innovation. Finally, it is surprising, given his self-conscious and insightful descriptions of his own scholarly process, that Bazerman says so little about composition and rhetoric as a knowledge-making discipline. His theories and analytical techniques beg to be applied to our own discourse.

It strikes me that the book’s structure—broad theoretical statements setting the parameters of a project, framing a group of essentially discrete essays that test out the theory as a conceptual tool—is characteristic of recent single-authored books now beginning to appear in composition (this is precisely the organization of my own Composition as a Human Science). Perhaps this structure reflects rhetorically the stage our scholarship has now reached, where individual researchers introduce powerful concepts and comprehensive frameworks as agendas for future research that no single scholar could fulfill. These proposals depend on a research community to elaborate, instantiate, and test their fruitfulness. Such initiatives create the demand for exactly the historical process of genre creation and community formation that Bazerman describes for science.

In this light it is not surprising that the most weakly articulated rhetorical element in this work is Bazerman’s own sense of his audience. I suspect (as a fellow writer) that he is writing in the hope, rather than the knowledge or even faith, of a scholarly audience broader than a small circle of specialists in technical communication or the few scientists who take an active interest in rhetorical studies. Bazerman’s leadership in the CCC Research Network suggests that he is silent on audience because he realizes we have yet to solve the problem of constructing written genres that will shape and be shaped by domains of shared practical activity comparable to experimentation in science. He cannot count on, or even envisage at present, a research community forming a receptive audience for his and other multidisciplinary scholarship in composition. Bazerman’s book, however, speaks to our shared dilemma by showing how another community learned to make (and to fight over) broadly intelligible meanings: “research communication requires practical social understanding of cooperative endeavor, aggressive assertion, and agonistic competition” (296). For this, Bazerman’s book deserves to have fellow scholars engage his ideas in a sustained dialogue that will constructively criticize, supplement, appropriate, and build on his work.

The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston: Bedford, 1990, 1282 pages).

Reviewed by Virginia Allen, Iowa State University

It used to be assumed that when a work of literature achieved canonization, it had by definition withstood the test of time, as if somehow time were the agent while the producers of canonical texts were mere instruments. But
in English studies of late, *canonization* has become a pejorative term, synonymous with cultural hegemony and rife with suspicions of an elitist conspiracy against the innovative, the feminine, and the nonwhite. To set out deliberately to produce a text demarcating a canon, as Bizzell and Herzberg have done, is a bold undertaking; whether it is a noble one will be variously argued.

With the sounds of the canonical wars of literature reverberating from the curriculum committee meeting across the hall, now is a good time to observe the making of a canon in progress and to challenge assumptions upon which the canon is based. The editors acknowledge "the provisional quality of the tradition," and in the most admirable rhetorical spirit, they reveal an expectation that the canon they have proposed will be open to negotiation.

The text is divided chronologically into five parts: Classical, Medieval, Renaissance, Enlightenment (including a disappointing fifty pages on "The Rhetoric of Composition"), and Twentieth-Century Rhetoric. The good news is that the complete texts of the *Gorgias* (W.R.M. Lamb translation) and the *Phaedrus* (F.N. Fowler translation) are included. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (Rhys Roberts translation) is represented by chapters one through three of Book I and chapters one through twenty-four of Book II. (The editors warn that the selections in the anthology are *not* to be taken as scholarly editions, and they provide brief bibliographic information on available editions following each selection.) Chief among the surprises is the absence of Longinus' "On the Sublime." Vico is included, but not Descartes. The associationists are not represented, except for Bain, who is mistakenly called a faculty psychologist (13). The longest of the five parts is Twentieth-Century Rhetoric, including along with the expected Richards, Burke, Weaver, Perelman, and Toulmin, names more commonly associated with literary criticism: Bakhtin, Foucault, Derrida, and Kristeva. And questioning "the limits of rhetoric," they include work by Gates and Cixous that one would expect to find in a linguistics or philosophy of language anthology.

One assumption the editors make is that a single, loosely historical course covering two and a half millennia is adequate preparation for our students. Obviously it isn't, but complaining about omissions in a 1282-page text is uncharitable, especially since the Chapman/Tate survey of thirty-eight doctoral programs in rhetoric and composition reveals that a single survey course is the most common approach. That being the case, one can reasonably expect the Bizzell and Herzberg text to sweep the market, replacing photocopies of excerpts from primary texts and the generally unworkable alternative of library reserve.

Given the cost of the book ($47.50 hardcover), that may be good news for the editors, but most instructors will undoubtedly shy away from requiring the purchase of supplementary texts. Yet, the temptation to continue using George Kennedy's *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*...
from Ancient to Modern Times will be strong, for two reasons. First, Kennedy is the voice of authority (the canonical instrument, if you will) for the first generation of “bootstrappers,” composition and rhetoric “specialists” coming out of English departments with backgrounds in literature or less often linguistics, self-trained or semi-trained, full of vinegar and eager to take on the establishment.

Undertaking to edit a canonical text presupposes authority, not only in naming the essential texts, but in commenting on them. And therein lies the second reason for continuing to use Kennedy: a certain distrust of the authority of Bizzell and Herzberg’s introductory material. The introductory material too often presupposes the historical background and theoretical grounding that the course for which the text will be chosen is expected to provide. Part of my uneasiness may be traceable to their stated preference for works which are “epistemic and ideological,” and part of it has to do with sentences like “Plato concerns himself with discursive pathways around the tragedy of knowledge, from the probable to the absolute” (24). If pressed, Bizzell or Herzberg might explain what that means. However, this is not just a passing sentence. It is the topic sentence about Plato addressed to students who may very well be encountering him for the first time. My own preference would be that the introductory material err in the direction of blandness, even frigidity, rather than wander into the grandiosity or unintelligibility that has recently beset lit-crit jargon. Although some of the introductory material is really quite good, Bizzell and Herzberg’s bootstraps are frequently visible, as when they say Aristotle was “ineligible” to replace Plato as leader of the Academy, or when they say Fred Newton Scott made use of “behavioral psychology” (144, 665).

Occasionally, what I take as a misreading may be only a question of emphasis or an arguable position that I am unfamiliar with because of my own jerry-rigged background, but there is one piece of misinformation—that Alexander Bain was a faculty psychologist (13)—that has some important repercussions for how they read the whole of nineteenth-century rhetoric, the most disappointing sub-section of the entire text for this reader. Although they state that faculty psychology extended well into the nineteenth century, that isn’t really true. Herbart had pointed out the circularity of the mental-faculty hypothesis (we remember because we have a faculty of memory, and so on) in 1816. Bain wasn’t born until 1818. The vocabulary was still around in a loose descriptive sense and then became hopelessly entangled in the faculties of the phrenologists before becoming shibboleths, avoided by every serious student of psychology. Bain is more properly called an associationist, and he lived long enough to see his psychology both disparaged and replaced, not by Freudianism, as Bizzell and Herzberg would have us believe, but by Wundt and the Wurzburg introspectionists and then the functionalism of William James and John Dewey, the dominant theoretical influence on Scott. The clue that Scott was still operating in the pre-
behavioral paradigm is his continued use of the language of Lamarckian evolution in the 1922 essay "English Composition as a Mode of Behavior" cited by Bizzell and Herzberg.

It is a matter of some importance that although Bain used the term *faculties*, he was not a faculty psychologist, and that although Scott used the term *behavior*, he was not a behaviorist. Now, I for one would be fascinated to read an essay arguing that Freudian ideology first became a force in composition and rhetoric at the turn of the century, but the proof has to be worked out in detail, then presented in a journal article where it can be quarrelled with, before it can be asserted authoritatively in a canonical text. As a self-confessed bootstrapper in a discipline that is only now beginning to define its parameters, I urgently need to be able to rely on the authoritative-ness of the information I put in front of my students. Regrettably, an error of this sort becomes a question of trust.

Despite these quibbles, however, let me be clear in saying that Bizzell and Herzberg have undertaken and carried through an enormous job for which they need to be heartily congratulated and thanked. Somebody needed to do it. Modifications and corrections are called for, but if I may quote Louise Smith's cover comment, "The profession needs this anthology."


Reviewed by C.H. Knoblauch, SUNY at Albany

Susan Miller has orchestrated a rich interplay of themes from discourses that needed, sooner or later, to come together if the field of composition—alive as it may be with ideological counterpoint—was not to die regardless from intellectual boredom. Against the backdrop of Walter Ong's theories of oral and literate culture, Miller's argument brings poststructuralist literary theory—its ideas of absence, the death of the author, and the primacy of text—to the service of composition studies, with its concern for writers and the practices of writing, by proposing a "textual rhetoric" that can more adequately theorize "writing" as well as "the writer" in light of the concrete social and technological circumstances of modern intertextuality. Along the way, she critiques traditional intellectual history for its spiritualized renderings of "mind" and "idea," its myths of continuity, and its phony conversations among "great men," while espousing the methods of a materialist historicism. And she conveys in her own practice a tantalizing sample, if not the full panoply, of local detail (the frailness of Isocrates, which made him too weak