Reading is hard. It is made harder when our interpretive grids function as gatekeepers against new ideas or ideas that run counter to our current understanding. But I think it is hardest when we encounter "counterjectionist" thinking. A counterjectionist poses something old in the guise of something new. If the counterjectionist is successful, he or she trips up readers by tricking them into thinking they, too, feel the resonance of the old in the new. Admittedly, it is next to impossible to posit the new in new terms (or to see the new with new eyes). I would call this event something like "projectionist" thinking. It also falls into the category of the virtual,
which is closer to what I mean, even though the virtual is too often pitted only against the actual. I try to read, write, and think in this way in order to "future proof" myself (inasmuch as this is possible), both for my own edification and for the sake of my students. I want to be ready for the future when we stumble into it together. I want to smell it up close, and not just remember the past under some hip/gnosis. I suppose this accounts for my reaction to John Trimbur's "Agency and the Death of the Author: A Partial Defense of Modernism"—specifically, his desire "to suspend for a moment the millennial sense of urgency that seems to drive postmodern theorizing" (285). Aside from the fact that this state of suspension would detain us on our way to the future, it also feels like a derailment waiting to happen.

Trimbur is not, in my view, bluntly counterjectionist in his thinking, but I worry that his essay will be welcomed by such critics in order to shore up their own "retrosubjectivist" projects. And that prospect is the key difficulty I have with his modest proposal to rehabilitate the concept of agency (via Marx) and the concept of the modernist subject (via the Enlightenment). The problem is one of attitude, of the angle of the pitch—forward (future, virtual) or backward (retro, actual). To be sure, the coastline is impossible to measure in the wake of postmodern theory. Although there may be value in redrawing the shoreline as it might have looked before, even that image will vary, of course, depending on who is drawing the line. Casting my brief response in these terms, I trust that setting my sights on the virtual—while keeping Trimbur's view also in mind—is enough to delineate a possible common horizon. Where we differ will be made clear as I revisit some key conceptual starting points for Trimbur's argument: the death of the author, postmodern theory, subjectivity, agency, doing, freedom, the streets, and the present. Where we agree rests in the language of his call to upgrade what is outmoded, to reconstitute the obsolete and retrograde, and to mobilize allegiances against "an archive of dated beliefs" that merely leaves us "with the shard of an old lexicon instead of a motive for action" (289-90).

There is a difference, however, between trying to reconstitute subjectivity by replacing outdated theories with updated "structures of feeling," and using familiar landmarks (topoi, metaphors) in order to go offshore altogether. In the latter case, we can traffic in what I will call "beta rhetoric": a testbed platform from which we can invent and move theoretical contraband (such as new registers of agency and author-effects made possible by virtual networks) outside the jurisdiction of mainstream rhetoric and composition and continental philosophy. Going "beta" also
allows me to structure this response by way of "tiny deconstructions" that are, in one sense, direct responses to Trimbur and, in another sense, perform as thirteenth-century quodlibeta—that is, as a type of scholarly exercise comprised of disputations that conjoin a mixture of texts of various provenances (or, in music, a whimsical succession of pieces spontaneously strung together). More importantly, the appeal of quodlibeta is that the disputation could center on "any problem whatsoever (de quolibet) proposed by any listener whatsoever (a quolibet)" (Alluntis and Wolter xxv). And now to the q's.

Cueing the Queue of Q's
In Trimbur's "partial defense of modernism," which he admits is "partial in the sense of limited, unfinished, and partisan," I am slightly troubled by his reduction of postmodernist theory to mere reactionary thinking against modernism, and by his claim that some critics use it in order to "blackmail" us with a "fear of the Universal Subject," which, he suggests, is at best apolitical and at worst put "to questionable political ends" (286, 294). Mind you, I am not discounting some vestige of currency in Trimbur's arguments; some are powerfully expedient trajectories to the future—for example, when he discusses Foucault's "mode of reflective relation to the present," and Robert Darnton's interpretation of "hack writers ... produc[ing] a constant stream of libelles" against France's Old Regime, which are ideas I will return to. I think Trimbur may have hitched a ride on the wrong side of the road leading to where he wants to go. Or, as a student once said to me, "You've got the right string, but the wrong yo-yo."

Not wanting to dwell too long on Trimbur's minor mishandling of postmodern theory, let me just say why reducing postmodern theory and then dismissing it so briefly severely limits the depth and complexity of the various theories we might generally construe as strategies of deconstruction. Although Trimbur's analysis does not discount variations on postmodernist views of subjectivity, it does have the effect of not taking into account some of the positive alternatives developed under the rubrics of poststructuralism and postmodernism. As Trimbur notes, what made the author "obsolete" came about after the "failed revolution in 1968" (the student riots in Paris), during which time the "changing relations of writing and reading" posited by Derrida and Lyotard (among other "revisionist currents on the Left Bank") left the author "fragmented and decentered" (283). Derrida announced that "[t]he 'subject' of writing does not exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author."
The subject of writing is a *system* of relations between strata: the Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the world" ("Freud" 226-27). Subjectivity is "inscribed in a system of *differance*" (Positions 28).

Eschewing the "subject" of such a circulatory system, Trimbur wants to "keep at least a version of the author alive and kicking" as a "vital point to organize around, in writers' guilds, unions, congresses, cooperatives, and other associations for self-management" (295-96). But his definitions of and warnings about postmodern deconstructions of the author and agency tend to characterize the subject in such a way that it leaves no durable space for understanding why notions of the author as an agent of a theoretical central self were originally debunked. Trimbur understands the stakes and how they got so high, and partially agrees with Bruce McComiskey, for example, who argues that the "Enlightenment conception of the Subject . . . leads inevitably to [physical and metaphysical] violence" (352). What troubles Trimbur is how such conclusions end up rewriting history. Thus, he turns to Foucault’s qualifier that "one doesn’t have to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ the Enlightenment" in order to recoup what "we believe to be indispensable in the Enlightenment for the ‘constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects’" (Trimbur 291). It is not clear, however, whether Trimbur patches us all the way through to the Foucault-Kant front, since he filters out any noise on the line about the "new" subject, as when Foucault posits: "To be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in the vocabulary of his day, calls *dandysme*" (41). In so doing, Trimbur unconsciously misleads by misrepresenting both the motives and matter of some postmodern analyses in his attempt to counter what he views as postmodernism’s originary misleading. Predicated on such terms as *decentering*, *fragmentation*, *impasse*, and *vacancy*, postmodern theory comes across as destructive and nihilistic, characterizations that have not gone unaddressed by those accustomed to explaining deconstruction. According to John Caputo, deconstruction is "not some stealthy, cunning agent of disruption, is not an agent at all"; rather, it "simply [passes] the word along that one is rather more on one’s own that one likes to think" (4). Caputo explains:

Deconstruction shows how a film of undecidability creeps quietly over the clarity of decisions, on cat-soft paws, clouding judgment just ever so much, so that we cannot quite make out the figures all around us. But do not be mistaken. *Deconstruction offers no excuse not to act*. Deconstruction
does not put up a stop sign that brings action to a halt, to the full stop of\ndecision; rather, it installs a flashing yellow light, warning drivers who\nmust in any case get where they are going to proceed with caution, for the\nway is not safe. Undecidability does not detract from the urgency of\ndecision; it simply underlines the difficulty. (4; emphasis added)

In a similar vein, Drucilla Cornell renames deconstruction “the philoso­­phy of the limit” precisely because it “does not reduce the philosophical\ntradition to an ‘unreconstructable’ litter, thus undermining the possibility\nof determining precepts for moral action; rather, it exposes the quasi­­transcendental conditions that establish any system, including a legal\nsystem as a system” (1).

Trimbur argues, however, that “agency” is not about explaining,\nespecially explaining “why people act as they do”; rather, it’s “a question\nof what is to be done” (287). That Trimbur makes this claim under what\nhe believes is the full steam of his sovereign subjectivity reinforces his\naim to put to rest the “rumor” that the author has died. A vital Ronell makes\na fascinating point on this topic in an interview with Diane Davis. Ronell\nsuggests that the author was never “not dead and that it has never stopped\ndying.” Furthermore, she explains,

\[\text{Psychoanalysis has been declared dead, too, and so has deconstruction, but, as we know, the dead can be very powerful. Freud illustrates or throws this power switch in } \textit{Totem and Taboo}: \text{when the little resentful hordes of brothers get together and kill this powerful father, what they discover is that they are left with remorse and unmanageable haunting and sadness, such that the dead father turns out to be more powerful dead than he ever was alive. He is more alive when he is dead. Thus, to declare writing dead can also, in fact, make it more haunting, more difficult and commanding. (Davis 254)}\]

Trimbur, in contrast, believes the problems associated with resusci­­tating agency (as the “missing link” in postmodern accounts of subjectivity) are the direct result of postmodernism having “dissolved” the author “into the semiosis of intertextuality” (283). He would have us retract the\ndissolution or death of the author, revive “the ethos of the High Enlight­­enment” (which, as Foucault suggests, enabled us to “[throw] off the yoke” of “self-caused immaturity”) and the French Revolution, after\nwhich we can all go about continuing “‘the undefined work of freedom,’\nwhich is the modernist legacy” (294).

Yet, calculating a link between writing and revolution equates lan­­guage with meaning in a way that is not unproblematic. In “Reading the
World,” Gayatri Spivak suggests that the question of freedom is at the heart of the dispute about reading that exists between rhetoric and composition theorists and literary critics. Spivak claims that the “fear of a critical reading that would question the writer’s direct access to his or her meaning is related to the received dogma of the illusion of freedom” (30). Trimbur argues that such claims challenge the “felt sense of presence and agency that individuals and groups experience at those moments of historical crisis when they know what they are doing and join together, with their differences, at the center of their own history, without debilitating irony or doubt” (295). That’s cutting to the chase. Solidarity, however, cuts two ways—for example, we must remember Jonestown, Columbine, Oklahoma City, Waco, Berlin. Preferring the “the old modernist project of negotiating differences out in the streets,” Trimbur rejects what he terms “the project of preserving difference as an always uncertain theoretical foundation” (295). Still, an interpellation that draws us together under the banner of “the streets” is also not unproblematic.

Cueing the Virtual Q’s
Thus far I’ve had to be a bit circumspect about Trimbur’s retrospective on the modernist subject, focusing on what I consider the most neglected aspect of his argument—that he grounds his call to action in a nostalgia for modernism and the subject of Enlightenment rationality by pointing to the impotence of postmodern theory and its story of the death of the author (“for all its charms”). Turning now to points of agreement—to ways of upgrading what is outmoded, and reconstituting what is obsolete and retrograde—I slip into a virtual “contact zone” not of my own making, but one that is “in the making.” As I suggested earlier, I’m not necessarily juxtaposing the virtual with the actual so much as adjusting the attitude, or the pitch, of terms like agent, the streets, and the present. I envision the array of SETI dishes pointed to the sky in the film Contact, moving in order to capture a signal long enough to translate its message. Here is where I cue the future and spin some projectionist (and virtual) tales in which new registers of agency and authorship not only resist codification in the language of modernism, they also presage its radical metamorphosis. In Silicon Second Nature, Stefan Helmreich writes: “As Artificial Life researchers embrace the logics of synthetic vitality, they come to possess a new sort of subjectivity, a silicon second nature that may be increasingly common among humans inhabiting a world in which computers are haunted by ‘life’” (12). These are wild haunts, admittedly. But I’m discovering that it’s wild all the way down.
Recently, a few of us on the Computers, Writing, and Theory listserv had occasion to discuss such invocations of “the streets” made in the name of doing the so-called real work of teaching, as opposed to what some see as mere theorizing (see Olson’s discussion of the backlash against theory). When it was suggested that somehow we need to “take theory to the streets,” it seemed to me worth noting that the concept of the streets is changing in substantive ways. I wrote:

Taking theory to the street, or “doing street theory” may be a preferable way to cloak (cloak as outerwear or as concealing) one’s theorizing or reading theory in the domain of action (activity). I’m really interested in why the “street” legitimizes theorizing in the way some seem to want it to. Taken further, I wonder whether this list could be considered a “street”? Are we neighbors in that way? Is it not susceptible to the same drive-by shootings, block parties, strolling, protests, onlooking, rubbernecking, gossiping, preaching, bike-riding, roller-skating, yo-yoing, hopscotching, ropeskipping, barbequing, hammering, street-dancing? What counts as “the street”? What counts as “doing theory”? (12 July 1999)

I’d like to think every street is like the Berlin Wall, imagined and materialized (real-ized) in the form of mondo theoretical hairsplitting at the highest level—yet taken down slab by slab, covered with swarms of jubilant people dangling legs over bittersweet graffiti. Taggers, as graffiti artists call themselves, liken their work to “hanging your alias on their scene.” And even as I look out tonight on a placid glacial fjord in Norway, light still at two a.m., snow in the elevations, the sounds of the sheep’s jangling bells when I startle them while taking a walk outside to hear the raging waterfall but fifty yards from my window—even as I witness all this serenity, these same streets were occupied by German forces that were hunting down resistance fighters in World War II, one of whom lived in this house, and who died in a camp not far from here after being taken in the night, near this waterfall, with the sound of bells jangling as the abduction took place. Hanging our alias on any scene is not, for me, about finding the “way out.” It’s about living with the duality, the dangers, the arctic ice in all its beauty shifting into thundering avalanches, or knowing that it can and will. Maybe on this street, maybe tonight.

How we figure street theory makes an immense difference, but what sort of subjects are we if our figurations are haunted by tropes such as bandwidth and speed? What time zones are our streets in? What alias are we hanging on whose scene if we jockey between images of restoration and devastation? Is this not the nature of the sublime? That combination

The infobahn (the information highway), however, does more than just teach an old metaphor new tricks; it shifts the locus of the streets and exponentially multiplies them at the same time. It also cuts through what makes the streets such an enticing topos by problematizing the relations among temporality, spatiality, activity, and agency. New tropes emerge, such as proximity and speed. New pockets of autonomy fade in and out. New critical avenues replace the old: the rhetoric of the glitch, resolution fatigue (what filters out the graininess of reality?), coded immersion, real-time mobility markets (moving in all directions at once). To encounter these other textures of thinking, it is necessary to cross the borders of our discursive comfort zones and seek temporary asylum among other discourses. For example, accustomed (and cautious) as we are about the history of “error,” making it something worth studying requires the kind of casuistic stretching that some digital artists find palpable material for constructing art. Belinda Barnet and Nik Gaffney make use of the fact that “the nature of technology is that it breaks down. Computers run out of memory, the web is full of dead links, programs crash, information is garbled. . . . Why is the glitch dangerously political, anarchic, then? It draws attention to the constructed nature of information. To its fragility, usually hidden from us. To its nature as bits, not atoms. The glitch interferes with perfect reproduction.” Carried into the domain of subjectivity, the glitch also suggests a hitch in spreading the rumor of autonomy, which is not to say autonomy does not surface from time to time. Hakim Bey calls this the “temporary autonomous zone” (T.A.Z.). According to Bey, “by extrapolating from past and future stories about ‘islands in the net’ we may collect evidence to suggest that a certain kind of ‘free enclave’ is not only possible in our time but also existent.”

Like Trimbur, I am also enamored of Kant’s call for the “maturity” with which to “overthrow custodial care and take things into your own hands” (294). It seems there has never been a more fecund period in which to achieve just that, but not necessarily on modernist grounds. This is not to say that digital culture is utopian, nor that teletechnologies are ubiquitous or unproblematic. As Ronell notes, “I have never thought positive technologies initiate new modalities of Being or reflection. Very often these technologies, I have tried to show, respond to some sort of rupture that itself isn’t even entirely new—there isn’t the epistemic, clean-cut or clear new beginning” (Davis 256-57). Having said that, I also want to say that the issue of access is as problematic now as it was when books were first bound and printed and the illiterate were excluded from knowledge
as much by the economics of buying books as by their access to education and learning to read. The degree of belief and participation in social responsibility, however, seems to be escalating, made easier by networked collectives for whom previously limited proximity to one another prevented qualitative collaboration on common goals. In short, it is no longer as easy to criticize the rush to technologize on the grounds that it further marginalizes the already disenfranchised. Even *WIRED* magazine—the erstwhile bible of the new “optionaires” (millionaires on paper)—recently compared the number of people in Africa with access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities to the number of Africans who own PC’s and the number of local Internet providers per country (Behar 137-38). And as early as 1994, *WIRED* reported on the question of priorities in Africa. Jeff Greenwald interviewed Babacar Fall—a Senegalese journalist and communications specialist appointed by UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization—on the effort to revive the Pan African News Agency (PANA). According to Greenwald,

It’s well known that aid projects on the continent have a history of expensive failure; the reason, Fall advanced, is the dismal state of African communications.

“You can’t treat people like cattle,” he stated imperatively. “You have to convince them—which means you have to communicate with them. For twenty years, the priorities for development in Africa have included agriculture, health, and the environment. Yes. But none of these can succeed if there’s no communication. You can’t develop agriculture if you can’t have a dialogue with the farmers in rural areas. You can’t improve health if people aren’t informed about major epidemics like AIDS. You can’t protect the environment if you can’t communicate with the people who are placing it in danger. The industrial countries have spent billions of dollars trying to develop agriculture, change health conditions, and fight problems like pollution and desertification. Nearly all these programs have failed. Finally, we understand why: There is no way to develop a country if the people cannot participate.”

Additionally, *WIRED* reports that the exiled government of Tibet is a new client of a radical organization called HavenCo, which has established the first data haven that answers to no government. Located on Sealand, a sixty-year-old gunnery fort (offshore platform) in the North Sea, HavenCo’s founder Ryan Lackey (a twenty-one-year-old MIT dropout) established his offshore, off-government company on a “principality” occupied by a British couple who took over the fortress through
a loophole in international law called "dereliction of sovereignty" (Garfinkel 236). They proclaimed the independence of Sealand and even issued passports and minted gold and silver coins. The point of the partnership between Sealand and HavenCo is to give entities like Tibet Online an Internet presence and to "test some of the edges of our geopolitical economy" (234). Lackey believes that "freedom is the next killer app" (230; emphasis added). For those less geeky, that means freedom is the next big software application to come along.

In computing circles, such examples of the "hacker ethic" provides a corrective to industry standards and planned obsolescence by what is called the "open source" movement. It's no secret that technology innovation struggles against proprietary models of research and development. I compare it to a similar model in composition pedagogy: innovative theory is driven out by the proprietary textbook publishing industry. In other words, the question of authorship and agency gets played out along the same lines as it does in programming and electronic expression. But instead of recommending the author as "a vital point to organize around," as Trimbur suggests, writers should follow the lead of writers online (including programmers) who tend to foster trust among themselves in an "open source" cross-platform environment. Additionally, presented with other registers of agency as we write (for example, the ability to encrypt texts) and as we read (that is, when we read texts screened for us by our own software agents trolling the Internet according to our reading habits), we have to theorize the passage of texts among agents (who could be actual or virtual) as much as or more than we do the construction and interpretation of texts among authors, which has been the primary business of rhetoric and composition until now.

Hypertext and cybertexts—what Espen Aarseth calls "ergodic literature"—are just two examples of new forms of writing and reading that virtual spaces like the WWW and MOOs (and programs like Dreamweaver and Storyspace) make possible. Aarseth's research should be particularly interesting to rhetorical theorists because of his explicit use of literary theory. Aarseth explains,

> During the cybertexual process, the user will have effectuated a semiotic sequence, and this selective movement is a work of physical construction that the various concepts of 'reading' do not account for. This phenomenon I call *ergodic*, using a term appropriated from physics that derives from the Greek words *ergon* and *hodos*, meaning 'work' and 'path.' In ergodic literature, nontrivial effort is required to allow the reader to traverse the text.
In one sense, older rhetorical forms seem to be reemerging. And while format is no longer exterior to (or unrelated to) thinking, it isn't as deterministic in the ways that essays have been over the years.

I guess if anything I've learned to be "format agnostic," which is also to say, in the context of this essay, "subjectivity agnostic." I would not have us use one "operating system" instead of another, subscribe to one "provider" instead of another, or advocate one "interface" instead of another. Yet, I would not have us build more foundations on modernist soil. I would have us go offshore, or, as Rem Koolhaas and Lebbeus Woods do, I would "explore the unmaterial world" (qtd. in Wolf 314-15). Koolhaas and Woods, in different ways, fashion radical architectural concepts that have a bearing on agency and on what counts as "the street." As Gary Wolf explains, Koolhaas perceived that "architectural concepts have marketable value even if concrete is never poured. Perhaps especially if concrete is never poured" (314-15). This could also apply to theorizing the subject. Koolhaas sees his job, Wolf writes, as analyzing "the relationship between human behavior, built structures, and the invisible networks of commerce and culture" (315). Woods, in fact, is famous for having never built any of his designs. He has, however, designed a freescape for the city of Zagreb after it was destroyed, and he theorizes about the relation between the architecture of decay (and the unbuilt) and the urban subject.

My agnosticism also extends to defining agency under any specific regime as having been more effective than any other in dismantling oppressive power structures. The "ethos of the High Enlightenment" is a bit tarnished—to put it mildly. Thus, invoking, as Trimbur does, the hack writers of the Old Regime who produced "a constant stream of . . . slanderous, pornographic, and sensationalistic attacks on every aspect of respectable society" seems less useful than invoking hackers on the Web, which is rife with such libelles written by all manner of "authors" game enough to negotiate their differences out in the virtual streets (293). Agency is alive and kicking. Consider the resurrection of Morse Code, which is now being harnessed for rehabilitation therapy through the use of Augmentative-Alternative Communication and Assistive Technology, including mobility and adapted worksite access for para- and quadriplegics. Other inroads include high-end experimental virtual reality systems that can give quadriplegics immersive experiences such as the experience of walking again. And refinements in voice recognition software are increasing the access to knowledge for the blind and disabled.

It is encouraging that Trimbur heeds Foucault's call for a "mode of
reflective relation to the present," but let us also look to alternative testbeds of reality (or beta rhetorics of real-time, such as MOOs) as other instantiations of the "present" worth exploring. If we add to Trimbur's Brechtian theater-like "dramatic laboratory" the new laboratory of the technological and virtual (or the unmaterial) world, we will see that "spectators [have] become collaborators" in ways previously unavailable to them in the offline world. Thus, it is difficult to share Trimbur's sense that we are "without recourse to collective self-defining action," given just the few examples I could present in the space of this response (297). We may be "cast" into the world without recourse to anti-revisionist accounts of modernist values, but do we need them in this rapidly changing virtual world?

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**Notes**

1. I deal more substantially with these issues in my current project, *Beta Rhetoric: A Virtual Anatomy of Technology, Writing, and Deconstruction*.

2. The use of "tiny" is drawn from the practice of "tinysex" in online chat spaces like MUDs (multi-user domains) and IRC (Internet Relay Chat), and from a general sense of "being" online (see Dibbell). See also Benedikt's online description of various MUD protocols. She writes, "When the prefix 'Tiny' is put in front of a word, it puts the word in the context of happening on a MU* (after the first MU*, TinyMUD). For example: TinyJerk, TinyPlot, TinySex."

3. *Quodlibeta* (from the Latin *quodlibet* meaning "what you want," or "as you would like it") also concerned "free discussions" not restrained to a particular subject and written after a scholar (teacher) had a widespread renown. These "miscellanies" took the form of "answers to questions which . . . began to come to him, not only from the academic world in which he lived, but from all classes of persons and from every part of Christendom" (Catholic Encyclopedia). Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham (among others) published on *quodlibetal* questions.

4. Computers, Writing, and Theory (http://lingua.utdallas.edu/rhetoric/cwt.html) is an e-mail discussion group committed to discussion on a number of topics related to computers and writing (broadly defined), rhetoric and composition and technology, and the theory and pedagogy related to electronic expression in these fields.

5. For some discussion on this outside of the United States, see Holmevik and Haynes, "Norwegian Accords." It should be noted that much of the research about online collaboration is featured in the field of computers and writing in the
U.S., but there are vast collectives involved in reshaping and redefining collaboration that should not go unnoticed, and *Global Literacies*, where our article appears, is unique in its approach to this topic.

6. It would be useful here to point to other models of agency and subjectivity—for example, Elam's notion of "groundless solidarity" and Braidotti's notion of "nomadic subjects." For a brief and general explanation of the concepts of self or subject in composition, see Haynes' "Self/the Subject."

7. Virilio's critiques of the fetishization of the *present* (his fear that real-time teletechnologies will "kill the present") have been hotly debated among digital theorists for several years. For my views on Virilio, see "Total ReCALL" and Holmevik and Haynes, "CypherText." See also Virilio's *Open Sky* and the recent collection of Virilian criticism edited by Armitage. This issue could also be situated perhaps against the backdrop of Latour's argument that it is problematic to theorize about postmodernity because "we have never been modern" yet.

**Works Cited**


