Trained in linguistics, literature and psychoanalysis, Luce Irigaray nonetheless insists that her works must be read, above all, as philosophical texts—that is, as interventions into the specific canon of thought “by means of which values are defined,” in her view. She thus assigns primacy to the philosophical not only as a dimension of her own multifarious writings, but within culture generally: in the historical production of knowledge, meaning, subjectivity, power. In fact, she suggests that it is because of philosophy’s unique historical potency that women have been so vehemently excluded from its precincts—“the thing most refused to a woman is to do philosophy”—even as their literary impulses have been relatively indulged. Luce Irigaray inverts this arrangement, downplaying the importance of her practice as a “writer” (along with her involvement with psychoanalysis) while emphatically laying claim to the status of philosopher. Moreover, she indicates that, in refusing or neglecting to interrogate their own categories of thought, feminists who pursue a “politics of equality” which demands “not to be behind, not to be second,” are complicitous in women’s exclusion from philosophy: “the way of changing argumentation in order to deconstruct a discourse [is] absolutely not their problem,” she remarks. Implicitly, then, the feminism of equality is relatively well accommodated by the patriarchy while efforts to develop “an autonomous politics” of the feminine, a feminism of difference, meet with the same resistance as a woman’s doing philosophy—and for the same reason.

Corollary to Luce Irigaray’s categorical rejection of a feminism of equality is her equally categorical repudiation of any filiation with the work of Simone de Beauvoir, whose egalitarianist “refus[al] to be Other” she contrasts with her own “demand to be radically Other in order to exit from a [certain] horizon” of thought. At the same time, while she grants having read Beauvoir’s fiction “as an adolescent,” Luce Irigaray says that she has read only a small part of The Second Sex—the epic work in which Beauvoir’s famous theory of woman as the absolute Other of Western culture is elaborated—and voices a deep sense of “disappointment” at Beauvoir’s failure to offer support during the professional crisis precipitated by the publication of Speculum of the Other Woman, Luce Irigaray’s
own controversial philosophical epic (which was also her doctoral dissertation in philosophy), in 1974. Calling attention to the rethinking of transcendence in her own writings, Luce Irigaray rejects the view, which she ascribes to Beauvoir, that "woman remains always within the dimension of immanence and that she's incapable of transcendence"—as if suggesting that this gender segregation reinscribes, in another register, the gendered hierarchy that privileges philosophy (the discourse of transcendence, in this coupling) over literature (the discourse of immanence). Strategically or paradoxically, the most significant "theoretical filiation" acknowledged by Luce Irigaray is with a male-identified idiom from which women have been systematically excluded: "the tradition of Western philosophy."

Beauvoir and Sartre were, of course, among the most celebrated couples of their day; Luce Irigaray cites her own relationship with Renzo Imbeni in discussing the possibility of a new relation between man and woman that would also define "a different historical configuration" and "a new horizon" both culturally and politically. The young, she thinks, are especially hungry for such a relation, which would be characterized by "reciprocal respect," "autonomy," and "reciprocal affection," but which could only be predicated on something that has always been lacking in Western tradition: a recognition of the irreducible—that is, ontological—difference between man and woman. It is clear that for Luce Irigaray the meaning of the much-vaunted expression "sexual difference" is ontological before it is psychological, biological, sociological, or epistemological. Whereas a purely "empirical" type of negativity differentiates one woman (or one man) from another in the social dialectic, "the negativity between a man and a woman" participates in the order of being as such and so constitutes "a mystery," a negativity which—"contrary to [that of] the Hegelian dialectic"—will "never [be] surmount[ed]" in any sort of sublation. Unsuspected by (the Hegelian existentialist) Beauvoir, by the feminism of equality, or indeed by the gay rights movement, this mystery also houses the as-yet-unrealized possibility of a new kind of transcendence. As distinct from the "vertical transcendence" of the "genealogical," parent/child, relation "that has dominated our traditions"—including constructions of the man/woman relation, as in Freud's account of the "successful" marriage in which a wife replaces her husband's mother and he becomes her son—Luce Irigaray envisions "a horizontal transcendence" between two mature but irreducibly different subjects, man and woman. Since "sexual difference is a fundamental parameter of the socio-cultural order" (what she calls "sexual choice" is deemed "secondary"), it follows that "inventing a new relationship [between man and woman] is fundamentally the same as inventing a new socio-cultural order." By the same token, Luce Irigaray asserts that it is precisely because she situates difference as such ("the difference and the negative which I will never surmount") between the two genders rather than elsewhere that she is "able to respect the differences everywhere: differences between other races, differences between the generations, and so on."
This effort to think the man/woman couple in its twoness is the logical culmination of a project that began, in *Speculum*, with a critique of the monopoly of a single, masculine subject in Western tradition, then proceeded to a "second phase" that attempted to "define those mediations that could permit the existence of a feminine subjectivity." Contributing to this grand philosophical project are a series of experiments conducted by Luce Irigaray in recent years and designed to demonstrate the workings of sexual difference within gendered patterns of language use—ultimately in order "to redistribute discourse" between man and woman so as to promote that which has never yet taken place: an authentic dialogue between the two. These experiments purport to demystify the seeming neutrality of linguistic forms by uncovering the different, sexuate relations that inform the use of language by men and women respectively. They show, for example, that in a setting where girls typically use the preposition "with" in relation to another human subject, boys in the same setting will instead use it in relation to an inanimate object; girls thus construct (and construct themselves within) a subject-subject dialectic where boys construct a dialectic of subject and object. Similarly, girls typically use the first-person pronoun ("I" or "Je") in dialectical relation with another subject ("You" or "Tu"), whereas boys typically use it in relation to an object or "it." The "I," then, always conceals a relation and is not in fact one but two—sexed—a reality that Luce Irigaray proposes to capture in the double reformulation "I-she" ("Je-elle") and "I-he" ("Je-il"). Through such discursive "redistributions," she believes, it might become possible to construct the "double subjectivity" toward which her work has always been directed. In a related vein, Luce Irigaray suggests that feminism can undermine itself by fetishizing the authority of "personal experience" understood in terms of "the purely narrative, autobiographical 'I,'" or the 'I' that expresses only affect; by way of antidote, she urges a recognition of the dialectic of subject and object, the doubleness, internal to the subject as such: "I can't myself, all alone, affirm my own experience, since this is something I know only after the fact, by means of discussion, and so on. I can't affirm that this is always already the experience of a woman." Experience should be understood dialectically, as the experience of an "I-she" or "Je-elle"; in this sense, it forms a significant parameter of Luce Irigaray's theorizing and a source of feminist insight.

Luce Irigaray's resistance to elaborating what she calls "a metadiscourse of Luce Irigaray"—either within this interview or elsewhere—is in keeping with the dialectical emphasis of her thought. To offer "commentary" of "a reflexive, critical" sort on her own writing would be to subject it to precisely the kind of "logical formalization" that, in her view, forecloses dialogue and precludes the representation of sexual difference. In order to keep her text "always open" she attempts to situate it "at the crossroads of a double mise en forme," at or as "the encounter" between a "literary formalization" and a "logical formalization"—thus, assimilable to neither. The pervasiveness of interrogative constructions in her utterance serves a comparable intent: "the text is always open onto a new sense, and onto a future sense" as well as "onto a potential 'You,' a potential
Despite, or perhaps because of, this concern for preserving the dialogic character of her work, Luce Irigaray is distressed by the misreadings that she feels have been widely visited upon her text, whether as the result of mistranslation, the misrecognition of her intellectual filiations, or both; and she expresses an insistent desire to retain as much control as possible over the dissemination and interpretation of her own words.

[Luce Irigaray requested that our exchange open with a brief comment from her concerning her recent activities and the nature and evolution of her work to date. Our questions to her begin just after these comments.]

LUCE IRIGARAY. Here's a book about which I'll talk a little bit called J'aime à toi, the second one that I wrote directly in Italian. These are books that have had great success, a large audience, especially but not only among the young. They correspond to the third phase of my work, in which I am trying to define a new model of possible relations between man and woman, without the submission of either one to the other. Occasionally this displeases some feminists, but these books inspire much hope and find much resonance, especially with the young. The third phase of my work thus corresponds, as I said, to the construction of an intersubjectivity respecting sexual difference. This is something, a task, that no one has yet done, I think, something that's completely new. The second phase of my work was to define those mediations that could permit the existence of a feminine subjectivity—that is to say, another subject—and the first phase was the most critical one, which comprehended, above all, Speculum, This Sex Which Is Not One, and to some extent An Ethics of Sexual Difference. It was the phase in which I showed how a single subject, traditionally the masculine subject, had constructed the world and interpreted the world according to a single perspective. Thus, three phases: the first a critique, you might say, of the auto-mono-centrism of the Western subject; the second, how to define a second subject; and the third phase, how to define a relationship, a philosophy, an ethic, a relationship between two different subjects. For this reason the last book is called Essere due, Etre deux [Being Two], in a sense at once philosophical and also in the sense of being two, two things.

Before going to the questions I want to make a comment useful for you and, I think, for many American readers and especially for many feminist readers, male and female, worldwide. I think that in the United States my books are read mainly in literature departments. But they are philosophical books and I think that there is a great deal of misunderstanding about them because the heart of my argument is philosophical, and literary scholars are not always prepared to understand this philosophical core. Along these lines, I want to say that the questions you pose are tied to your literary training and that the audience, moreover, is literary. These are questions that speak only
to certain aspects of my work. Perhaps it's not pleasing that I say this, but at the same time I think it's useful. To make a work rigorous, it's necessary to agree on what's at stake in the work, and, even more, to agree that I speak as a woman and that the thing most refused to a woman is to do philosophy. It's always been admitted that women are able to create literature—at least a little, if they have time—but philosophy, by means of which values are defined, that was strictly reserved for men.

Also, to create a genuinely autonomous politics—not a politics of equality, but an autonomous politics—that too is a point where there's great resistance. What I've done recently in Scandinavia and before leaving Italy is for the first time to explain myself more fully concerning my relationship to Simone de Beauvoir, showing the radical difference between our two bodies of work. Thus, if it interests you to repose questions about this, I can answer them.

Q. We've established a tradition of opening every interview with this question: Do you consider yourself a writer?
A. How do you believe I could respond to you? Please note that you've put "writer" (un écrivain) in the masculine, but let that pass. I don't know if it's a problem of translation. What is a writer for you, in the first place? And in the second place, is it really up to me to decide if I'm a writer or not? I'm astonished to think that someone is able to decide for herself if she is a writer or not.

Q. In general, it's history that decides.
A. Absolutely, we're in agreement.

Q. Many readers in the United States rely on translations in approaching your work. In light of your concern with the phonetic specificity of languages, as well as with the process of cultural sedimentation in language, what guidance can you offer your would-be readers in the U.S.?
A. I don't understand what this means.

Q. Most fundamentally: Is your work translatable?
A. If my work—now, notice how I've put this—if my work represents difficulties of translation, I'd say these are above all difficulties of syntax, logical difficulties, more than phonetic ones. I also think that there are two aspects of the problem of translation. The first thing that I've already spoken about is that very few male or female translators really read me as a philosopher and thus make interpretive errors about my text because of this problem. Also, errors of translation may come from the fact that I am opening a new field of thought. For example, there's a central part of Speculum that's called "L'incontournable volume." The American woman who translated it entitled this chapter "Volume Fluidity." In the anthology published by Blackwell, the chapter is retranslated because the people at Blackwell and Margaret Whitford retranslated it, but there are new errors in their translation. My attention was drawn to the Italian translation made by someone competent, a [female] philosopher, but for whom my thought was, more or
less, something completely new, at least then. But in Italian, in any case, the term “incontornabile” exists. By “L’incontournable volume” I simply meant a volume that can’t be circumscribed because it’s open. Thus, it didn’t mean either “volume fluidity” or “volume without contours.” It’s an allusion to the morphology of the female body, and I say that this morphology is an open volume, one that can’t be circumscribed. A closed volume can be circumscribed; an open volume can’t be circumscribed. Why do people make this mistake? Because they fail to listen and lack the imagination that corresponds to what I mean.

I want to give another example since you’ve spoken of translation. Speculum has as its subtitle de l’autrefemme, and it’s true that I was imprudent [in so titling it]. With this title and subtitle I meant two things. Almost everybody understood the term “speculum” as simply the term “mirror.” But the title evokes much more than this: it’s an allusion to those European works (I’m no longer sure of exactly what era) that speak of the “speculum mundi”—that is, the “mirror of the world.” It’s not simply a question of a mirror in which one sees oneself, but of the way in which it’s possible to give an account of the world within a discourse: a mirror of the world. How I’m going to try to give an account of the world in my discourse. It’s in this sense above all that I also played with the mirror, but not simply, because the mirror in a simple sense, in which I see myself, has served for the most part to constitute a masculine subject. And the subtitle was even more striking, because in French it’s de l’autrefemme. Apparently I was imprudent because in Speculum I play with words all the time. I should have put after de l’autre a colon: de l’autre: femme [of the other: woman], meaning the other as [en tant que] woman. Then in Italian the subtitle became Speculum. L’altra donna [Speculum: The other woman]. Everybody thought it was a question of the image of the other woman—that is, they thought of an empirical relation between two women, for example. This is absolutely not the project of Speculum. In American it became Speculum of the Other Woman. That’s worse, because it should have been put, Speculum on the Other Woman or On the Other: Woman. That would have been best. It was there, that moment, that marked the counterpoint to Simone de Beauvoir. That is, Simone de Beauvoir refused to be the Other because she refused to be second in Western culture. In order not to be the Other she said, “I want to be the equal of man; I want to be the same as man; finally, I want to be a man. I want to be a masculine subject.” And that point of view I find is a very important philosophical and political regression. What I myself say is that there is no true Other in Western culture and that what I want—certainly I don’t want to be second—but I want there to be two subjects. Thus, it was “On the Other: Woman.” And these are things that have involved an equally great misunderstanding of my work, so that it’s been thought that in the second part of my work I turn my back on the first, that I renounce the first part. This error follows, among other things, from errors of translation in the title and subtitle of Speculum. I’ve never been repressive about
homosexuality, but in Speculum I didn’t want to treat a problem between two women. I wanted to treat the problem of the Other as woman in Western culture.

The advice I give to readers is to be bilingual; that’s the best. And to read, to read in English and French and compare them. To male and female translators, I would advise that they talk with me about the translation. I think it’s very important not to sell texts with errors in them. Also for the translator, because, as there are international translations, one day people will laugh at a poor translation, and meanwhile at the cultural level several years are lost with a bad translation.

Q. As a writer, you’ve resisted attempts to divide up the corpus of your work according to the law of genre into fictional and nonfictional, philosophical or poetic, essayistic and analytic texts. Why is it important to you to resist such gestures? How can readers engage with the various registers of your writing without resorting to such anatomies?

A. I recognize the point of this question although I’m now at another stage, but I’ll respond because it’s a question for literary people, or at the frontier between literature and philosophy. In the first place, I want to say that I resist genres because in Western tradition to pigeon-hole oneself in a genre is to accept a hierarchy—let’s say, between philosophy first and then art. Thus to accept that the artistic subject is second in relation to the subject who defines truth first. This I don’t want. I resist perhaps because I’m a woman, and traditionally women have always had a way of speaking, of expressing themselves artistically rather than simply, coolly, logically, and I don’t want to participate in the repression of this mode of expression. Neither do I want to remain within literature. I’d like to say also that I resist genres because, and above all, what matters to me is opening new ways of thought. That is, I want to think and I don’t want simply to submit myself to the traditional categories of logic and understanding, not simply. To accede to these new ways of thought, it’s necessary to find a new mode of thinking, a new mode of speaking. I’m not the first to say so; for example, Nietzsche said so, Heidegger said so. I think it’s extremely important to accede to thinking and not remain within the logical categories of an intelligence of commentary, or an intelligence of abstract rationality. I want to find a way of thinking that’s been forgotten in Western tradition.

Q. Concerning the practice of parler femme and the role of the poetic in your discourse, you remark in a 1980 interview with Suzanne Lamy and André Roy, “I think it’s necessary to deconstruct and argue, but with another kind of argumentation, by means of a certain deconstruction of discourse.” Can you elaborate on this “other argumentation” as a means of feminist intervention? Is it in any way related to what you call “Diotima’s method” in Sorcerer Love,” which you describe as a four-term dialectic?

A. I see that all the questions are rather difficult. I don’t know what’s meant by “feminist.” Or let’s say, more exactly, and there are many uses of this word,
that it constrains me to be called simply “feminist” knowing that I don’t have rapport with many other feminists. How can I say this? Are men going to be called “homministes”? I think it’s accepted that men will vary according to different choices, philosophical choices, political choices, and so on. For me it’s very tiresome today to classify all women—all women and men who are concerned closely or distantly with women’s liberation—as being feminists or not. There are feminists of equality and feminists of difference, to give just one example, and I don’t think that feminists of equality will ever be interrogated, themselves, about the way of changing argumentation in order to deconstruct a discourse; that’s absolutely not their problem. They want to be equal to men, not to be behind, not to be second. What matters to me is to make possible a double subjectivity. In order to make possible a double subjectivity, it’s necessary that I exit the prison of a single discourse and that I show how this discourse was necessarily limited to a single subject. But it troubles me a little to call this, in the abstract, a feminist intervention. To the second question I can’t respond at the moment because today I wasn’t able to get and reread “Sorcerer Love,” and the only thing I want to say is that, according to my analysis of Diotima’s discourse, that discourse isn’t homogeneous; that is, she doesn’t have the same position at the beginning of the discourse that she has at the end. And as much as I find the beginning of the discourse innovative, I don’t know quite how to say it—as much as it seems agreeable to me, to the same extent I find that the end is very much more traditional and less interesting.

Q. Your books seem to be composed or arranged in a variety of ways. For example, the tripartite structure of Speculum and the relation between and within its parts seems an essential aspect of the book’s “argument.” To very different effect, the divisions and arrangement of An Ethics of Sexual Difference seem equally deliberate, although the texts that comprise that volume were composed as lectures and thus under various circumstances. Elemental Passions seems composed according to some quite different logic. Can you comment on the way these or other texts were composed as volumes?

A. Speculum isn’t merely tripartite. It’s a book written in three parts, but it’s also necessary to emphasize that the parts are historically inverted. That is to say, it begins with Freud and ends with Plato, and there is a redoubling in the very interior of the book; thus, the book is called Speculum and the central part is called “Speculum.” There is throughout a play of historical reversals and of doubles that is much more than tripartite. Accordingly, the middle of the book is called “L’incontournable volume”—that is, the volume that can’t be circumscribed. Ethique is a book that’s much less composed; it simply follows the historical order of my seminars. Elemental Passions is composed directly, yes. Since you ask, “How were these volumes composed?” I will restrict my comment to three words: how can I say them? I can say first, I hope, artistically. That is, for me a book is also an art object, thus I compose my book and I’m not at all content to have an editor change my composition. In general I refuse
changes. For example, when I received the proofs to *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche* all the blanks had been suppressed and I had to recompose the whole thing. Thus, I would say first, “artistically.” At the philosophical level, I’d say there is in my composition a counterpoint between—this is difficult, it’s important to find just the right words, otherwise they’re going to make errors—between that which concerns the order of schematism and that which concerns the order of discourse. And I would say thirdly, I compose my books as if I were able to speak silently; that is, I always create a counterpoint between speech [*la parole*] and silence.

Q. In “The Three Genres” you characterize “style” in language as “that which resists formalization.” Can you elaborate on this definition? Do you accept the identification of “style” with the feminine? How can a writer cultivate her style? And finally, what’s the importance of style in your own writing practice?

A. I would like to note that most of the questions concern a meta-discourse of Luce Irigaray (above all don’t say Irigaray; I have a horror of that). In other words, you always ask me to take a reflexive, critical position on my work, which corresponds to one of the things I want to avoid. [Laughs.] I can do it, but I’m afraid interviews of this type can undo the effect of the way in which I write. It’s for this reason too that at a certain moment I don’t want to offer commentary, I want to give some beacons, but no more. Above all, translate my words literally. For example, when I speak of “schematism” I’m alluding to Kant’s word. If you use some other word, what I said no longer makes sense.

To continue to respond to your question: I want to say that in our tradition we are submitted to a type of logical formalization. When I don’t use a flat pronouncement to explain myself, I cross the formalization of writing with logical formalization. This is what makes my utterance [*parole*] place itself at the crossroads of a double *mise en forme*. And that permits, first, the production of new meaning effects and, above all, leaves the text always open [*entre-ouvert*]—in that it’s not enclosed within either a logical formalization or a literary formalization. It’s at the encounter of the two. Thus, the text is always open onto a new sense, and onto a future sense, and I would say also onto a potential “You” [*Tu*], a potential interlocutor. That’s what I’m able to say.

You ask, “Do you accept the idea that style is feminine?” I’m going to respond in a way that’s deliberately rather lapidary and for some people provocative. If you think that the feminine is diverse, as I believe, because subjectivity is diverse, then evidently style is diverse—short of its being a pure and simple technology. But then I don’t know if it’s possible to talk about a concrete subject, a feminine subject.

As to how a writer can develop her style, I’d respond much the same way. Firstly, I don’t think it’s possible to have generalizations, and it displeases me to issue a norm for others, but I’d say that thought seems to me to permit the deployment of art, not only thought but also art, because it permits an escape from imitation. Most people who write or paint have begun with
imitation. I think that if one permits it, thought will liberate itself from imitation and create its own way. And that also permits its own liberation from the status of pure and simple technique.

Q. One striking feature of your own writing practice for many years has been the use of interrogatives to produce a wide range of effects. Would you comment on this aspect of your "style"?

A. I think the importance of the interrogative is to leave a place for the future, thus not to establish a truth that would be a truth once and for all, and also to leave a place for the other—to leave a place for a way toward that other or for the other toward me. I think that's the best explanation of the interrogative. Interrogation is a very good means of passage because the way is always open.

Q. In "The Three Genres" and elsewhere you argue that it's essential for women to accede to the place of the "I" and you also call for "the transformation of the autobiographical 'I' into a different cultural 'I'". But in "A Chance for Life" you also urge women "never [to] give up subjective experience as an element of knowledge." How do these concerns relate to the role of the "I" in your own writings—for example, in Speculum and in your more recent work? Does your theorizing draw upon your own "subjective experience" as a woman?

A. I think that in these questions and in what you proffer as a possible contradiction on my part there is manifest something that for me is a certain impasse of subjectivity. No, I mean a certain way of feminine subjectivity expressing itself, at least that which she's been permitted historically, and that which risks becoming a certain impasse in the liberation of women. Then, many women have understood (no doubt because they needed to), that liberation for them was simply to say "I." They've begun to say "I" and have become a bit lost in this "I" because this "I" lacks, as the philosophers say, categories. Or then they fight among themselves to see who says "I" the loudest: your "I" versus my "I." Certainly, it was important to begin to venture to take the word and venture to say "I," but what seems more important to me, and in any case indispensable to the stage we're now at, is to say not only "I" but to say "I-she" (je-elle)—that is, to live that "I" and define it not only as a simple subjectivity that expresses itself, but in terms of a dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity. Then, I myself write "I" as "I marked she" (je indice elle), which permits me to make visible that the subject is two, that it's not a unique subject, and to pose all sorts of dialogic questions. For example, what is a dialogue between "I-she" and "You-she," a dialogue between "I-she" and "You-he," a dialogue between "I-he" and "You-she"? All these kinds of question, the dialogic intersection between two differently adhering subjects, two generically different subjects, become possible.

Thus, if you like, I think that the purely narrative, autobiographical "I," or the "I" that expresses only affect, risks being an "I" that collapses back into a role traditionally granted to woman: an "I" of pathos, that the woman also uses in her place, the home. It seems to me important to accede to a different
cultural "I"—that is, to construct a new objectivity that corresponds not to an indifferent "I" but to an "I" that's sexed feminine. It's necessary to remain both objective and subjective. And to remain within a dialectic between the two. I think the way I use the "I" is different depending on each text. The way of using "I" at one moment of my work is to refuse to pretend to dictate truth for others; that is, it's a certain strategy for breaking with a traditional philosophical subject and one that parenthesizes the fact that it's "he" who dictates the truth. In other words, I, Luce Irigaray, at this moment in history; I think there's a humility and a singularity at the philosophical level. At certain times, I think there's a dialectical strategy, but especially in the most recent books, for example, in *Essere Due* there are many dialectical strategies already in the title but also in the interior of the text, where I try to define what could be a double utterance [*une parole à deux*] that would respect the "I" and the "You" [*Tu*]. Thus, I use the "I" also to indicate speech [*le discours*]. The fact is I can't offer a single explanation that would apply to the collection of my works.

Yes, I draw on my personal experience if that means that I don't write or think in a purely abstract and insensible fashion. The truth I talk about is a truth that's also a sensible truth, one that changes with experience. The experience may be more immediately perceptual or more spiritual. I can say that, and I can also say that I don't think simply in order to depart from the thinking of others. Thus, yes, it goes by way of my personal experience—but I don't want you to put it that way, because it's very complicated. I can't myself, all alone, affirm my own experience, since this is something I know only after the fact, by means of discussion, and so on. I can't affirm that this is always already the experience of a woman. It must be a dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity.

Q. Your linguistic experiments indicate that, contrary to certain commonly held beliefs, women tend to speak more objectively than men, their "I" more often giving way to the interlocutor or the subject matter of the utterance. But as you also note in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* and elsewhere, it's men, not women, who continue to monopolize the rhetoric of objectivity across the disciplines and in public life—a rhetoric that sometimes operates by transposing the "I" to the third person or to impersonal constructions such as *il y a*. How can feminists more effectively expose the subjectivity of such masculinist rhetoric?

A. I'd say that they should do so in a rigorous fashion, and I propose as an example "A Chance at Life," since you've cited it. That is, to make a rigorous analysis of masculine discourse and to disassemble the mechanisms of masculine discourse. I think that simply to engage in polemic will only augment distances and obstacles. I want to say also that it's important not to confuse the third person "he" [*il*] with the "there is" [*il y a*]. They're different. For example, *il y a* in Heidegger isn't at all the *il*. But, in any case, in responding to the question "How can they bring to light more effectively the subjectivity of that masculine rhetoric?" I'd say by making a rigorous analysis of mascu-
line discourse and in drawing out the conclusions of their analysis. If the liberation of woman is to become an egotistical man, then it would be better if she stayed where she is. [Laughs.] It's all the more necessary to pay attention because among feminists of difference there are also two categories. [Laughs.] There's an Italian and perhaps also an American party, I'm not sure, that says, "We, the women who are different. Who are different from you" and who remain among themselves saying, "We're different." This lacks something of dialectic, of humility, of the sense of history. What really interests me is actually to change the relationship of difference between the genders. I want to tell you why I'm not sure that you've fully understood the feminism of difference. It's because of the questions you'll ask me later on, for example, about homosexuals. If you understood the feminism of difference you wouldn't ask these kind of questions.

Q. In the United States your work is sometimes misunderstood as homophobic, has been perceived as homophobic by certain writers. That's what inspires the later question.

A. I think this isn't fair, because I believe that when Speculum was understood as simply homophile, in part because of an error of translation, and when it became clear that I wasn't simply a homophile, then they said I was a homophobe, because people didn't know how to think the difference fairly. Then, either one is a homophile or a homophobe? I found myself in Toronto at a seminar where in the next room there was an American, I think, who was giving a seminar on Speculum and I was in the next room while she gave a seminar on Speculum against me. Oh yes, this is very fashionable. Even if Speculum is the child I've disowned, abandoned, now it's for them, isn't it, to do what they wish with this very difficult book that they certainly don't understand. I think Speculum is discussed in the way that Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason was, never mind the fact that no one has actually read it. And this situation is equally frequent, notably because of the misunderstanding I spoke about. So, I was a homophile and I've become a homophobe. [Laughs.] It has nothing to do with all that. Personally, I haven't changed positions.

Q. Your 1977 indictment of Lacanian analysis, "The Poverty of Psychoanalysis," calls on male practitioners to analyse their own unanalyzed drives and desires, including their homosexual desire and their desire to rape. Would you address comparable requirements of self-analysis to would-be male feminists?

A. I would require that every analyst, man or woman, feminist or not, in order to listen to someone (as) other must analyse their homosexual desires, their desire to rape and violate the other—man or woman, feminist or non-feminist. What strikes me is that men don't listen to themselves talk. They don't hear/know what they're saying.

Q. In a 1987 interview with Alice Jardine, you note that Speculum "is a difficult book, as it defines a new horizon of thought," and in a 1988 interview with Christine Lasagni you say that there is "no break" between your earlier and your latest texts. Does Speculum perform a kind of groundwork for your subsequent
interventions in philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural theory? How would you place it within the ongoing evolution of your work, especially your recent experiments in linguistics?

A. I indicated already how I define the three stages of my work, so it’s not necessary to repeat that. The research in linguistics appeared during the second part of my work when I was trying to define new mediations for the feminine subject, and it continues to interest me also in order to see how to make possible a relation between man and woman. When you see that if you ask a class of high-school students to create a sentence with the preposition “with” and that a girl will make a sentence of the type “I’m going out tonight with you” [toi] or “I want to live with him” [lui] and that the boy will create a sentence of the type “I’m going out with my bike” or “I wrote that sentence with a pen,” of course you ask yourself how you’re going to get these two subjects to live together, how you’re going to create bridges. Thus, it’s important to start out again from discourse. I began these analyses of discourse also because, obviously, when I changed language and culture people would always say, since nothing is more portable than nationalism, “What’s true for you, a French speaker, isn’t true for us.” So I decided to make inquiries in a maximum number of languages and cultures to be able to respond to these kinds of criticisms. Now I’m a little better prepared: I know a little better how this works out in a language where, let’s say, gender doesn’t express itself in articles as it does in French. I know it’s going to express itself elsewhere—for example, in the use of prepositions. I think this also puts in question the idea that there must be language universals. Probably today I’d say that in a certain sense the universal is perhaps two at the level of subjectivity and at the level of discourse, and that this can lead the way to a consequent or secondary change at the level of language [langue]. This, certainly, poses a thrilling but large problem—for computers, too.

Q. In *Speculum* you invoke an approach to dream interpretation that would treat the dream not as the “rebus” of an “already given graphic order” but as a kind of pictograph, an avatar of an *other* order of writing. More recently you’ve argued that alphabetic writing is “linked historically to the civil and religious codification of patriarchal power” and you’ve affirmed the existence of an ancient social order where women’s participation in civil and religious life is linked somehow to “still partially figurative, non-abstract” systems of written signs. Is there a connection between the pictographic dream script of the unconscious and the “partially figurative” writing of this pre-patriarchal history?

A. I’d say that in a book like *This Sex Which Is Not One* I asked myself—and this seems to me to respond to your question—if woman didn’t correspond in one sense to that which we call the “unconscious.” If the culture is founded on a certain repression of the graphic order, and if that which returns at night under the guise of the dream presents itself as a sort of pictograph, isn’t there the trace of a much more generalizable pictographic order that had already been
historically repressed, specifically in the West? In order to know, it would be necessary to analyze the dreams of cultures in which writing is still today more pictographic, but I haven't done that. I know that cultures in which writing is more pictographic are generally more favorable to the feminine subject and to a culture of the feminine.

Q. In “Gesture in Psychoanalysis” you say that girls and boys enter language by means of different bodily gestures: the boy's, epitomized in the Freudian fort/da, is apt to embody an alternating and linear motion that also mimics his style of masturbation, whereas the girl's is apt to be circular, self-enveloping, and expressive of rapport with, rather than mastery over, the (m)other. Does this mean that the logic of mastery is in some sense inscribed in the boy's anatomy, or at least in his capacity for autoeroticism? If cultural reconstruction depends upon the reconstruction of language, must we alter the very gestures by which boys and girls enter language?

A. Well, it seems to me that in this passage I was talking about the gesture of the little boy [Hans, of Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*]. That gesture is not entirely linear because it comes here, goes there, comes into the bed and goes out of the bed. It's a bit more complicated than being simply linear. Did I myself talk of masturbation?

Q. You might have said “autoerotic.”

A. That's already better. It's not entirely the same thing. Autoerotic, yes, but that's not masturbation. To the extent that it's a gesture of mastery, it's not entirely similar. I think there are errors in the question, or in any case, errors in the relation between the [English] text and me. Also, in this text I oppose the triangular to the circular, especially the triangle of vowels. I pose the opposition of vowels, the phonetic difference between the little girl and the little boy, because I relate, I believe, the word of the little girl to the OUM, the sacred syllable of the Far East. What I want to say about this, and what seems to me interesting, is that when people set up oppositions in my work, they oversimplify it. Here you are prepared, I'd say, to oppose the anatomical to the cultural and to make a parallelism between the anatomical and the cultural. But of course it's not simply a question of anatomy; it's a question of the relation between two subjects. The relation of the little boy to his mother is different from the little girl's relation. The little boy, in order to situate himself vis-à-vis the mother, must have a strategy, perhaps a strategy of mastery, because he finds himself in an extremely difficult situation. He's a little boy. He has come out of a woman who's different from him. He himself will never be able to engender, to give birth. He is therefore in a space of unfathomable mystery. He must invent a strategy to keep himself from being submerged, engulfed. For the little girl it's entirely different. She's a little woman born of another woman. She is able to engender like her mother; thus, she has a sort of jubilation in being herself and in playing with herself. For the little boy, it's necessary to construct a world in order to construct himself. It's a very very different situation. It's not simply an anatomical
question; it's also a relational question. It's essential not to forget that the anatomical is always entangled in the relational.

Now, I'm not sure the little boy accedes to language only in that way. It was Freud who saw that one day and decided so. I think boys accede to language more according to a subject-object relation—and this is verified by every linguistic inquiry—and the girl more by means of a subject-subject relation. For example, the little girl says to her mother, "Mama, will you play with me?" In other words it's a little "I" that talks to a [feminine] "You" [une Tu] and proposes to do something together while leaving her mother the right to respond. The little boy says, "I want a little car" or "I want to play with a ball." He places much less emphasis on the "together" [ensemble] and especially on the two, and in general he doesn't ask for the opinion of the other. He doesn't use questioning like the little girl.

So, must one modify these gestures? No, I don't think so at all. I think—and this is rather like what I'm trying to do in the two recent books—that the genealogical relation is a vertical relation with a vertical transcendence. If we become capable of a horizontal relation between adult man and adult woman with a horizontal transcendence—that is, an irreducibility between "I-woman" [Je-femme] and "You-man" [Tu-homme]—then if a woman constitutes her feminine identity, she can help man exit from a simple or a difficult relation with his mother by means of a horizontal rapport between the man and the woman. In taking leave of the genealogical relation that has dominated our traditions and in trying to define a new relation of maturity, a horizontal relation between two genders involving the negative, involving irreducibility, involving difference. It's possible to advise the mother to speak differently to the girl and boy, because if the little girl says to her mother, "Mama, do you want to play with me?" or "Mama, can I comb your hair?" it's a little bit of her discourse flowing to her mother. An utterance going from mother to daughter might be, "Clean your room if you want to watch television" or "Bring back some milk on your way home from school." That is, she suppresses the dialogue; she suppresses the "doing together" [faire ensemble]. The little girl who enters language and receives this kind of response from her first partner—that's very serious. At the same time, when she goes to school she will have a masculine partner imposed on her obligatorily. Then when the little boy says, "I want a little car," the mother will say a sentence like, "Do you want me to come and give you a kiss in bed before you go to sleep?" That is, she poses many more questions to the little boy than to the little girl. The "Tu" which the little girl has given her, she gives to the little boy. One could teach the mother and teachers to pay more attention to the discourse of the little girl. I think the most destructive thing in our culture (mythology says the same thing, in Kora's [Proserpina's] abduction by the god of the underworld), is the loss of the little girl's questions, her discourse. Even more than that of the mother, the little girl's discourse is destroyed.
Q. You’re a practicing psychoanalyst and have written several papers on the
technique of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. To what extent can the analytic
encounter serve as a model for the sexuate reconstruction of language, such
as you’ve advocated—especially with reference to the relation between the
“I” and the “You”? Can the therapeutic encounter serve in other ways as a
model for collective, cultural transformation? Which aspects of clinical
technique seem most suggestive for this purpose?

A. I was practicing; I’m not at present. I’m not sure I understand the question.
I’d say that Freud in his analytical models talks little of sexual difference,
except in a biological way, not in a relational way. He talks a great deal about
genealogy and about castration. Otherwise, for him the model of the
successful couple is when the woman succeeds in becoming the mother of a
little boy and in this way succeeds in becoming her husband’s mother. There
aren’t really any couples in Freud. And much talk of castration. I myself
would say that castration seems a useless thing from the moment in which one
thinks in terms of two subjects, the limit of one subject sufficing to impose the
limit of the other subject. In this sense, difference—real and not merely
theoretical recognition, the real and not merely the theoretical drama of
sexual difference—would be for me the privileged means of conducting a
course of analysis. That is, at every moment to return difference to the patient,
reflecting back to the patient the difference in his or her life and above all in
creating the two.

I haven’t written that much on the technique of psychoanalysis. I’m not
sure I can respond well to this question, and I’m not sure I completely
understand it. I’m in the process of drafting a communication for an
intervention I’m going to make in Italy next week. For a time I proposed to
reconstruct society or the social community through encounters between
two. This was to escape from an abstract model of a disincarnate community,
a totalitarian community, and I’d say also to give me a grip on political life.
If I accept that there are others who are deciding in my place, if I accept those
instances of power where people decide in my place, then I’m completely
impotent; I can do nothing. Some years ago, out of discouragement, I decided
that I would begin again every moment of the day with the relation of two.
This didn’t go so badly—it’s interesting. Obviously, this two is always
potentially a sexuate two. It’s difficult to explain, but interesting, because
between man and woman there’s a negative, a type of irreducibility that
doesn’t exist between a woman and a woman. Let’s say between a man and
woman the negativity [la négativité] is, dare I say it, of an ontological,
irreducible type. Between a woman and another woman it’s of a much more
empirical type and, furthermore, can only be understood and can only live
in the ontological difference between man and woman. It’s complicated.

This is a little like a refrain that returns throughout my book, which is the
title of a chapter, Toi qui ne sera jamais moi ni mien [“You Who’ll Never Be
Me or Mine”]. If I say this to you [looking at Gaëtan Brulotte], it’s true. If I respect
reality, you’ll never be me or mine because we’re different and moreover because we’re each at a different intersection of nature/culture, or of nature/relationality, which is not the same thing. You have a different body, you are in a different relational world, you are a boy born of a woman and that implies on your part a whole world-construction different from mine, a different relational world, a different cultural world. Between us there is really a mystery. Yes, there’s an irreducible mystery between man and woman. It’s not at all the same kind of mystery that exists between woman and woman or between man and man. It’s not similar. I don’t know if this is easy to understand. But I think that it’s because I’m able to situate there the difference and the negative which I will never surmount—contrary to the Hegelian negative, for example—it’s because I situate it there that I’m able to respect the differences everywhere: differences between the other races, differences between the generations, and so on. Because I’ve placed a limit on my horizon, on my power. And I’m not able to put that limit anywhere but there, because it’s real. I’m not able to place it in the same way with another woman, where it’s much less real, because we [she and I] are not at the crossroads of nature and culture. This is factitious. If I put the limit there, I risk doing harm either to her/it [elle] or to myself. If I put it between us [Gaëtan Brulotte as a man and Luce Irigaray as a woman], I think that you won’t feel yourself to be injured when I say, “You who will never be me or mine.” That doesn’t harm you at all, unless if already at an imaginary level you’ve wanted to create your culture to the detriment of my own subjectivity. Then that can perhaps hurt you, but in fact it doesn’t hurt you at all. It’s a cultural error, I’d say. While if I put the limit there I risk harming the other.

I prepared a book in which I labored for a long time toward a recognition of this irreducible difference. I dedicated it to a man, an Italian politician with whom I continue to work. In a very intense public debate that we had, I don’t quite know how to say it, he recognized my position and I recognized his, and for perhaps one of the first times in my life I truly sensed that we were two. And that helped me, I’d say, in putting together a transcendental intuition and a lived experience. It allowed me to reformulate the issue in a different manner. And we work together, especially on the political level, trying always to remain two. Sometimes he has it that the difference not be a sexuate, man-woman difference, while I always try to return the difference to that. When we’ve made certain book presentations and political debates together in Italy, I find it extremely interesting to see the interest of those who come to hear us about what transpires between us. People are extremely attentive, as if there were a new horizon there and they want to come; they enjoy coming, especially the young. When I presented this book with him, to whom it’s dedicated, at the presentation where there were a lot of people, the young people came up later to get the book autographed. So I put a brief inscription and, as he was standing beside me, they presented the book to him saying, “you too.” [Laughs.] And he said, “But I don’t want to, I didn’t do anything”
because this is a man of great integrity, very honest—and I said to him there's nothing wrong with it. But what struck me was the desire of these people, especially the young ones, for a relation between a man and a woman that was a relation of reciprocal respect, of autonomy, and at the same time, yes, of reciprocal affection, so that something changes in the cultural relation, the political relation, and so on. It's really fascinating. It's a different historical configuration.

Feminists sometimes would like to talk in terms of a reversal of power. The men have had it; now we'll take power. I don't think this is the gesture that needs to be made. It's necessary to try to establish a relation of two. This is by far the most important: two, but different from that which already exists—that is, a completely new relation and without any horizontal submission and without any submission of one sex to the other. This calls for a fundamental rethinking of problems of sexual desire, because one is always left to deal with the level of sexual desire, as the greatest feminists understand. If they're homosexual then they no longer have that problem, or think they no longer have it; if they're not homosexual then they're a little schizophrenic because they're feminists on the social plane and on the personal plane they sometimes relapse into the worst stereotypes of heterosexuality. So I think that to change the mode of relationship between one and the other, between man and woman on the civil and affective plane, I think this is one of the most important gestures of our time.

Q. You sometimes use the language of pathology to talk about social and cultural predicaments as well as individual ones. What is the status of the therapeutic, of the idea of health and healing, in your work?
A. I've said that it's profoundly pathogenic for girls to find themselves always confronted with models and figures of masculine genealogy. I would say that what interests me more and more is happiness and that to be in good health can be an aid to happiness. But the relation to happiness beyond that to normality, in short, is complicated.

Q. You call for a new ethics of the couple, apparently referring to various kinds of couple—mother and daughter, sister and brother, for example, as well as the father/son and mother/son couples that still secure patriarchal genealogy. But you've said that in your view "man and woman is the most mysterious and creative couple." Does the project of creating "a culture of difference" and of critiquing what you've called "the hom(m)osexual imaginary" depend upon a ranking of sexualities such that lesbians and gay men are less mysterious and less creative than the man/woman couple? Legally, what relationship is there between women's rights and the rights of sexual minorities?
A. I think I responded to this question in part when I spoke about the negative, about the irreducibly other of the horizontal transcendence. It seems to me that the difference with other Others—for example, the difference with an Other of the same gender—that to me is not the same as the difference with someone who is of another gender. Note, it's essential not to confuse my critique of the Western hom(m)osexual imaginary, that is, of a world of the
masculine subject, that can think itself only between masculine subjects—hom(m)osexual with the “m” in parentheses—it’s essential not to confuse this critique, this ideological and cultural hom(m)osexualité with the practice of homosexuality. It’s not the same thing. Mine is an oeuvre that concerns the relation of sexual difference; it’s not necessary to demand that I create the work of others. I think today there’s a great risk of being intellectual capitalists and believing that one can talk about everything, about nothing, about everyone, regardless of one’s own experience. About the man-woman relation I have many other things to say. I think when people have looked at my new books a little they’re going to understand everything I’ve done as leading to them.

And I’m amused by the last part of this question where it says, “From a legal point of view, what’s the relationship between women’s rights and the rights of sexual minorities?” In France since 1980 homosexuals have rights and women no longer have them. That is, they are classified as men [hommes] with regard to their rights. They have rights only as a share of men’s rights. As women they have no genuine rights. In France at present more attention is paid to minorities than to that half of the world called women. In my opinion that’s because with the other minorities the patriarchy can remain that which condescends generously toward minorities, whereas in the horizontal man-woman relation there is no more patriarchy. We are two equal subjectivities, and inventing a new relationship is fundamentally the same as inventing a new socio-cultural order. I also think it’s important not to confuse sexual choice with sexual difference. For me sexual difference is a fundamental parameter of the socio-cultural order; sexual choice is secondary. Even if one chooses to remain among women, it’s necessary to resolve the problem of sexual difference. And likewise if one remains among men.

Q. By way of conclusion, we have a tradition of posing the following question: Are you aware of any misreadings or misunderstandings of your work that you’d like to address here?

A. There are certainly errors of translation; I’ve given you examples. There are errors of interpretation which are tied to something I’ve already indicated: the principal points of error derive from not being sufficiently attentive to my philosophical training, and especially to my relationship to ontology and to the negative. In the same vein, errors result from confusing a scientific with a philosophical discipline, which aren’t the same thing. Obviously, I represent a snare for the reader to the extent that I have various scientific trainings—linguistic, psychological, psychoanalytic, literary (my first studies were literary)—and at the same time, a philosophical training. So I make use of scientific techniques; sometimes I make an analysis of discourse using only a scientific technique. Fundamentally, what I recur to the most in interpretation is, I think finally, a certain philosophical level. So when I’m read simply as a psychoanalyst or as a linguist, there are some levels of thought, intention, and interpretation in my work that are already lost.
There is also another error. I think Simone de Beauvoir said that woman remains always within the dimension of immanence and that she's incapable of transcendence. But—by I don't know what mystery!—transcendence is something that interests me very much. Often the way in which I'm read and interpreted is too immanent, too much tied to contiguity, and the source and reference of my work is misunderstood. It's true that a woman who has a relationship to transcendence and to the transcendental in a real rather than a formal way is something all too rare. But I'd say there's been a little of that in my life.

Another error occurs when filiations are imputed to me that are not mine: for example, it's said that I'm a daughter of Simone de Beauvoir and that I haven't acknowledged enough the source of my thinking in relation to her. But that's because I'm not a daughter of Simone de Beauvoir. I don't know her work well. I read her novels when I was an adolescent. Two years ago I tried, for the sake of my students, to take another look at *The Second Sex*; in fact, I read it in 1952 and read only the Introduction and a little of the first chapter, but this is not at all the source of my work. And I've even commented recently about the time when *Speculum* came out and I sent it to Simone de Beauvoir, and I was very disappointed when she didn't respond to me—very disappointed, especially because I had much trouble on account of *Speculum*. I was excluded from the university, and afterward in France I couldn't get a teaching appointment. I still don't have one. So I'm not a daughter of Simone de Beauvoir; I think my theoretical filiation, as I've always said (it's in all my books), is much more to the tradition of Western philosophy. Now, I'm not saying that Simone de Beauvoir isn't part of that tradition, but hers isn't an oeuvre that I know well nor to which I myself especially refer. It's possible that I've been influenced by her work by means of the ideological climate, but I'm not someone who lives very much in that world. Once again, the question of the Other as she treats it, and the question of the Other as I treat it, as I was just saying, are radically different. She refuses to be Other and I demand to be radically Other in order to exit from a horizon. I think they even say I'm a disciple of Rousseau. I don't know Rousseau's oeuvre well. It's true that when Rousseau's work is explained to me there are certain things that are somewhat similar, but if I'd read much Rousseau I would have said so. I know well the philosophers of whom I speak. Look at my work and you'll see.

Notes

1In keeping with her express and emphatic preference, Luce Irigaray is referred to throughout this text using not only her surname (which is, of course, sexually neutral) but also her given name (which is sexually marked as feminine).

2The questions we framed for Luce Irigaray concerned three major aspects of her published work: the specificity of her own practice as a writer; her relationship to psychoanalytic theory
and practice; and her relationship to the traditions of Western philosophy. Unfortunately, time constraints compelled her to skip past precisely those questions that addressed the aspect of her work which she here describes as most crucial, her status and practice as a philosopher.

Luce Irigaray's writings on psychoanalytic technique include "Gesture in Psychoanalysis" (in Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis), "The Limits of the Transference" (in The Irigaray Reader), "Le Praticable de la Scène," and "L’énoncé en analyse" (both in Parler n’est jamais neutre).

"J'aime à toi" has a chapter called "Toi qui ne sera jamais mien."

Gaétan Brulotte served as translator during the interview in Paris and also transcribed the French version of the interview. Elizabeth Hirsh translated the French text into English. "J'aime à toi" is dedicated to Renzo Imbeni.

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Winterowd Award Winners Announced

The annual W. Ross Winterowd Award for the most outstanding book on composition theory published in 1995 was awarded to Xin Liu Gale for Teachers, Discourses, and Authority in the Postmodern Composition Classroom.

The 1994 W. Ross Winterowd Award was awarded to Jasper Neel for Aristotle’s Voice: Rhetoric, Theory, and Writing in America.

This annual award was generously endowed by Professor Winterowd. The selection committee was chaired by Julie Drew. Professor Winterowd presented the 1995 awards during the Association of Teachers of Advanced Composition meeting at the CCCC Convention in Milwaukee.

Send nominations for the 1996 W. Ross Winterowd Award to Thomas Kent, editor; JAC; Department of English; Iowa State University; Ames, IA 50011.