Many of us have probably taken a ride on Disney’s *It’s A Small World*, which premiered at the 1964 New York World’s Fair, reappeared at California’s Disneyland in 1966, and has since been installed at Florida’s Disney World, Tokyo Disneyland, and Disneyland Paris. For critics of Disney, this ride has become emblematic of Disneyfied community: we travel on the so-called “rivers of the world” through six large rooms of audio-animatronic children dressed in the native costumes of various regions, all singing “It’s A Small World After All,” all with Euro-American facial features, all with the same bodies, all happy. In the last room, the children are dressed in white, in a grand display of what Stephen Fjellman has called “simulated ecumenism.” Here, white is the color of transcendence, of departure from the material plane—that is, departure from diversity, competition, conflict, violence.

At this point in the ride, then, the representation of community reflects the desire for magic—that is, for symbolic action in the service of social or individual transformation (see Covino, *Magic* 11-16). This desire is answered by a vision of idealized community, a community that, as I will propose in this essay, is consistent both with the harmonizing of difference that generally characterizes the phenomenon of Disneyfication and with the traditional role of the sorcerer as the figure who invokes the rhetoric of the culture in power. In this initial example, we might name the sorcerer “Walt Disney,” inasmuch as this name represents a global corporate force that seeks to identify “magic” with an institutional rhetoric that defines imagination and intelligence in very conservative terms.

In positing Disney as an influential sorcerer, I take seriously Jean Baudrillard’s concern that Disney is in the process of “capturing all the real world to integrate it into its synthetic universe, in the form of a vast ‘reality show’ where reality itself becomes a spectacle, ... where the real becomes a theme park.” The Disney Company owns three television networks (ABC, Lifetime, and the Disney Channel), theaters on Broad-
way and in Chicago, a radio network, four theme parks, a new theme park in development in Hong Kong, an online amusement park, a cruise line, a store in almost every large shopping mall, two professional sports teams, virtual reality theme parks in Florida and Chicago (DisneyQuest), and a residential community called Celebration. Disney's efforts to colonize the real world are matched by its theme-park appropriations of Western cultures; this effort is perhaps most apparent in the compressions of history and geography that occur throughout Disney World in Florida, which I will discuss further below.

Against the rhetorics of the sorcerer, whose purpose is to maintain and contain the culture in power, I would counterpose the rhetoric of the witch, whose purpose is to confront and disrupt the culture in power. Both the sorcerer and the witch advertise community, and both appeal to the desire for magic. The sorcerer identifies the transformative power of magic with conservation, materializing simulacra that reinforce established values and discourage critical thinking, while the witch identifies magic with radical change, with counter-spells. Historically, the sorcerer and the witch are sometimes difficult to distinguish, but it is often the case that the sorcerer is the most powerful member of the court, while the witch is a heretic, perceived as a threat to the good working order of the official community. The witch that I will focus on in this essay is Mary Daly, who, as Disney's nemesis, confronts the sorcerer's rhetoric of community with her Wickedary, a work that constructs an alternative "magic kingdom" (one without kings) through an insistence on an anti-patriarchal lexicon. The witch and the sorcerer have been pitted against each other for centuries. Their is a history of conflict that I would like to survey here in order to contextualize more fully the Disney/Daly agonistic and to show the ways in which the competition to lead the community entails the advocacy and legitimation of opposing forms of invention and imagination.

The Sorcerer, the Witch, and the Law
The situation of witches has changed since the Middle Ages, inasmuch as witches have gained broad (though scarcely universal) acceptance more as religious than as magical figures. The Y2K New Age witch is represented on the Web site of the Covenant of the Goddess, which defines itself as a "nonprofit religious corporation" and a participant in the "North American Interfaith Network." The Covenant is rather explicit about its mission to counteract the traditional view of witches:

After thousands of years of "bad press" we are coming out of the "broom closet" to educate the public about ourselves and our religion. Moreover,
we acknowledge the need to establish a rapport with the ecumenical religious community.

... Though practices may vary, most traditions have many similarities, such as the working of magic and a respect for nature. Most Witches find enough common ground for mutual support and productive networking throughout the Craft community.

This witch is, of course, kinder and gentler than some of her feminist contemporaries, such as Daly’s Great Hag of History, or the witch portrayed in Robin Morgan’s *Sisterhood is Powerful*—a witch who is “groovy, courageous, aggressive, intelligent, nonconformist, explorative, curious, independent, sexually liberated, revolutionary,” and who is set against the “death-dealing, sexual, economic, and spiritual repression of the Imperialist Phallic Society” (605).

One way to describe the difference between the witch of the Covenant of the Goddess and witches that derive from the tradition of wicked women is to call the Goddess-Witch “religious” and the wicked witch “magical.” Religion differs from magic insofar as religion beseeches the powers of the universe and magic compels those powers. The New Age definition of witchcraft as a cooperative enterprise, enacted in corporate unity with other religions, seeks to deliver it from the criminal realm of compulsion, to make it less magical and, in effect, less dangerous. The magical, dangerous witch is the one exemplified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through Heinrich Kraemer and James Sprenger’s *Malleus Maleficarum*, the “Witches’ Hammer,” which was the handbook for the persecution and execution of witches during the Inquisition.

Kraemer and Sprenger’s witch eats children and castrates men. When I pit the sorcerer against the witch, I have the magical witch in mind, the witch who is created, maintained, and assaulted by a magic-rhetoric of religion; the witch who is reconstituted as a heretical rhetor in the work of Mary Daly; the witch who confronts both the rhetoric and the law that define the community she defies. With this witch and her enemy sorcerers in view, then, I want here to further historicize the Disney-Daly agonistic by revisiting a central proposition offered by Edward Peters in *The Magician, the Witch, and the Law*—namely, that the witch is a product of medieval rhetorical exercises, very much a figment of the composing imagination. This perspective leads us to consider the relationship among heretical imagination, intelligence, and community that is at issue in the sorcerer’s construction of the witch, and to ask, finally, whether the rhetorics of community that the lawful sorcerer and the wicked witch advance are all that distinct.
Peters traces the development of a medieval body of law that informed the inquisition of heretics and the persecution of witches. His book is perhaps the only careful argument positing that medieval rhetorical exercises eventually come to constitute the laws that define the persecution of witches. This argument, which I will explain more fully in a moment, can be summarized briefly: rhetoric becomes history; history illustrates law; law justifies persecution. In this scheme, the witch is a rhetorical figure rather than a real figure, and the persecution of witches amounts to punitive action against women whose extraordinary powers never really existed.

As Peters notes, the persecution of witches was a virulent anti-feminist development of the persecution of heretics. The heretic is conflated early on with the magician or magus in Platonic and patristic literature. As we trace the development of narratives that become the foundation for canon law and persecution, we can say that the magus becomes identified with the heretic and the heretic ultimately becomes feminized as the witch. Originally, the magus is portrayed as a Persian astrologer/priest of the sort that accompanied Xerxes into Greece in the fifth century BCE. For Plato, the magus is a deceiver, often described in bestial terms, who pretends to compel the spirit world for profit. In Augustine's neo-Platonic castigation of magic, the magus is one who traffics with demons. Such conceptions of magic as an alien religion account for its growth as a threat; the magician and the heretic coincide as enemies of the established community—and, I would add, of its conventional rhetoric.

The association of heresy and magic with certain social types is largely the work of rhetoricians. As Peters proposes, medieval monastic writers who describe vicious heretics do so in part because of the generic demands of the narratio fabulosa, in part as an illustration of patristic warnings against magic, and in part, I would add, as an exaggerated maintenance of their own "place" in an enclosed and exclusive male society. Maintaining that society means constructing the outside, the other, as someone to be feared.

One of the most striking monastic castigations of heresy is Anselm of Besate's eleventh century Rhetorimachia, which provides a particularly vivid and vicious portrait of an infernal magician who was a servant of the devil and who magically removed the hands from corpses and used them to enact his criminal desires. Exercises such as Anselm's, which fall into the rhetorical tradition of the controversia, provided the substance for chronicles, moral stories, and invectives that presented such characters as
the evil magician as if they were literally true. As Peters explains, the purpose of some of the most vivid chronicles of heretical magic is "not to inform accurately, but to arouse within the pious reader the appropriate revulsion against the object being condemned" (39). Thus, the conception of the witch that arose later, based on fabulous stories of heretical magicians, does not have a basis in social reality. The witch is, then, a feminization of the fantastic male sociopath.

In *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, R.I. Moore points out that fabulous stories of heretical magicians were being written from at least the eighth century forward, while the actual persecution of heresy was relatively rare until the eleventh century. This is largely because the church as an institution was not consolidated and religious opinion and practice varied from locality to locality, precluding a consistent body of law and its practice. Moore stresses that historians who regard persecution as a psycho-cultural given—that is, as part of human nature—may be effectively enfranchising a practice that has actually only arisen in specific social contexts as a response to a discernible set of conditions. In short, it is not possible to say that persecution is a normal cultural activity.

For those of us concentrating on the role of rhetoric in the formation of a persecuting society, both Moore and Peters, along with Peter Brown, understand persecution as the work of the literate against the illiterate, a kind of persecution that becomes more pronounced when new technologies of literacy emerge, as in the High Middle Ages. Also, the growth of cities plays a major role in stabilizing political power in princes and prelates who become more interested in giving further definition to the person of the outsider. The development of a body of laws and processes that intensifies persecution might be understood, Moore argues, as a kind of "pollution fear, . . . the fear that the privileged feel of those at whose expense their privilege is enjoyed" (101). Daniel Lawrence O'Keefe offers a similar proposal about the growth of witch persecution in particular: the witch is a figure who is troubling to the conscience of the moral imperialists; in the event that she threatens their morality, they preempt the threat by accusing her of immorality (444). It is worth noting here that the penalty for heresy was originally excommunication; the heretic was to be disallowed from trafficking with the faithful. However, once canon law developed during the later Middle Ages to include strictures codifying persecution, the penalty became death, based on the argument that if murderers are put to death, so should heretics and witches, since the destruction of the eternal soul is much more serious than the destruction of the body.
My overall point throughout this brief survey of the development of the persecution of the witch is that the witch who was persecuted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries amounts to a definition, a figuration, that emerged from the cultural definition of heresy, a definition that began as a perverse masculine dream of demonic, magical power and that was elaborated in cloistered rhetorical exercises. Fear of magic coincides with fear of the pagan other, and the development of supervisory institutions makes it imperative to codify that fear in laws against heresy. Heresy, associated in fantastic stories with vicious magicians, comes to be associated with women in particular because they are thought to be particularly susceptible to the persuasion of a demonic intelligence. In The Malleus Maleficarum, Kraemer and Sprenger note that “women are naturally more impressionable, and more ready to receive the influence of a disembodied spirit,” and further, that once they have learned evil arts, women are naturally free to communicate them to other women, through their “slippery tongues.” They stress that “All wickedness is but little to the wickedness of a woman” (41-47). As with the fear of magic in general, especially in its connection to heresy, witch fear is the fear of unlicensed intelligence. The sin of curiositas, which is “the passion for knowing unnecessary things,” banishes the witch outside the sphere of legitimate knowledge. Witch persecution elaborates curiositas as female intelligence that overtakes male intelligence, as we see again and again in Kraemer and Sprenger’s descriptions of the ways that a witch can make a penis disappear. The witch accomplishes this feat by creating a powerful hallucination, moving a man’s inner mental images from place to place so that though his penis is not actually gone, he cannot visualize it (58-59). Mindful that the associative disposition of mental images is central to classical conceptions of rhetorical invention, we can say that the witch alters a man’s capacity to invent the mental lexicon of his own self-image; in effect, she modifies his imagination, teaching him to see himself differently. Altering the composing imagination is the fundamental sin of heresy and the most dangerous product of witchcraft.

To get their penises back, men are advised by Kraemer and Sprenger to first try “persuasion” on the witch (“gentle words and promises”), but this strategy is not likely to work. The man must therefore expect to resort to violence—for example, choking the witch until she agrees to return his property (119). These are extraordinary examples, adding up to a conception of female intelligence that has the power to alter the patriarchal body and mind, intelligence so strong that male intelligence cannot reclaim dominance. The only recourse is physical violence: he has to beat her up,
or kill her, because she's smarter than he is.

Peters allows us to see the wicked witch not only as a very late modification of the heretic, but also as a figure whose dangers have no factual, historical foundations. The wicked witch is an instance of the power of fantastic rhetoric to fashion history and law. Her magic, manifest in her dangerous ability to control male intelligence, has fed male fantasies that may underwrite—in their most extreme application—domestic violence. The New Age witch, the religious witch, writes her own description, and the description that informs covens throughout the United States and abroad is of a witch who beseeches virtuous spiritual forces and joins hands with major world religions. These two witches represent competing feminist rhetorics, the exhortation of wicked, heretical intelligence, an intelligence ironically constructed in complicity with masculine fears, versus the exhortation of a religious intelligence constructed to maintain a broadly inclusive, harmonious world order.

**Magic Kingdoms**

To the extent that the New Age witch aspires to ecumenical harmony and seeks to be identified within the sphere of established religion, she associates herself with the *legitimate* realm of the sorcerer. Recognizing the New Age witch as a kind of sorcerer, then, I want to return to the contemporary sorcerer-witch agonistic represented by Disney and Daly to examine their competing constructions of community. *Piety* is the key term for defining this sorcerer and this witch, for distinguishing between them, and for understanding the kind of community each maintains. The sense of piety I want to employ here comes from Kenneth Burke, who connects it to the process of identification—that is, the process of being social. As a social being, I align my own interests with those of the various institutions, communities, and concepts that maintain my sense of identity. Piety, then, informs what we consider to be *proper* identifications. It is governed by our perception of the psychological, historical, and cultural "sources of our being" and is constituted by our loyalty to those sources. Piety is a magical concept to the extent that it is motivated by a wish to return to an Edenic, ideal state of being, and it is a social concept to the extent that it names one's attempt to "fit" a social category. Thus, a thug is pious in his conformity to the characteristics of thuggery; as Burke notes, even vulgarity—practiced religiously—is pious (74-75; see also Covino, "Cyberpunk" 41-42). In my argument here, both the sorcerer and the witch are pious, and each demands a form of piety that reflects his or her own interests and loyalties.
As an overt appeal to piety, the motto for the twenty-fifth anniversary year of Disney World was “Remember the Magic.” This motto appeared everywhere in the parks during 1998: on shopping bags and paper cups, intoned throughout the nightly fireworks show at the Magic Kingdom, flashing on the screens of every unused cash register in every Disney store in the world. The full expression from the official twenty-fifth anniversary song is “It’s time to remember the magic.” This lyric is itself an abbreviation for “It’s time to remember the Magic Kingdom”—or, “It’s time to come back to Disney World,” a call to grown-up fans of Disney to come back again and bring their kids. Pleasant cooperation is a sign of Disney piety: employees are trained to be interminably cheerful, and guests are expected to move through the parks with a kind of orderly appreciation for where they are. Vulgarity and thuggery are both so rare and so forbidden that they’ve become the stuff of myth and legend among park employees—or, as Disney calls them, cast members. Cast members interviewed by Jane Kuenz associate impiety with a category of guests they call “Brazilians”:

If the employees are to be believed, Brazilians wreak havoc from one end of the park to the other: they leap over store counters in a fury when credit cards are refused; waltz into restricted areas in the path of oncoming conveyances; invite their boy-children to relieve themselves [while standing in line]; grope aspiring actresses in their starlet costumes at MGM; and amuse themselves by trying to toss coins into tubas as if the band were a dime game at the county fair. (Project on Disney 150-51)

“Brazilian” is the name for any difficult Disney guest, regardless of the guest’s race or ethnicity. Thus, Disney cast members identify the impious with the foreign, overstate their “actual presence or destructiveness” (the sheer number of Brazilian stories seems improbable), and label all riotous individuals with a single name that preserves their common hostility to the Magic Kingdom. Maintaining the regulatory piety required by the Disney Company (which is, during working hours, the source of their being), the cast members become unwitting sorcerer’s apprentices, preserving the boss’ magic as did their medieval counterparts when they developed fantastic narratives of monstrous impiety and called anyone who was out of line a witch.

Daly calls herself a witch, and in the context of Disney World standards, she is certainly a Brazilian. At the same time, she, like Disney, offers a magical vision of ideal community, presenting in her Wickedary a revision of history, philosophy, and politics in which wild, wicked
women—so long repressed and relegated to the background of society—are written into the foreground. This is an admittedly magical celebration in which the ideal community is inhabited by women creating new realities:

Be-Witching women snap the blinding/binding ties that have kept us from Seeing and Be-Speaking. Breaking these evil ties, we See with truly Wicked Eyes... Our Mediumship springs, spirals, and soars. Our Space-Craft moves outside all hitherto known directions. We Spin beyond the compass of every compass. (9)

While the sorcerer has his Brazilians, the witch has her “snools.” Snools are rampant in the world; they are the “normal” male inhabitants of this sadistic and masochistic society, and they are often accompanied by snoolettes: women who run with snools. For Daly, then, radical nonconformity is precisely what counts as good behavior. Yet, piety still means loyalty and belief, and thus an uncompromising pledge against snooldom (227). We may want to note, of course, that the world really is rife with destructive snools more than Disney World is rife with Brazilians.

While both the witch and the sorcerer maintain exclusive communities, they also share an interest in the regulation of memory as a process that supports and maintains a belief in magic. Disney is widely known to enforce a community of memory that compresses time and space to suit a vision of unity and progress: on the Jungle Cruise ride, the Congo River is connected to the Zambezi, the Amazon, and the Irawaddy without interruption; in Epcot Center, the United States is on the same shore as France; in Liberty Square, robot versions of all forty-two United States presidents stand together on one stage, nodding and gesturing and speaking with one another; and on the Spaceship Earth ride, the history of communication takes us, in fifteen minutes, from the era of cave drawings to a virtual reality future in which we’re all happily accessible to one another via body communication technologies. Relying on the power of staged authenticity, Disney often succeeds in marketing the definitive view of a historical or cultural event or person. David Nicholson-Lord has called Disneyfication the transformation of culture and history into “heritage.” And, as Alan Bryman points out, Disney’s “fairy-tale classics [have become] in most people’s minds the way they [will conceptualize] those classics in the future: Disney’s Snow White is the Snow White” (190-91). The regulation of memory extends to Disney A to Z: The Official Encyclopedia, where the entry for Chicago represents the tendency to construct the larger world exclusively in terms of Disney's
world: “Chicago: City where Walt Disney was born, on December 5, 1901, at 1249 Tripp Avenue, a home that had been built by his father, Elias” (Smith 88).

The witch also knows the importance of the regulation of memory. In the Wickedary, Daly rejects “standardized memories fabricated in fatherland, . . . mass-produced collective memories intended to obliterate the past and to control the present and future,” and she embraces memory as “the power to transcend” conventional categories and “to connect with the sources of instinctive, ecstatic knowledge” that inform radical intellectual and political action (79). Critical memory is a subversive force and the foundation for Daly’s necessarily vicious language:

If women continue to lose our Deep Memories, then the images propagated by the pornographers, the obscene experiments of the reproductive technologists, the mutilation and murder of women’s bodies by the sons of Jack the Ripper, and the mutilation and murder of women’s minds by omnipresent woman-hating propagandists will go unprotected. Unprotected also will be the rape and murder of the planet. (Outercourse 130)

Certainly, this is a striking counterpoint to the sorcerer’s refrain, “Remember the Magic.”

What is at issue, finally, in the conflict between the sorcerer and the witch is the nature and limits of imagination and intelligence. Given the witch’s threat to rob the sorcerer of his potency, we would expect him to guard against the sin of curiositas. Disney does this through an insistence on our essential sameness and on the irrelevance of entertaining the different, the strange, the threatening. The Spaceship Earth ride, which in many ways epitomizes the Disney version of community, is one of a number of attractions that celebrate our technological capacity to make instant contact with others and, in so doing, to discover that we can create cosmic harmony. The narrator on Spaceship Earth says, “As our information and knowledge grew, the world began to shrink,” showing us an American teenage boy communicating with an Asian girl via computer and portraying the earth as an electronic network of happy folks. As we watch kids in a classroom take a virtual field trip, the narrator tells us that “we all share the common bonds of hope, sorrow, dreams, and joy.” Along with the message that we can all become part of the network that constitutes our core emotional and intellectual life, we must conclude that unhappiness comes from being alone, unplugged, uncommon—from imagination and intelligence that are disconnected.
While community remains an elusive but crucial concept, shaping our thoughts as educators about issues as large as curriculum reform and activities as local as dividing a classroom of students into peer editing groups, the sorcerer and the witch may represent—at extremes—the kinds of magic that community can imply and the sorts of pieties that it might enforce. The fact is that wherever there are competing interests, desires, and abilities—that is, wherever people actually get together—magic is hard to come by. Disney critic Karen Klugman describes a scene at Disney World in which the effort to find a reasonably priced pair of shorts drew her family into such conflict that she and the children ended up in tears, sitting on a bench in the middle of the Magic Kingdom, their faces red and wet while a Disney World band stood before them smiling and playing "Dixie":

That was when I started my journey on the Alternative Ride through Disney World, an activity that I recommend to anyone who, in the presence of constructed joviality, feels like a cultural misfit. It puts your critical faculties to work for you, not against you, enabling you to participate in the magic on your own terms. Instead of feeling like an anonymous peasant with particular interests that are not recognized in the vast kingdom, you can think of yourself as the court jester.

(Klugman echoes Ramona Fernandez, who also finds that the call to community can be a prompt for a “complex negotiation within a simulated and distorted landscape” (248). Klugman and Fernandez are simply calling for a certain resistance to community as the way to maintain one’s vitality within it: the powers of magic—because they can create untenable but nonetheless compelling illusions—must be met with the powers of irony.

But I doubt that this alternative ride is wild enough for the witch, for whom exile from the sorcerer’s kingdom is a permanent state of mind. She wants nothing of what Fernandez calls “complex negotiation” because she is certain about what is wrong. Her response is not irony but wicked heretical intelligence and the refusal to compromise. She is dangerous and endangered, perhaps soon to become a casualty of the sorcery that colonizes a world in which, as Baudrillard notes, we all have become extras.

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