the way in which Gramsci espoused it as a latter-day “Jacobin” and educator for Italian communism. It was tied into political strategies and infused with political meaning. Education was one potent means of revolutionising society; truly human education was an expected benefit of the achievement of social and political rights, economic justice and “the New Moral World.” (51)

The development of institutionalized education can be understood as a response to these radical alternatives, which clearly posed a threat to dominant capitalist interests: “Radicalism aimed to provide substitutes to sponsored forms. Philanthropic educators sought to regulate, destroy or replace the means of cultural reproduction that existed within the working class itself and which provided networks through which radicals could work” (51). The recognition that the driving forces for creating educational institutions included reactions to and attempts to control resistance explains the apparent contradictions between the idea of education as a “democratizing” force and the idea of education as an oppressive instrument of domination. Institutionalized education, in this analysis, can be understood as fulfilling the need for both creating and containing specific social relations. Johnson’s analysis of English schooling, then, becomes pertinent to an analysis of the social context in which American public higher education developed.

As historians such as Howard Zinn and Eric Foner have well established, the developing working-class resistances in early and mid-
nineteenth century America were a web of industrial and agricultural labor movements, complicated by native racism, ethnic immigration, and women's rights movements. Much of this unrest can be understood in distinctly class terms: the working class fighting for identity and rights against a capitalist class seeking to exploit the subordinate class' labor. The anti-renter movement, Dorr's Rebellion, the numerous and often violent strikes in larger cities, and the development of the National Reform Association are among the many examples that indicate this sort of working class unrest in both industrial and agricultural settings. However, there is nothing simple about class, and resistance movements reflected the complexities of the social totality.

In the period preceding the civil war (coincident with the development of the land grant movement), slaves—both black and American Indian—were fighting for their freedom as well. Slave revolts and organizing for revolt were increasingly common in the 1830s. Slave rebellion (such as Nat Turner's rebellion), or the possibility of slave rebellion, shaped social relations, especially in the South, in many ways. Black slaves in the South were not the only slaves at this time, nor were they alone in their uprising. American Indian slavery was widely used throughout the territories, and similar fears of uprisings were prevalent in those territories. Those fears were realized with the Cherokee Slave Revolt of 1842. Zinn's account of these events quotes political and industrial leaders from the time period linking the threats of such revolts to increased militancy and readiness on the part of slaveowners and the state (170). Such militancy also was imposed on white Americans who participated in slave resistance, as Eugene Genovese points out:

The slaveholders... suspected that non-slaveholders would encourage slave disobedience and even rebellion, not so much out of sympathy for the blacks as out of hatred for the rich planters and resentment of their own poverty. White men sometimes were linked to slave insurrectionary plots, and each such incident rekindled fears. (qtd. in Zinn 171)

Activists for women's rights, such as Fanny Wright, Sojourner Truth, and Lucretia Mott, linked slave rights to the larger goal of human emancipation, including women's rights. Anti-slavery resistance and activism posed a threat to capital interests and the country's definition of itself as a rising economic power structure in deep ways. Simultaneously, other forces of resistance complicated social relations between laborers them-
selves as well as between labor and capital. Tensions between Americans and the growing influx of immigrants were apparent. And women were fighting for and winning rights as laborers in impressive actions. Industrial capitalism, built upon structurally racist and sexist systems, divided labor against itself, and labor unrest tended to reflect those divisions.

Although the resistances that were developing were diverse, they all shared a common thread of threatening the dominance of capitalist interests. Zinn argues that one way in which growing class dissent was contained or redirected was through the Civil War. Describing how such diverse labor unrest was developing into a class consciousness, Zinn articulates the arguments made that such resistance was re-channeled through a renewed interest in "nationalism" provided by the war. Alan Dawley notes that despite its diversity, these resistance movements were based on "labor militancy and the rise of class consciousness" (qtd. in Zinn 227-28). Zinn argues, citing Dawley, that it is possible that a unified class movement may have developed

if not for the fact that "an entire generation was sidetracked in the 1860's because of the Civil War." Northern wage earners who rallied to the Union cause became allied with their employers. National issues took over from class issues: "At a time when scores of industrial communities . . . were seething with resistance to industrialism, national politics were preoccupied with the issues of war and reconstruction." And on these issues the political parties took positions, offered choices, obscured the fact that the political system itself and the wealthy classes it represented were responsible for the problems they now offered to solve. (228)

The suggestion, however, that the war was a sufficient disabling mechanism for class unrest may oversimplify the history. Class antagonism did not disappear because of a focus on nationalism, but was clearly contained by a combination of factors. One of those factors included public higher education; and this awareness of class antagonism begins to reveal the way that class itself was rhetorically constructed in the land grant movement as another means of containing resistance and reasserting dominant interests.

The Institutionalization of Class Interests
Joseph Turner initiated a specific construction of "class" in his discourse championing the idea of public higher education: "All civilized society
is, necessarily, divided into two distinct co-operative, not antagonistic, classes. . . . a small class, whose proper business is to teach the true principles of religion, law, medicine, science, art, and literature” (qtd. in James 66). This small class, he calls the “professional” class. The second class is “a much larger class, who are engaged in some form of labor in agriculture, commerce, and the arts,” the “industrial class” (66). Turner argues that the professional class has its educational institutions and that the industrial class deserves the same opportunity for individuals within it to receive “APPROPRIATE LIBERAL EDUCATION, suited to their wants and their destiny” (66).

The identification of a specific class that the land grant was to benefit is central to all discourse surrounding the movement. At the 1852 Springfield Convention, a “memorial” written for the Illinois legislature addresses concerns that state funds would be directed to the universities already in existence because those institutions served the needs of the professional rather than the industrial class. The memorial urges the state to allocate funds “for the equal use of all classes of our citizens, and especially to meet the pressing necessities of the great industrial classes and interests of the State” (James 86). The statement argues for a national policy for “the appropriate endowment of Universities for the liberal education of the Industrial Classes in their several pursuits in each State in the Union” (87).

In his personal notebooks, Senator Morrill’s reflections on his reasons for pursuing the Land Grant Act included “industrial class” interest. He says,

Most of the existing collegiate institutions and their feeders were based upon the classic plan of teaching those only destined to pursue the so-called learned professions, leaving the farmers and mechanics and all those who must win their bread by labor, to the haphazard of being self-taught or not scientifically taught at all, and restricting the number of those who might be supposed to be qualified to fill places of higher consideration in private or public employment to the limited number of the graduates of literary institutions. (qtd. in Berg 2)

These arguments for the land grant initiative are echoed in public opinion, as expressed in newspapers of the time. The Central Illinois Times, for instance, supported the initiative because “It contains a wholesome principle of prosperity and advancement, which will, if fully carried out, tend to elevate and improve the condition of the honest hard working farmer. We have always held that
The first object of government is to afford protection to the working classes, for in them lies the strength and the glory of the nation" (qtd. in James 97). Governor Hunt of New York is quoted as supporting the initiative "which shall stand as a lasting memorial of our munificence, and contribute to the diffusion of intelligence among the producing classes, during all future time" (James 98).

The discourse contains a clear concern for "class interest," and it might well be entertained that the land grant movement represented the actions of what Gramsci calls "organic intellectuals" from the industrial class in securing advantages for that class. "Organic intellectuals," Gramsci explains, are the members of a class able to recognize the needs of their class and able to formulate actions "to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class" (5–6). It is tempting here to see the land grant initiative as such an organic intellectual movement. In fact, Nevins suggests this when he describes the movement: "Throughout the North an irresistible support had been mobilized behind it: farm organizations, labor unions, newspapers..." (3). Earle Ross' history also suggests a class movement: "‘The Industrial Movement' was a term applied to a very general and, at the time, rather indefinite effort of reformers associated with a great variety of ‘causes' to combine both general and vocational educational opportunity at all levels and for all classes of society" (97). Certainly, Turner and the authors of the several memorials to Congress imply a class movement with statements such as: "What do the Industrial Classes Want?.... They want, and they ought to have, the same facilities for understanding the true philosophy—the science and the art of their several pursuits (their life-business)" (qtd. in James 67).

It is important, however, to heed Foucault's warning to look at the complex web of relations in any given discourse. Foucault argues that any examination of a domain of discourse must include questions about its formation: "First question: who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language?" (50). When we look to who is speaking in this discourse, we can identify those speakers as the intellectuals of the professional class, working for the interests of that class. That is, it is those people dressed in the "prestige" of the dominant group—and not the members of the named "industrial" class—who are the speakers for this movement.

A great deal of the discourse surrounding the "support" for the land grant movement is devoted to identifying its leaders, undoubtedly to
create an "ethos" that would secure its acceptance within the dynamics of growing class distinctions. Gramsci argues that there is "spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production" (12). The public discourse around the land grant movement exemplifies the legitimizing function of evoking the "prestige" of the dominant class. In the histories of the Act, Senator Morrill is identified and lauded for "his earnest, wise and persistent advocacy of the policy" (James 8). Nevins credits (in addition to the ambiguous "farm organizations" and "labor unions") "newspapers, the pulpit, groups of educators, and a wide variety of reformers" (3). He goes on to be more specific:

In addition to these historical accounts, the primary documents themselves construct the same ethos of social prestige for passage of the Act.

Accompanying the Memorial to the Illinois legislature is a letter from Alexander Starne, Secretary of State, which identifies "sample sentiments of the press, at home and abroad upon the . . . resolutions" (James 96). The supporters of the concept of the land grant identified include voices from the New York Tribune, The Central Illinois Times, Governor Hunt, the Honorable Marshall P. Wilder, and Reverend Mr. Hitchcock "president of Amherst College" (James 96–99). The letter says, "This memorial [a similar initiative in Massachusetts] is signed by some of the most eminent scholars and civilians of Massachusetts. . . . Do these gentlemen know anything about scholarship, education, practical life and
social want...?” (100). The letter identifies who represents the “farm organizations”: Professor James B. Turner, whose professional class status has been amply identified (109).

The land grant movement was concerned with issues of class, but it is evident that subordinate class interests are being constructed by the dominant class. The dominant class is both identifying the characteristics and needs of a subordinate class, as well as arguing for the mechanisms to meet those defined needs. Importantly, this articulation of “Industrial Class” interests effaces the diversity of the working class needs (or, more correctly, demands) of the period. The working-class resistance of this history integrally depended upon the activism of blacks, American Indians, ethnic minorities, and women. While class struggles at the time revolved around demands for fair labor practices, safe working conditions, equitable property and taxation rights, and even basic human rights, the dominant discourse reflected in the land grant movement redefined those demands as the need for the tools of increased productivity. Additionally, despite the rhetoric of a monolithic “Industrial Class,” the first institutions of public higher education—through the network of other discursive and cultural mechanisms that Foucault argues must be taken into account—effectively only served a very specific segment of the laboring classes. Because of state laws, traditions, specific university admission policies, and deeply entrenched cultural “norms,” women, blacks, and unpropertied whites were for all practical purposes excluded from higher education.

This complicated history reveals several important considerations. First, the land grant college movement laid the foundation for the creation of public institutions of higher education specifically geared toward particular segments of the population. Thus, while appearing to meet the “needs” and demands of all these groups, as an institutional network, those groups were fragmented and their needs differentiated. The rhetoric of the land grant movement serves to efface class (as well as gender and race) difference, while systematically reinscribing those differences through its institutions. Second, the existence of expanded opportunities for education and the dominant framing of those institutions as the means by which the laboring classes might achieve “success” (in the sense of increased economic mobility—the promise of liberal capitalism), enabled the dominant social interests to both name (and thus redefine) and address the needs of the subordinate classes. In some senses, the very sites of struggle for those excluded from higher education—and all it promised—focused on access to those opportunities for each particular group.
This can be understood as undermining the working class solidarity that Zinn and others argue was forming prior to the Civil War. The formation of American public higher education, then, can be understood as contributing to the redefining and the fragmenting of working class interests, and, in this sense, the American public university exemplifies the function of hegemony as containment.

Institutional Work in a New Light
Analyzing the formation and function of cultural institutions in terms of this concept of hegemony—that is, the simultaneously responding to resistance and actively creating structures to propagate dominant interests—enables us to consider the continued development of such institutions in a more critical fashion. The analysis of just one fundamental moment in the formation of public higher education demonstrates that such institutions arise and are shaped by contested and contradictory motivations. The leaders of the movement, as I have attempted to show, were impelled both by economic imperatives in their own interest and the need to address possible social resistance that developed out of the growing inequity of a capitalist system that requires inequity to expand. In responding to resistance in a particular way, reconstructing interests and solutions to problems, dominant institutions gain the support and consent of a larger public and function to effectively conceal the ways in which they are imbricated in the problems they claim to address.

Because these institutions function in this way, the conditions that cause social inequity that brought the resistance to begin with do not substantially change. Therefore, moments of resistance continue, though perhaps fragmented by the responses of dominant structures. Those dominant structures and institutions must remain continually responsive to emerging pressures. Gramsci explains that the creation and alteration of dominant structures (state entities and parties, media, church and religious organizations, financial institutions) is wholly connected to responding to such crises when the “ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only ‘dominant’” (275). He connects these institutional responses directly to education: “The crisis of the curriculum and organisation of the schools, i.e. of the overall framework of a policy for forming modern intellectual cadres, is to a great extent an aspect and a ramification of the more comprehensive and general organic crisis” (26). The contemporary climate I described in opening this essay point to such a crisis.
Public higher education has historically played a significant role in responding to these crises by adapting to various social pressures in ways that contain and redefine resistance. The various legislative acts that have altered the discursive parameters of public higher education can be understood in much the same fashion as I have argued that the land grant act itself can be read. For instance, the various acts have made public education responsive to expanded groups of people (such as women and blacks). As William DeGenaro has described, the turn of the century saw the development of a second tier of institutions of higher education, the “Junior College,” in order to provide yet another segment of the working class the means to enhance their productivity and competitiveness as free laborers. Legislative acts have served to re-invigorate economic incentive in relation to home ownership, and to redress conditions created by war (the G.I. Bill) at the same time as providing incentive for continued service and readiness for war. As Randy Martin further points out in his introduction to Chalk Lines, contemporary legislation regarding public higher education also functions to ameliorate individual consumer credit and tax relief in response to economic uncertainty and a precarious credit-based financial system.

Within the institution of higher education itself, resistance—which both reflects and is rooted in larger social contexts—continually develops and is effectively contained in institutional rhetoric and policies. At moments of increased civil unrest surrounding national events such as war or civil rights movements, the ways in which resistance is addressed from within institutions of higher education (not simply individual institutions, but across them through professional bureaucratic entities) can be understood as reconstructing that resistance and creating contained spaces for that resistance. If we are in a similar historical moment to the conditions that created the land grant movement and the expansion of higher education, historical analysis suggests that higher education will tend to reflect its function of preserving and perpetuating the dominant socioeconomic system.

As we shape our scholarly work and academic programs to respond to social conditions, it is necessary to scrutinize the implications of our work, especially those activities that have direct impact on communities (service learning, literacy centers, community partnerships). Given that the historic and continuing function of higher education must be understood as hegemonic, and given that hegemony itself always reveals moments of contradiction and resistance, we are in a position to ask how rhetorical theory and discursive analyses might continue
to offer the potential of not simply reinscribing dominant interests, but actively identifying and challenging the ways in which resistance is contained.

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Notes

1. For just a few examples and extended discussion on this point, see Crowley, Ohmann, and Berlin.

2. A quick survey of the literature over the past century demonstrates this ongoing critique. Just over fifty years after the passing of the Land Grant Act establishing public colleges in every state, Thorstein Veblen wrote The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum On the Conduct of Universities by Business Men. In 1974, Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital: Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century linked the development of higher education with the importation of German models of industry and education, connecting corporate research parks and departments of science and engineering. Recently, there has been an increase in scholarship concerned with analyzing the relationship of higher education to what have now become globalized corporate structures. Full-length books on the subject include: Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins, Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt’s Academic Keywords: A Devil’s Dictionary for Higher Education, Annette Kolodny’s Failing the Future: A Dean Looks at Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century, Stanley Aranowitz’s The Knowledge Factory, and Chalk Lines: The Politics of Work in the Managed University edited by Randy Martin; and a proliferation of articles in academic journals such as Antipode (“Who Rules this Sausage Factory?”), College English (“Ivory Arches and Golden Towers: Why We’re All Consumer Researchers Now”), or JAC (“Politics, Pedagogy, and Profession of Composition: Confronting Commodification and Contingencies of Power,” “Class Consciousness and the Junior College Movement: Creating a Docile Workforce”); and non-academic publications such as Mother Jones (“Digital Diplomas”), The Atlantic (“The University, Inc.”), and The Harvard Magazine (“The Market-Model Univeristy: Humanities in the Age of Money”) to name only a few.

3. For an extensive treatment of the relationship between slavery, labor, and the Civil War, see Foner. His treatment explicates the “ideology of free labor” and examines the complicated ways in which slavery, anti-slavery, and Republicanism functioned at this historical moment. His argument concerning “free labor” supports my previous analysis of liberal capitalism drawn from Hall and Gramsci.

4. According to Ron Eyerman (from the introduction of Intellectuals, Universities, and the State in Western Modern Societies), “Gramsci distin-
guished between organic and traditional intellectuals. He saw the former as indigenous to a particular class and as the articulators of its specific, class-related interests” (4). Gramsci, in his discussion of the organic intellectual for a modern society, claims that, “In the modern world, technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new type of intellectual” (9). Gramsci’s own arguments about the organic intellectual in modern society provide some explanation for the appearance of subordinate class interests being spoken for. Eyerman says, “Gramsci claimed that the subordinate working class was not in a position to create its own ‘organic’ intelligentsia. With Lenin and Kautsky, he believed that parts of the traditional intelligentsia, déclassé, would join with the working-class movement to become, if not its leaders, at least the articulators of its class interests—that is, formulating its ideology” (4).

5. That the originally established land grant colleges did indeed exclude much of the working class, blacks, and women is evidenced by the historical debates and the passage of subsequent acts to create additional colleges for women and blacks. The 1862 Act was, and continues to be, followed by legislation regarding this relationship. For example, women were allowed to enroll in public land grant universities with men on a state by state basis by the (always controversial) grace of a progressive administrator such as James Calder at Pennsylvania State in 1871. In other states, such as Mississippi in 1884, public women’s colleges were formed in response to what became articulated as the need for women to be educated in the science and vocation of home economics. The “Second Land Grant Act” of 1890 explicitly addressed “equality” by mandating a second college in every state primarily for the education of blacks. In 1887, the Hatch Act mandated the creation of agricultural experiment stations for scientific research. In 1907 an amendment to the Morrill Act led increased funding to existing land grant institutions. The Smith-Lever Act was passed in 1914, creating the mandate for land grant institutions to provide communities with the benefits of research and teaching through extension services. Additional legislation since the Morrill Act has created new mandates and additional appropriations. Some examples of this legislation include the Bankhead-Jones Act, 1935; the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (G.I. Bill of Rights), 1944; the Bankhead-Flannagan Act, 1945; the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith-Mundt Act), 1948; the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), 1958; the Higher Education Act, 1965; and the National and Community Service Trust Act, 1993.

Works Cited


